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Abstract 
This thesis investigates various aspects of e/migration. Its focus is on examining the 
motivation behind individuals’ decision to migrate, the impact of migration on the host 
countries’ economies, and finally the impact of high skilled emigration on the human capital 
level in origin countries. In our analyses, wherever possible, we attempt to distinguish among 
origin countries in terms of OECD and non-OECD origins, EU and non-EU origins, the skill 
level of e/migrants as well as the level of well-being of the origin countries. 
To begin with, Chapter 1 investigates whether ICT facilitates migration flows from OECD to 
OECD countries, as well as non-OECD to OECD countries based on the magnitude of the 
flows, examining those with a thresholds 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 flows that are more than an equal to 
100, 300 and 500 people, respectively. Our non-linear instrumental approach to broadband 
penetration rates find a positive and strong effect on migration flows. This effect appears to be 
even stronger for non-OECD to OECD flows in comparison to OECD to OECD flows. The 
results improve above the larger (that is 0.5) constraint. 
Chapter 2 concludes that the results for the UK showed that migration has a positive and 
significant effect on the productivity of industries in the long run, particularly those who are 
highly educated non-EU migrants. For Spain, the effect of migration on the productivity of 
firms both in the short run and long run seems to be positive in most cases. As to the 
Netherlands, the effect of migration on productivity in the short run is positive and significant 
for EU migrants only. Due, mainly, to limited observations, the results for Germany do not 
show any significant changes in productivity with migration, although the direction of change 
is positive. Various findings are presented in order to distinguish between EU and non-EU 
origins as well as the skill level of migrants. 
 
 
Chapter 3 contributes an insightful panel data analysis of human capital and high skilled 
emigration for 74 origin countries from 1980 to 2000 with a five-year frequency. In contrast 
to Beine et al.’s (2011) first panel data analysis of the same dataset, we find a significant 
negative brain drain impact of high skilled emigration across countries sampled. This is due, 
mainly, to the fact that the origin countries sampled and the additional control variables used 
in our analysis.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter-1 investigates whether ICT facilitates migration flows from OECD to OECD 
(hereafter OtO) countries, as well as from non-OECD to OECD (hereafter non-OtO) 
countries. Within ICT tools, we primarily focused on broadband. The main host countries 
here are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The 
selection of both OECD and non-OECD origin countries are based on the magnitude of the 
flows, examining those with a minimum number of 100 people (threshold 0.1) who are 
migrating from source to host, followed by 300 (threshold 0.3) and 500 (threshold 0.5) 
people. We do not consider migration flows of less than 100 people   The main reason why 
we focused on threshholds such as the number of people  that are less than or equal to 100,  
300 and 500 is the fact that there are too many missing variables where there are less than a 
100 people migration from origin to host (OECD, migration database). For example,  the 
flows data from Turkey (TR)  to Slovakia (SK) is missing from 1995 to 2002. From Norway 
(NO) to Belgium (BE) the data available only after 2007, or to Slovakia and Slovenia  only 
after 2003 and 2007, respectively. Thus, we had to focus on the flows where we can gain the 
most data in terms of time. In Chapter 1, we explore the role of ICT connections as a potential 
determinant of a person’s decision to migrate while controlling for a number of economic 
variables. Since the data captures both time series and cross-sectional components, panel data 
analysis will be progressed. By looking at the efficacy of ICT connections, we intend to fill 
the gap in the literature on the relationship between communication facilities and migration 
decisions. 
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We find strong and positive effect of broadband on migration flows between 1995 and 2009. 
This supports the fact that ICT connections between origin and host affect migration flows 
from origin to host country by improving the flow of information about the host which affects 
migration decisions from the origin. 
This effect is more prominent for non-OECD to OECD country pairs. Results improve for 
larger thresholds. This is due to the fact that we believe higher frequency of moving - 
although capturing fewer country pairs - will produce more accurate results.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the productivity effects of migration in four European Union (EU) 
countries: the UK, Spain and the Netherlands for 1995-2008 and Germany for 2002-2008. 
This analysis was carried out using EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) and EU-KLEMS data. 
In Chapter 2, the large range of productivity variables provided by the EU KLEMS database 
is combined with the EU LFS, so that detailed information on the share of migrants in each 
industry is calculated.  
The productivity implications of migration are more likely to be seen in the long run than in 
the short-run. Using a Cobb Douglas production function, we provide both the short-run and 
long-run effects of migration across industries for the four EU countries. While doing so, we 
desegregate migrants into high, medium and low skill groups as described by the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) (5-6), ISCED (3-4), ISCED (1-2) codes within 
the EU LFS database. This allows us to pay attention to the different effects of migration by 
different skill groups.  
In order to investigate the long-run impact of migration on firm productivity, we apply the 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) variant for the autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) estimator. 
The PMG estimator constrains the long-run coefficients to be identical across firms but allows 
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short-run coefficients and error variances to vary across units. The PMG estimator has been 
shown to deliver consistent results if the lag order is specified correctly (Pesaran et al., 2012). 
We use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the optimal lag length.  
According to our results, high and low skilled EU and non-EU migrants contribute to 
productivity significantly while medium skilled migrants affect productivity negatively and 
significantly in the UK.  For Spain, we observed significant contribution of non-EU migrants 
but negative effect of EU migrants. We also find that low skilled migrants always affect the 
productivity positively without distinction of EU and non-EU origins. We find that only the 
Netherlands experienced increase in productivity in the short run. Apart from low and 
medium skilled EU immigrants, we observed positive and significant productivity effect of 
migration. Due to limited data, we fail to observe any significant link between migration share 
and productivity in Germany both in the short run and long run, although we observed 
positive effect at all times. However, we believe that if we have had more data available for 
Germany, we would have found significant link between migration share and productivity, 
due particularly to the long history of migration in Germany. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of high skilled emigration on human capital in 74 origin 
countries. To do this, we use a panel of data constructed by the World Bank Development 
Research Group, and collected by Cécily Defoort (Beine et al., 2011). In this dataset, most 
data for migration stocks and their educational attainments are based on six major OECD 
countries acting as host countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA. 
The data is available from 1975 to 2000 with a 5-year frequency.  
We apply the econvergenc  empirical model and set the difference between log of human 
capital in year t  (ex-post emigration) and 5t  (ex-ante emigration) as the dependent 
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variable. We regress the dependent variable on the log of ex-ante human capital, the log of the 
high skilled emigration rate at the beginning of the period (i.e. at time 5t ) and an interaction 
variable for possible non-linearity in the relationship between emigration rate and human 
capital. In order to control for this possible non-linearity that is based on the well-being of the 
origin countries, such that an interaction variable is measured as 55 loglog  tt GDPpcxp  
where plog  is the log of high skilled emigration rate and the log of GDPpclog  is GDP per 
capita. We carry out our estimations with sub-sample of origin countries. Such that, we set 
two dummies - 15D  and 10D - that are equal to 1 if an origin country’s GDP per capita is less 
than 15% and 10% lower than the average GDP per capita of the G7 countries, (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA). In doing this, we are able to distinguish two 
country groups with two different GDP per capita frontiers. We expect to find robust results 
based on these two specifications, although perhaps better results may be expected for 
countries with 10D  as the deviation of GDP per capita across countries will be smoother in 
comparison to the countries with 15D .  
Additionally, we control the dependent variable by a variable remittance at time 5t , because 
this eases the constraints on human capital investment for individuals in the origin and for 
potential return migrants. We also consider that public expenditure on education may have a 
direct effect on the human capital level of a country. Thus, we use it as a control variable.  As 
a proxy for the cost of acquiring education, we use population density at time 5t , and we 
also include population density in our model.  Finally, we have regional dummies for sub-
Saharan and Latin American countries. 
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The selection of origin countries is mostly based on the availability of data. We attempt to 
include as many origin countries as possible and end up with 74 origin countries from 1980 to 
2000 with a 5-year frequency.  
We apply OLS, IV-fixed effects and IV-first difference on the econvergenc  model. Our 
findings for countries with 15D  and 10D  specification are not so different in terms of the 
signs of the coefficients, but the significance improves much more for sub-sample of 
countries with 10D . In general, we find a divergence in natives’ human capital among the 
origin countries sampled. We observe a negative brain drain effect, suggesting that there is a 
loss of skilled population in origin countries rather than a brain gain ex-post emigration. This 
could be explained by the fact that high skilled emigrants do not come back to origin 
countries with additional skills acquired in the host countries. Nor do individuals left behind 
in origin countries become more skilled, or, assuming they do, they also choose to emigrate 
rather than stay and level off the skill level difference after emigration. A negative and 
significant result for the interaction variables of high skilled emigrants with 15D  and 10D
suggests a weak incentive effect in origin countries. In fact, this effect is stronger for sub-
sample of countries with 10D . As expected, remittance and public expenditure are found to be 
positively related with the change in human capital level. Population density is also found to 
be positive and significant, suggesting that the higher the population density (less cost of 
acquiring education), the larger the increase in the human capital level. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Does ICT Facilitate Immigration Flows?  
A non-Non-linear Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The history of migration encompasses a large period of time affecting different countries at 
different levels, from different perspectives and in different time periods. A massive influx of 
migration occurred from all over Europe to the USA in the 1600s, and this pattern reached a 
peak between 1820 and 1920. After World War II there was a substantial wave of 
immigration across the world. In recent years, the rate of international migration has increased 
noticeably. Currently 232 million individuals, who represent approximately 3.6 per cent of the 
world population, are living outside their country of origin. According to the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) Report (2013), the growth in the number of immigrants 
between 2000 and 2010 was double in comparison to the previous decade.  This figure is 
slightly higher in Europe compared to the USA.  
Evidently, the USA has received the largest influx of migrants, specifically from Europe, 
since the 1600s, and is currently hosting 44,183,643 migrants (which represent approximately 
14.3 per cent of the USA population) (US Census, 2010). Nevertheless, persons within 
Europe have had more intention to stay within Europe than move to the USA for the last 
couple of decades. Due to the onset of the recession, the European countries paved the way 
for new inflows after the first oil crisis in the 1970s, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
situation settled owing to the fact that the fall of the Iron Curtain enabled persons to travel 
within Europe with fewer or no restrictions (Beets and Willekens, 2009). 
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With such a significant number of individuals choosing to live outside their country of origin 
our attention is drawn to the reasons behind individuals’ decision to migrate. In this regard, 
we intend to investigate flows from OECD to OECD (hereafter OtO) countries, as well as 
non-OECD to OECD (hereafter non-OtO) countries. The main host countries here are Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK, and the selection of 
the host countries are based on the availability of the data. The selection of both OECD and 
non-OECD origin countries are based on the magnitude of the flows, examining those with a 
minimum number of 100 people who are migration from origin to host, followed by 300 and 
500 people. Country pairs based on these three thresholds are listed in Tables 1.11 to 1.16 in 
Appendix A.  
Throughout the literature, multiple economic, political and social aspects have been pointed 
out as reasons behind individuals’ decision to migrate, chiefly, wages, employment and 
unemployment rates, inequality, GDP per capita/GDP level, population/population density, 
trade, immigration law, and education attainments. We find it surprising that ICT facilities 
between origin and host have not been considered as a determinant, especially considering 
how this plays a crucial role in the life of a person who is away from their home country in 
terms of information exchange, etc. Also and more importantly, we believe that ICT 
connections affect migration flows from origin to host country by improving the flow of 
information about the host which affects migration decisions from the origin. 
In this chapter, we look at the role of ICT connections as a potential determinant of migration 
as well as a number of economic aspects as reasons behind a person’s decision to migrate. In 
order to do this, we will use the number of  people aged 15-64 from the origin to receiving 
country, obtained from the OECD; controlled for employment rate in the host country and 
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unemployment rate in the origin country (EUROSTAT); real gross domestic product per 
capita (GDP); broadband, cable TV and voice telephony subscription penetration rate 
(International Telecommunication Union, ITU); average wage across industries (OECD- 
Occupational wages around the world (OWW)) in the host; and the distance between origin 
and host country; (CEPII, Mayer and Zignago, 2011). A dummy variable to capture 
institutional features, FREE, is equal to 1 if there is no legal restriction on 
travelling/staying/working from the origin to host country (EUROSTAT, EEA). Since the 
data captures both time series and cross-sectional components, a panel data analysis will be 
progressed. By including ICT connections, we intend to fill the gap on the relation between 
communication facilities and migration decisions, and we expect to find a significant effect of 
communication facilities on a person’s decision to migrate for OtO and non-OtO flows 
between 1995 and 2009.  
This chapter examines reasons behind individuals’ decision to migrate. Section 1.2 represents 
a literature review. Section 1.3 presents the data analysis and estimated model. Section 1.4 
discusses endogenous variables, non-linear instrumental variables, validity of instruments, 
some robustness checks and analysis result. Finally, Section 1.5 presents the conclusion.  
Appendix A presents the country pairs for 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds.  Appendix B provides 
empirical results with additional methods. Appendix C provides descriptive statistics for 
actual and predicted broadband , Appendix D illustrates the curves for the actual and 
predicted broadband penetration rates. Appendix E presents the results for the validity of 
instruments. Finally, Appendix F provides some additional robustness checks.    
1.2 Literature Review 
From prehistoric to modern times, human beings have always been on the move. This means 
that the history of migration coincides with the history of humanity. By and large it may be 
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seen that individuals move to better and safer places, but what is a better and safer place? Are 
these criteria sufficient to encompass the reasons behind individuals’ decisions to migrate? 
Before investigating the reasons behind individuals’ decision to migrate, it is beneficial to 
explain what it is to be a migrant and what migration is. Any occupant who was born in a 
foreign country can be defined as an immigrant (Rowthorn, 2008; Gonzáles and Ortega, 
2008). A more comprehensive description given by Gott and Johnson (2002) is that an 
immigrant is a person who was born abroad or who is an offspring that is not older than 16 
with at least one foreign-born parent. Apart from these studies, there are many different 
opinions for classifying immigrants. When it comes to immigration, it is rather an event than 
a person(s). In the literature, migration is generally defined as a replacement of location. In 
these terms, a person who leaves their country of origin between the ages of 15 and 74 
without any distinction of gender, marital status or occupational status is referred to as an 
immigrant.  
Lewis (1954) pointed out that a necessary condition for an individual to migrate is the 
availability of sufficient earnings in the host country. However, the important question to ask 
in this context is how an individual decides where to go for the purpose of working. In Lewis’ 
(1954) neoclassical approach it is assumed that the modern sector attracts those who are in the 
traditional agricultural sectors until wages in the two sectors are equalised (Zanker-Hagen, 
2008). Todaro (1969) and Todaro and Harris (1970) enhanced this approach by paying 
attention to the urban labour market which attracts rural workers in less developed countries. 
Their papers questioned whether an unskilled rural worker can find a standard urban job with 
a better salary as a process of labour transfer from rural to urban environments. A change 
from low skill jobs to high skill jobs is expected and it is shown that although it is possible 
not to get a job upon arrival in the city, an individual tends to migrate due to an expectation of 
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better income. More generally, the direction of movement is from low earning to high earning 
countries (Massey et al., 1994). 
Moreover, Lee (1966) proposed a ‘push and pull’ migration theory under the supply and 
demand side of the migration framework. He pointed out that there are factors that hold 
individuals in the home country or impel them to move from their home country. He 
essentially grouped the factors that may trigger migration by taking individuals’ 
characteristics into account. This approach suggests that individuals tend to move to places 
where they believe they will gain maximum benefit. In order to predict where this greatest 
benefit may be gained, all positive, negative and neutral factors as well as obstacles, such as 
migration laws, and personal factors are taken into consideration. Thus, Lee’s push and pull 
theory puts together almost all possible components of the migration process rather than 
looking at the more specific causal mechanisms. 
Sjaastad (1962) was the first to model migration under Human Capital Theory. The theory 
depends upon the maximum benefit to the individual’s self-improvement that is to be gained 
by staying or moving. Considering the skill they have, individuals calculate the net present 
value of the returns by staying home and the expected net present value of the returns in the 
host, and choose to migrate if the latter is relatively greater. Chiswick (1999) claimed that the 
relative wage difference between the host and origin countries to both direct and indirect 
migration cost (i.e. 
indirectdirect
ji
CC
WW


) determines the approximate rate of return from migration, 
and the greater this rate, the more probability the person will migrate. According to this 
theory, the more educated and/or the younger the individual, the more likely they are to 
migrate; as well as the longer the distance, the greater the risk that needs to be taken, and the 
less likely they are to migrate; in other words, a higher cost of migration leads to less 
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migration. However, the theory only applies for individual perspectives on immigration rather 
than general aspects of migration.   
An increased demand on the labour market in developed countries attracts those who are in 
need of a job or better earnings, even for a temporary period. This would be described as 
complementary changes in the labour markets within different countries in which the purpose 
of both the employers’ need for labour and the employees’ need for a good job will be served. 
The approach known as The Dual Labour Market Theory is a result of such changes in the 
labour market (Piore, 1972; Piore, 1979; Harrison and Sum, 1979). For instance, a massive 
labour demand in Germany in the 1960s opened its doors to Italian, Portuguese, Greek and 
mostly Turkish migrants until the demand met its capacity later in the 1970s. Demand in the 
labour market arises as natives refuse to do less skilled and/or unimportant jobs in the host 
country (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). Thus, migrants here play a complementary role and 
consequently do not pose a threat to natives. 
Another popular approach is the Network Migration Model. People with the same cultural, 
religious and/or linguistic background are more compatible with each other and Network 
Migration theory relies upon these factors. A person who decides to migrate to a certain 
country is more likely to follow a previous migrant that they know (Massey, 1990). Epstein 
(2008) emphasised the importance of network as an essential component of the utility 
function of a new immigrant in the host country and claimed that the greater the network size 
(i.e. of individuals who have previous migration experience from the same origin as the new 
arrivals) the more probable migration is to occur. If one questions why capital cities are more 
diverse than other cities in the host, networks could be an explanation. Individuals tend to 
move to capitals as a starting point as they are considered to be a less unknown location. The 
cycle starts by attracting other immigrants and eventually capitals become the centre of the 
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host country for immigrants. The main assumption of this theory is that the stronger the 
network of an individual, the higher their tendency to migrate. Thus, networking is assumed 
to be positively related to migration.  
Furthermore, Greenwood (1975) surveyed the literature until the 1970s, and showed that 
certain aspects were considered by individuals before making a decision to migrate, such as 
distance, earnings of immigrants, networking, cost of migration, and characteristics of an 
immigrant. Greenwood (1985) conducted another survey to cover the period until the 1980s, 
and found that, in addition to the factors listed in his first survey, labour market conditions, 
taxation conditions and environmental features in the host country, personal job skill, and 
personal circumstances such as education, age, gender, marital status, are essential 
determinants of migration. On the sociological side, ‘networks’ are quite intensive features in 
decisions on where to move as they reduce the risk (Haug, 2008).  
Migration is an issue of self-selection. In this regard, the majority of labour economists follow 
Roy’s (1951) self-selection model, which is based on the assumption that individuals’ 
decisions on participating in job markets depends upon the ability that they have, the 
technology that is to be applied and the correlation amongst these skills in a community, 
where there are only two occupations available. Although Roy’s model captures a simple 
case, it provides a basis for decision-making problems such as job, location and education. 
Borjas (1987), for instance, launched the first extension to Roy’s model to point out how 
earnings of immigrants across multiple skill groups are important in terms of deciding 
whether to move from or stay in the origin country. The basis of the theory lies in: 
iiiw  ln   (1.1) 
jjjw  ln  (1.2) 
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where; 
ji ww ,  are wages in the origin and host countries; ji  , are observable socioeconomic 
variables in the origin and host countries, and 
ji  , are characteristics of immigrants which are 
unobservable and normally distributed with a zero mean and 
22
, ji  standard errors 
respectively. According to this theory, migration occurs if: 
0)()( 0  ijjI   (1.3) 
where  is the time equivalent measure of the cost of migration. In other words, migration 
occurs if the value of logged wages in the host outweighs the logged value of wages in the 
origin country plus migration cost.  
The earnings of individuals are decisive in the decision-making process, and are perhaps the 
most fundamental determinant. However, it would be too easy to assume that there is only 
one factor that influences individuals’ decision to migrate. Therefore, Borjas (1989) modified 
his previous theory and presented a more comprehensive approach by taking individuals’ skill 
into account as follows: 
iii Xw  log   (1.4) 
jjj Xw  log   (1.5) 
where, 
ji ww , are wages in the origin and host countries respectively, ji XX  ,  indicate the 
expected earnings of an individual determined by the observable vector of skill of immigrant 
( X ) and 
ji  ,  are unobservable variables that are normally distributed with a zero mean and 
22 , ji  variance respectively. Hence, immigration occurs if: 
0)(])([  ijijXI   (1.6) 
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Thus, according to Borjas (1989), the decision to migrate depends upon expected earnings 
that are relative to the skill that an immigrant has and the relative cost of migration (e.g. travel 
costs, relocation in the host country, foregone salary in the home country, sufficient amount of 
money to survive in the host country until having a job). 
Clark (2002, 2007), however, modified Borjas(1987, 1989) theory by expanding the meaning 
of migration cost; that is, based on an individual k with skill s they decide to migrate if: 
0))()(()]()([ 21  kkkikj sqcczswswI   (1.7) 
where, for an individual ks , kz is individual-specific costs based on  expected income from 
the host country; 1c is the direct cost , as defined above, considered as the necessary amount 
of money used before securing a job in the host country after arrival; )( ks is the skill-
related cost (in here  is a benchmark skill level in the host, and  is the skill selectivity of 
immigration policy), relative to the average skill level in the host country, and finally )(2 qc  is 
quota-related costs based on the status of a migrant under the quota. The term quota was first 
used as a migration policy term in America in order to avoid mass migration from all around 
the world. By dividing immigration costs into four sections, Clark et al., (2002, 2007) 
provided an insightful approach to Borjas’(1987, 1989) theory as well as shedding light on 
political restriction as a migration cost. 
Following this, Mayda (2008) argued that political restrictions are essential factors that must 
be included in migration theories. That is, although the host country may potentially meet 
most of the expectations of those immigrants, the immigration policy itself should be 
considered as an essential deterrent factor, as initial entrance to this country - work permission 
- being able to work for intended hours - being able to claim some benefit while working at 
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the same time - being exempt from taxation are designated by immigration policy. Thus it 
may be claimed that decision-making on migration depends fundamentally on the 
combination of the net benefit to an individual, political restriction and characteristics of 
immigrants. In fact, the characteristics of immigrants - in regard to how much risk they are 
willing to take - have more impact on the decision-making process than first appears. 
According to Arcand and Mbaye (2013), for instance, those who migrate illegally do not seem 
to consider net benefit of migration or policy restrictions before they migrate: they only 
appear to be willing to escape from the home country without considering what the 
consequences will be.  
Niedercorn and Bechdolt (1969) looked at the gravity model using the framework of utility 
theory. Variables included in this theory are the population of the host country, the finite 
number of journeys planned, the period of time that will be spent in the host, and the sum of 
money that will be needed for this journey from a single origin country to multiple host 
countries.  
The most general form of the gravity model was given by Vanderkaup (1977). The level of 
immigration flows depends upon the relative population in the origin and host countries and 
the distance between those countries (i.e. 
c
ij
b
ji
ij
D
PP
Flows

  where ijFlows  indicates the flow 
rate from i to j  , 
b
j
a
i PandP indicates the population of the origin and host countries 
respectively, 
c
ijD  indicates the distance between the origin and host countries; a and b are to 
be estimated, c is the distance elasticity).  
Rodrigue et al. (2009), however, approached the gravity model of migration, which is 
described as a physical science (also known as Newton’s law), and explained that if the 
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importance of one location increases across any two locations, there will also be an increase 
in movement between those two locations. Here, the importance of the location is measured 
by population, GDP level, employment, unemployment, poverty or other appropriate variables, 
and the model is set up as:
c
ij
b
j
a
i
ij
D
PP
kFlows  ,where 
b
j
a
i PandP indicates the importance of the 
origin and the host country, and k is related to the temporal rate of the event that is measured 
by the time of the migration. This gravity model is different from Niedercorn & Bechdolt’s 
(1969) gravity model in that the importance of a country is not constrained by population 
only, but captures GDP, labour market conditions and other relevant factors. Thus, it would 
be appropriate to state that a general assumption of the gravity model of migration is that the 
greater the relative importance of the origin and host countries, the more the migration. A 
gravity model mainly focuses on the importance of the country within country pairs and can 
be adjusted using other migration theories depending upon the expectation of what aspects of 
decision-making are to be analysed. Thus, this paper will use the gravity approach.   
Hypothetically, a number of economic factors, such as economic hardship, poverty, low 
standard of living, low wages, wage differences, infrastructure and social factors, such as 
wars, famine, drought and natural disasters trigger people to seek other countries to live in. 
This paper intends to focus on economic reasons.  
The history of migration encounters several aspects of immigration intentions at the macro 
and micro levels (Hagen-Zanker, 2008). Whilst individual expectations motivate 
individuals to migrate, social ties, affiliation or more generally the expectation of a better 
economic structure trigger people to move from their country of origin (Jong, 2010). 
 Employment opportunity is deemed to be an essential incentive to migrate, as well as a 
high level of income (Daniels and Ruhr, 2003; Sorhun, 2011). Individuals consider moving 
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to places with a high potential of finding a job so that they can start earning money for 
survival after arrival. A high level of unemployment, and low level and/or share of GDP 
per capita in the home country are also considered motivations for people to seek other 
places (Feridun, 2007). That is, failure to find a job in a certain period of time pushes 
individuals to seek locations with lower unemployment rates. On the other hand, the 
distance between the origin and receiving countries is deemed to be an essential deterrent 
(Mayda, 2008; Sorhun 2011), meaning that greater distance requires more cost of travel as 
well as more risks. As such, with the on-going turmoil in some Middle East countries such 
as Egypt, Libya, Yemen and most recently Syria, multiple nationalities from those 
countries are attracted by Turkey, which does not have the desired level of economic 
growth compared to more developed countries but is chosen by neighbouring countries that 
have a close border (Sirkeci and Esipova, 2013).  
Additionally, Greenwood (1985) indicated that housing markets and the taxation system, 
both local and state, might be vital issues for potential migrants. Bilaterally, if house prices 
are costly in the host country, this influences the person’s decision to move there, and if 
house prices are high in the origin country this also affects individuals seeking places with 
low/lower house prices.  
What is more, Coulon and Wadsworth (2010) showed that purchasing power parity in the 
host country is as important a factor as wage differentials across skill groups during 
decision-making on migration. Ogilvy (1979) showed using National Health Service data 
within England and Wales that individuals with previous migration experience are more 
likely to migrate. Thus, individuals with previous migration experience gain substantial 
information on how to find a place to stay, how to find a job, how to search networks and 
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how to settle down. In other words, there is less risk in comparison with first-time 
immigration.  
Unemployment rate and earnings differentials play a significant role in deciding to move to 
another region, as they show the tendency to migrate to places with a low unemployment 
ratio and less wage disparity in not only cross-national migration but also inter-regional 
migration (Pissarides and McMaster, 1990). 
What is more, Ivlevs and King (2012) pointed out that immigration is an incentive for 
further immigration, which they call the ‘snowball effect’ of immigration. Furthermore, 
Sorhun (2011) examined the economic size of the receiving country as another motivation 
to migrate, as well as the association of income level with the migration decision in the case 
of Turkey’s internal/external migration. In other words, people tend to choose places to 
move to that are economically approximately 20% better. Additionally, people tend to 
move to countries where they feel happier, more secure and comfortable (Borjas, 1989).  
Furthermore, migrants also take into account the skills they have when deciding where to 
move (Greenwood, 1985). In that regard, it is unrealistic to expect a farmer to choose to go 
to a place where there is no agricultural industry. On the other side, skill composition is 
also a vital concern from the perspective of the host country. Geis et al., (2011) for 
instance, found substantial differences within the skill composition of immigrants in 
France, Germany, the UK and the USA: the UK and the USA host highly skilled 
immigrants compared to France and Germany, the two large EU member states. Thus, those 
with high skills are expected to choose places where they are provided with more 
convenient conditions, such as a less restrictive immigration policy, better social rights, or 
jobs with better wages. Immigration policy is taken into account not only by highly skilled 
migrants but also by unskilled ones, because less restrictive migration policies are 
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considered to be a motivation to migrate (Hatton, 2010; Mayda 2008) and restrictive 
migration policies are counted as an obstacle. , it would be more desirable to migrate to 
places with no or lower limits. Even in internal migration, different policies within states 
affect the individual’s decision to choose a location. Zavodny (1999) investigated location 
choices within six states of the USA, and found that people desired states where they could 
benefit more.  
Living in a hugely populated country, poverty and unpleasant environments are 
encountered as reasons to leave the home country (Amacher et al., 1998). Indeed, living 
under such conditions inevitably pushes individuals to move not to the best but at least 
better places. Deciding on a host country is also done under the consideration of gaining the 
greatest return in terms of human capital (Stark and Taylor, 1991). GDP per capita both in 
the origin and receiving country are found to be another aspect that is considered in terms 
of deciding whether to go and/or where to go (Marques, 2010).  
Generally, the decision to migrate depends both upon an immigrant’s characteristics and the 
labour market conditions in the host country (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989) and it can 
both be an individual level or a more general level decision-making process. If considered at 
the macro level, in general, the economic structure of the origin country is a huge push factor. 
Tsuda (1999), for instance, drew attention to the Brazilian-Japanese migration case. Brazil 
hosted a massive migration influx from Japan in the early 20
th
 century to deal with a labour 
shortage. However, the extensive recession in Brazil accounted for a massive inflation rate 
followed by a decrease in real personal income and job security, and Japanese migrants 
returned to their home country in the late 1980s. Indeed, a long-lasting economic handicap 
produces an uneasy community that pushes people to return to their home country.  
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Considering that people move towards living in better conditions, it is unlikely to expect a 
flow from powerful countries into powerless or impoverished countries. Portes and Böröcz 
(1989), for instance, noted that in the light of push and pull theories the advanced European 
counties are likely to be attracted by equatorial African immigrants as well as those from 
other undeveloped countries.  
Historically more migration occurs amongst single men in comparison to single women. 
However, some countries, such as Thailand, have the opposite case. Because Thai women 
have to repay their parents for raising them, migration is more frequent among Thai women 
(Jong, 2010). This suggests that migration is linked to individual expectations.  
Although it is emphasised that individuals expect better living standards in the host places, 
this may become problematic if having high living standards in the host country costs more 
than the salaries that an individual is earning. Champion (1999), for instance, showed that 
within the UK’s regions, London experiences more out-migration than in-migration compared 
to the rest of the UK between 1990 and 1991. The expense of living in London is the highest 
among the UK’s regions, although it provides better salaries and a higher standard of living, 
thus individuals choose to move to places where their living standards and earnings are 
balanced.  
So far, the majority of the motivations to migration have been captured. Having considered 
the characteristics of an immigrant, it is now safe to generalise that a person decides to 
migrate if the benefit of moving outweighs the benefit of staying. Considering we are living in 
the 21
st
 century and telecommunication has an essential role in individuals’ life in respect of 
keeping in touch with the families and friends in origin countries, exchanging information 
between origin and host countries, one should consider that, in addition to other factors, 
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telecommunication may trigger migration flows as well. Thus, this chapter will investigate 
whether there is such relationship between migration flows and telecommunication, and if so, 
fill in the gap in the migration literature. 
As this paper is to adapt the Gravity Model of Migration, the gravity model literature is kept 
separate and shown in Table 1.1. As can be seen from the table, to the best of our knowledge, 
no gravity model includes telecommunications facilities as a determinant of migration. 
Telecommunications facilities are considered as a tool to measure a country’s wealth in 
relation to GDP, but not as a tool that improves the flow of information about host countries 
which may as a result affect decisions to move from the origin country. Our gravity model 
will allow us to see such mobility in flows from origin to host in relation to 
telecommunications facilities. 
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Table1.1 Gravity Model through the literature 
Author(s) Geographical units and sample period Methodology Dependant variable Significant explanatory variables 
Karamera. 
et al. (2000) 
19 European, 16 African, 16 Asian, 2 North 
American, 3 Central American, 3 Caribbean, 12 
South American countries to North America; 
1976-1986 
Panel with time and 
country pair fixed 
effects and origin 
region dummies 
Total migration inflows (+): Population (origin), income (origin+host), unemployment (host), business credit ratings (origin), 
relative freedom (origin), common border, population density. 
(-): Distance, population (host), inflation (origin), political instability (origin), political rights (origin), 
civil liberty (origin), immigration policy 
Mayda 
 (2008) 
Migration to 14 OECD countries: Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA;1980-1995 
Panel OLS with individual 
country dummies 
Emigration rate (+): Per worker GDP (host), Young population (origin). 
(-): Distance 
Beine et al. 
(2006) 
Migration to OECD countries; 
1990 and 2000 
Panel OLS with dummy 
for 2000 
Skilled migrant inflows (+): Distance, GDP per capita ratio, social expenditure (host), democracy index (origin), public 
education expenditure (origin) 
(-): Linguistic proximity, education expenditures (host), openness to immigration. 
Shen  
(1999) 
Chinese provinces; 1985-1990 Panel OLS Total migration flows (+): Population (origin), GNP growth rate (origin+host) 
(-): Distance, illiteracy (host), agricultural employment (origin+host), population growth (origin), 
population density (origin+host) 
 Pedersen et 
al. (2008) 
 
Migration to OECD countries; 1990-2000 Panel fixed effects for 
host, WLS and GEE with 
host or country pairs 
dummy 
Total migration inflows (+): Stock of immigrants, common border, common language, colony dummy, trade volume, relative 
population (host\origin), social expenditure (host), 
(-): Distance, GDP per capita (origin+host), unemployment (host), illiteracy (origin), freedom house 
index (origin) 
Helliwell 
(1997) 
From USA to Canada, within Canada ; 1991 Cross section OLS Total migration inflows (+): Population (origin+host), real personal income (host) 
(-): Distance, real personal income (origin) 
Kumo  
(2007) 
Flows within Russian regions; 2003 Cross section OLS Total migration flows (+): Population (origin+host), gender ratio, paved roads, common border, some  regional dummies 
(-): Distance, below working age ration, some regional dummies 
Ashby 
(2007) 
Interregional flows within 48 USA states; 2000 Cross section with spatial 
dependency 
Migration rate (+): Relative economic freedom, relative population, relative income, relative employment growth, 
relative retired, relative heating days, distance squared, 
(-): Distance, relative precipitation, relative density, dummy for movers 
Fertig  
(2001) 
Flows from 17 OECD countries into Germany; 
1960-1994 
Panel GLS with origin 
country dummies 
Migration rate (+): Per capita income ratio, employment (host), free movement dummy 
(-): Lagged migration rate, employment (origin). 
Marques 
(2010) 
Flows from Central and Eastern Europe to EU-
15 countries; 1986-2006 
Panel fixed effects for host 
with region dummies 
Total migration flows (+): GDP (origin+host), GDP per capita (origin), current migration stock, contiguity, common 
language, liberal policy reform (host), some regional dummies 
(-): GDP per capita (host), unemployment (origin), political environment (host), distance, some 
regional dummies 
Andrienco 
& Guriev 
(2004) 
Interregional migration in Russia; 1992-1999 Panel OLS with time 
dummies and region-pairs 
fixed effects  
Number of people who 
migrate 
(+): Income per capita (host), unemployment rate (origin), poverty (origin), public goods provision 
(host) 
(-): Distance, income per capita (origin), unemployment rate (host), poverty(host), public goods 
provision (origin) 
Lewer & 
den 
Berg(2008) 
General Join hypothesis of cross-
section 
Level of immigration (+):population(origin) x population(host), common language, colonial link between host and origin, 
relative distance to income per capita in the origin, immigrants in the host  
(-) distance   
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As can be seen from the table, in almost all cases distance is found to be a significant 
demotivating factor, as the higher the distance, the higher the risk and the higher the migration 
cost. Higher wages, high GDP per capita, and a low unemployment rate/high employment rate 
in the host country are found to be the main motivating factors in deciding where to migrate. 
Our results in Section 1.3 will also confirm how these factors play an essential role in 
deciding where to move. 
1.3 Data and Empirical Model 
 
The empirical analysis employs a panel of data from a sample of inflows in thousands from 
origin country i   to host country j  at time t  .As an international telecommunications channel, 
we expect broadband to be the most convenient communication tool, as it is cheaper and 
allows for job applications and job interviews from overseas. Even so, we also analysed 
whether other telecommunications channels, such as mobile phones or fixed landline phones 
affect flows between origin and host, but found no strong evidence.  
In order to capture both ICT connections and a number of economic aspects as reasons behind 
individuals’ decision to migrate, the following gravity model will be applied: 
tijtjtitj
tijijtjitij
EMPRUNEMPRWAGE
RGDPDISTICTICTFLOWS
,,7,6,5
,43,21,
log
logloglogloglog




       (1.8) 
where ijFLOWS is the flow of immigrants in thousands. Here, we grouped migration flows 
into three thresholds that are equal to and greater than 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 (i.e. 10, 30 and 50 per 
1,000 population), both for OtO country pairs and non-OtO; 
ji ICTICT ,  are ICT connections  
in the origin and host respectively;
ijDIST is the distance between the origin and host country;
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ijRGDP  is the relative real GDP (i.e. 
j
i
RGDP
RGDP
both real GDP in the origin- iRGDP and real 
GDP in the host-
jRGDP are constant at 2000 US$ ); jWAGE is the average wage across 
industries in the host country all adjusted to 2000 US$; iUNEMPR  is the unemployment rate 
in the origin; 
jEMPR is the employment rate in the host and finally, ij is the error term. 
Throughout the literature, technology is assumed to evolve along an exponential growth curve 
(Griliches, 1957; Geroski, 2000; Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Comin et al., 2006; Czernich et 
al., 2011), thus, ICT connections in origin and host can be written as: 
iteICTit
1  and 
jteICT jt

 2     (1.9) 
where
jtit and   are the growth parameters of the rate of the ICT tool in the origin and host 
country, respectively. In our analysis, we primarily focus on broadband as an ICT tool for the 
reasons we explain in Section 1.4.  Broadband here is counted as from 256kbit/s to under 
2Mbit/s. Since migration occurs between specific country pairs, we focus on the relative 
broadband penetration rate within those country pairs. Thus, it can be written as: 
           jtittij xBROADBROADBROAD ,     (1.10) 
Based on equation (1.9), tijBROAD ,  takes the exponential form as: 
iteBROAD tij
**
,
     (1.11) 
Here, ijBROAD  is defined as the multiplication of broadband penetration rate in the origin and 
host country at time t . There is no previous literature as to how to set up country pair specific 
variable such that. However, since communication is a concept of information exchange, and 
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broadband is our communication variable, we needed to work on such interaction variables. 
Because, for example broadband may have been introduced country A(origin) two years later 
than country B(host), and if so, such interaction variable will enable us to observe what 
happens after A and B have broadband at the same time. We cannot have them the form of 
fractions because there is a possibility that either of the broadband variable can be zero (e.g. 
broadband has not been introduced yet). Since the sample has a mix of core EU countries and 
recent 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) as well as 2007 accession countries 
(Bulgaria and Romania), we control for legal restriction of travelling/staying and working in 
the host country by setting a dummy variable 
ijFREE  that is equal to 1 if there is no such 
restriction on moving from the origin to host country, 0 otherwise. 
In order to see the different effects of broadband penetration rate across country pairs, we also 
control for catching-up in broadband diffusion by including the years since broadband 
introduction in country pairs, 
B
tijT , (Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Czernich et al., 2011) where 
B represents the broadband penetration rate between country pairs (i.e.
ijBROAD ). The 
calculation of 
B
tijT , is made based on broadband penetration rate, and it is the number of years 
that country pairs both have been introduced to broadband. Having added time and country 
pair subscriptions, the complete estimation equation will be as follows: 
tijtij
B
tijtijtjti
jtijtijttijtij
TFREEEMPRUNEMPR
WAGERGDPDISTBROADFLOWS
,,8,7,6,5
432,10, loglogloglog




    (1.12) 
where 
ij and t are the country pair effects and time fixed effect respectively. When the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives fails to characterise the reasons behind individuals’ 
decision to migrate, it then purely depends upon the benefits of migrating to destination 
places- which is called multilateral resistance to migration (Bertoli and Moraga, 2013). In the 
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presence of multilateral resistance to migration, some of the studies adopt the Common 
Correlated Effects (Pesaran, 2006), or used ad hoc controls for time varying benefits of 
migration, or provide more restricted assumptions when specifying the estimated model. 
Considering that in any gravity model, there are more than one origin and similarly more than 
one destination country; one must deal with the relationship amongst specific country pairs 
(Anderson, 2010). In this chapter, the specification of our main independent variable is in an 
interaction form (i.e. jtittij xBROADBROADBROAD , ). By doing so, we believe we 
account for the relative attractiveness of country pairs sampled. However, additional methods 
could be adopted for a follow up robustness checks for this chapter in the future. 
See Table 1.2 below for a detailed description of the data:  
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Table1.2 Data and origins 
Notation Variable Unit Origin 
ijFLOWS  
Inflows of foreign population by 
nationality 
Thousands OECD 
iBROAD  
Broadband penetration rate in origin 256 kbit/s to less than 2Mbit/s 
Share of the population that has subscribed to 
broadband 
ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT 
Database 
jBROAD  
Broadband penetration rate in host 256 kbit/s to less than 2Mbit/s 
Share of the population that has subscribed to 
broadband 
ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT 
Database 
iTEL  
 
Fixed telephone subscriptions in origin Per 100 inhabitants ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT 
Database 
jTEL  
Fixed telephone subscriptions in host Per 100 inhabitants ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT 
Database 
iCABLE  
Cable TV subscribers in origin Per 100 inhabitants ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT 
Database 
jCABLE  
Cable TV subscribers in host Per 100 inhabitants ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT 
Database 
ijDIST  
Distance between origin and host Km CEPII 
iRGDP  
Real GDP in origin Constant 2000 US$ WORLDBANK, World Development Indicators 
jRGDP  
Real GDP in host Constant 2000 US$ WORLDBANK, World Development Indicators 
jWAGE  
Average wage across industries in the 
host 
Total wage across industries divided by 
number of total employees in the industries 
(All LCU adjusted to 2000 US$ dollar) 
OECD STAN Database, OWW Database for the UK, 
(ECB) European Central Bank Statistical Data 
Warehouse for US dollar exchange rate 
iUNEMPR  
Unemployment rate (origin) Total, % of total labour force, in million IMF 
jEMPR  
Employment rate (host) Percentage (Total gender, aged:20-64) EUROSTAT 
ijFREE  
=1 if no legal restriction on living, 
working in host 
0,1 Author calculation based on EUROSTAT-EEA 
B
tijT ,  
Years since country pairs both first 
introduced broadband 
Varies from 0 to 10 for OtO 
Varies from 0 to 8 for non-OtO 
Author calculation based on ITU (International 
Telecommunication Union) ICT Database 
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1.3.1 Causality of Broadband and Migration Flows 
The basic gravity model may suffer from different origins of endogeneity. One concern is 
reverse causality, in that, considering the origin and host country we might imagine that the 
greater the flows of people from origin to host the greater the communication flows between 
host and origin as migrants talk to family and friends: we will discuss this in more detail in 
Section 1.4.1. Another concern is that broadband penetration rate is endogenous to RGDP, 
employment rate and unemployment rate. Furthermore, considering that migration is a 
dynamic event, treating natives in the host country as fixed simplifies the fact that they can 
also migrate within those countries.  
We first attempt to correct for the endogeneity in the model by applying the Arello-Bond 
GMM estimator (Blackburne and Frank, 2007). The GMM results for OtO and non-OtO flows 
for the 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 (100, 300 and 500 or more people) thresholds is presented in Model 
(4) in Tables 1.18 to Table 1.23 in Appendix D. However, GMM does not seem to address 
multiple origins of endogeneity problems well. Firstly because, autocorrelation results for first 
order autocorrelation fails in most cases, and only improved in few cases in the second order 
autocorrelation as can be seen from Tables 1.18-1.23. Secondly, the Sargan test of over-
identification appears to fail. Finally, the presence of decreasing numbers of observations for 
different flow thresholds creates more trouble with GMM. 
Thus, in order to address several source of endogeneity bias in the model, we adopted 
Czernich et. al.’s (2011) instruments for the IV approach. Since broadband platforms rely on 
either the copper wire of voice telephony or the coaxial cable of cable TV between 
households and the main distribution frame, we instrumented the ceiling of broadband 
penetration ij with voice telephony and cable TV for the year 1997, which is the year before 
broadband was first introduced to both countries amongst country pairs at the same instant:  
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1997,21997,10 ijijij
CABLEVOICE                                 (1.13) 
Here we use the number of non-digital telecommunication access lines in 1997 (VOICEij, 1997) 
and the number of cable TV subscribers in 1997 (CABLEij, 1997) to measure the spread of the 
traditional telecommunication and cable networks in country pairs, calculated as: 
                                
1997,1997,1997, jiij VOICEVOICEVOICE                                (1.14) 
                                
1997,1997,1997, jiij CABLECABLECABLE                              (1.15) 
where VOICEi,1997 and VOICEj,1997 are the number of non-digital telecommunications access 
lines per 100 inhabitants in 1997 in the origin and host countries respectively; CABLEi,1997 
and CABLEj,1997 are the number of cable TV subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 1997 in the 
origin and host countries respectively. These variables were obtained from the World 
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database- International Telecommunication Union (ITO). 
Although 
1997,ijVOICE  and 1997,ijCABLE are time invariant variables, Stata 13’s nl (i.e. non-
linear) command provides time invariant coefficients for each of these variables. 
The majority of researchers have followed the logistical growth curve for a new technology 
defined by Griliches (1957) (Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Comin et al., 2006; Geroski, 2000; 
Czernich et al., 2011; Stoneman, 2002; Beck et al. et al., 2005; Michal and Tobias, 2006):  
                                        )(1 



t
ij
ij
e
BROAD                           (1.16) 
Again, ijBROAD is the broadband penetration rate measured as the multiplication of the share 
of the population that has subscribed to broadband in the origin and the share of the 
population that has subscribed to broadband in the host (i.e. 
ji BROADBROAD  ), whereas,
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ij  determines the maximum broadband penetration rate,  is the diffusion speed, and finally 
 is the inflexion point. Inserting equation (1.13) into equation (1.16), we obtain the 
following non-linear first stage equation: 
        
)]([
1997,21997,10
,
1 




t
jij
tij
e
CABLEVOICE
BROAD                    (1.17) 
By applying such non-linear least squares estimation, we compute the predicted broadband 
penetration rate with absolute exogenous factors. In order to receive consistent estimates from 
the second stage of the nonlinear equation, first-stage estimation must be specified correctly 
(Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Angrist and Kruger, 2001a;, 2001b).  
In order to see the fit of the first stage of the diffusion curve of the instrumental model, we 
plot the graphs of actual and predicted broadband for OtO and non-OtO country pairs for each 
threshold, but we only present 10 country pairs for each thresholds as there are 366 OtO 
country pairs (148+118+100) and 269 non-OtO country pairs (101+92+76) in total and it 
would take up generous space. Figures 1.1 to Figure 1.6 are presenting the actual and 
predicted broadband penetration rate. (please see Appendix B). For OtO country pairs with 
0.1 thresholds, Poland-UK and Germany-Austria appears to have a perfect fit of actual and 
predicted broadband penetration rate. Whereas, predicted broadband penetration rate for 
Netherlands-Belgium, Sweden-Norway, Belgium-Luxembourg country pairs seem to be a 
little below the actual rates. The actual and predicted values for the rest of country pairs, on 
average, seem to fit all right. Same pattern holds for OtO country pairs with 0.3 and 0.5 
thresholds. When it comes to non-OtO country pairs with 0.1 thresholds, Algeria-France, 
Russia-Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Austria, and Bulgaria-Spain seem to have a good 
fit, whereas for the  rest of the country pairs predicted values stays a little below the actual 
rates. In all, we can see a diffusion curve shape for all country pairs as expected which 
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confirms the fit of first stage of the diffusion curve, which corresponds to the majority of 
literature on technology diffusion (Griliches, 1957; Geroski, 2000; Gruber and Verboven, 
2001; Comin et al., 2006; Czernich et al., 2011). Also, we find consistent inflexion points for 
both OtO and non-OtO flows for each threshold. Hence, we believe that the first-stage 
estimation is specified adequately. As can be noticed from Figures 1.1-1.3 the same country 
pairs look like identical, this is same with Figures 1.4-1.6. We additionally provide 
descriptive statistics for actual and predicted broadband penetration rate in Table 1.17 in 
Appendix C. The starting and finishing point for each graph is very close to each other thus 
they look identical.     
In order to establish valid fitted values for broadband penetration rate, we attempt to use 
purely exogenous instrumental variables. Therefore, we use voice telephony and cable TV 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 1997, the year before the first emergence of broadband in 
the country pairs at the same time. Even though the instruments are time invariant, this 
produces time variant fitted values.  
The first stage of the non-linear instrumental variable is estimated by Equation (1.17) using a 
non-linear least square. Column (I), (II) and (III) of Table 1.3 presents 148, 118 and 101 OtO 
country pairs respectively, whereas Table 1.4  presents 101, 92, 76 non-OtO country pairs 
respectively, for 1995- 2009 . 
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Table1.3 OECD to OECD flows: diffusion curve of the Instrumental Model first stage 
Dependent variable: Broadband 
penetration rate(
tijBROAD , ) 
(I) (II) (III) 
Voice telephony penetration rate 
(
1997,ijVOICE ) 
0.274*** 
(0.006) 
0.276*** 
(0.007) 
0.277*** 
(0.008) 
Cable TV penetration rate 
(
1997,ijCABLE ) 
0.334*** 
(0.018) 
0.347
*** 
(0.018) 
0.302*** 
(0.017) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.917*** 
(0.025) 
0.903*** 
(0.027) 
0.890*** 
(0.028) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2005.662*** 
(0.057) 
2005.668*** 
(0.064) 
2005.720*** 
(0.068) 
Constant 0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004
** 
(0.001) 
2R  0.97 0.97 0.97 
N  1981 1580 1342 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 121.90 
(0.000) 
99.41 
(0.000) 
88.10 
(0.000) 
(I), (II), (III) present the first stage results of the diffusion curve for flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds respectively. For each threshold, 
we control the first stage model with more control variables, namely distance, real GDP, wage, unemployment rate, employment rate. The 
results are quite significant but the coefficients are very small, so we do not present them. They are available upon request. 
Table1.4 Non-OECD to OECD flows: diffusion curve of the Instrumental Model first stage 
Dependent variable: Broadband penetration 
rate(
tijBROAD , ) 
(I) (II) (III) 
Voice telephony penetration rate 
(
1997,ijVOICE ) 
0.152
*** 
(0.020) 
0.154
*** 
(0.021) 
0.145
*** 
(0.024) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) 0.107
*** 
(0.014) 
0.106
*** 
(0.014) 
0.105
*** 
(0.017) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.997
*** 
(0.104) 
0.995
*** 
(0.106) 
0.954
*** 
(0.113) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2007.308*** 
(0.271) 
2007.308
*** 
(0.277) 
2007.437
*** 
(0.343) 
Constant 0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
2R  0.84 0.85 0.83 
N  1359 1233 1015 
F-test(p-values in parenthesis) 44.70 
(0.000) 
43.23 
(0.000) 
28.13 
(0.000) 
(I), (II), (III) present the first stage results of the diffusion curve for flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds respectively. For each threshold, 
we control the first stage model with more control variables, namely distance, real GDP, wage, unemployment rate, employment rate. The 
results are quite significant but the coefficients are very small, so we do not present them. They are available upon request. 
For OtO flows, Table 1.3 shows that voice telephony penetration rate, cable TV penetration 
rate, diffusion speed and inflexion point are quite significant in determining broadband 
penetration rate. In fact, they are still very significant even after we control our first-stage 
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model with more control variables. However, we do not present them here, as the coefficients 
are very small (they are available upon request). The inflexion point is estimated at around 
2005 for OtO flows, and it does not vary much for different thresholds of flows.  
For non-OtO flows, Table 1.4 also confirms the significance of voice telephony penetration 
rate, cable TV penetration rate, diffusion speed and inflexion point in determining broadband 
penetration rate. The inflexion point for non-OtO flows is estimated at around 2007 and does 
not vary much for different thresholds of flows. Considering the different aspects of adopting 
technology, it is reasonable to find different inflexion points for OtO and non-OtO flows. 
Both voice telephony penetration rate and cable TV penetration rate appear to have positive 
and significant effects on the ceiling of the broadband penetration rate
ij . The F-test of joint 
significance for voice telephony and cable TV suggest that the null hypothesis that the 
estimated coefficients for both are different from zero at a 99% confidence interval.  
1.4 Empirical Results 
Our empirical results are based on Equation (1.12) in Section 1.3. The results shown in 
Tables 1.18 to Table 1.23 in Appendix D  present the OtO and non-OtO migration flows with 
0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds. In all tables, Model (1) presents the OLS, Model (2) the random 
effect, Model (3) the country pair and time fixed effect, and finally Model (4) presents the 
GMM results. As discussed in Section 1.3.1, the GMM results do not seem to fix the 
endogeneity problem of either flow (OtO and non-OtO) under any thresholds as explained in 
Section 1.3.1. In all six cases (OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds, and non-OtO flows 
with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds) second order autocorrelation is found to have no evidence of 
autocorrelation. However, apart from for OtO flows with 0.1 thresholds, the Sargan test of 
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over-identification fails. The fixed effect results are presented in Model (3) for six cases, and 
as a time invariant variable the log of distance is dropped from the model.  
Table.1.18 in Appendix D presents the results for OtO flows with a 0.1 rate threshold. 
Broadband penetration rate does not seem to have a significant effect in any of the models, 
and the coefficients are very small, especially in the fixed effect model. The dummy variable 
tijFREE , which is equal to 1 if there is no restriction on travelling/staying/working from the 
origin country to the host appears to have a positive and significant effect on migration flows, 
which confirms that less restriction will result in more migration. The coefficients for control 
variables are consistent from Model (2) to Model (4), but the significance does not hold 
across all of these models. 
Table 1.19 in Appendix D presents the results for OtO migration with a 0.3 threshold. 
Broadband penetration rate seems to have no effect on migration flows in any of the models, 
while the dummy variable 
tijFREE , has a positive and significant effect. Wages in the host 
country are found to be always positive and significant as a determinant of migration flows 
only in the random effect and fixed effect model. Generally, both relative RGP and distance 
are found to be negative and significant. To the extent that the more distance the more risk 
and the higher the migration cost, it is considered as a demotivating factor. 
Table 1.20 in Appendix D  shows the results for OtO migration with a 0.5 threshold. 
Broadband penetration rate here also does not seem to have any effect on migration flows. 
The coefficient is very small in the GMM model in particular. The majority of the signs of the 
coefficients and their significance hold similar to the OtO flows with 0.1 and 0.3 thresholds. 
Interestingly, neither unemployment rate in the origin, nor employment rate in the host show 
much evidence of significant effect on migration for OtO flows with any thresholds. 
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Table 1.21 in Appendix D  gives the non-OtO flows with a 0.1 threshold. Apart from in the 
random effect model, broadband penetration rate is found to have no significant effect on 
migration flows. This also is the case for non-OtO flows with 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds in Table 
1.22 and Table 1.23. Generally, for all thresholds, dummy 
ijFREE is found to have a positive 
and significant effect on migration flows. Based on the fixed effect models, the coefficient of 
dummy variable of
ijFREE is much larger for non-OtO flows. Considering the legal issue that 
migration cost increases when distance increases, legal issues might be a more important 
factor for those who are migrating from outside the OECD into the OECD. Furthermore, we 
do not have much evidence that unemployment rate in the origin and employment rate have 
an effect on the migration flows for OtO and non-OtO flows under any thresholds. Years 
since broadband was introduced to the country pairs seem to have a positive and significant 
effect, unlike what was expected. As we believe that broadband penetration rate facilitates 
migration flows, we expect the migration flows to be relatively lower in the years before 
broadband was introduced to country pairs.  
Thus, the overall results confirm the several origins of endogeneity that are causing 
inconsistency across different models. We believe that our non-linear IV approach will 
address the problem sufficiently. Based on the first stage of the diffusion curve, we calculate 
the predicted broadband penetration rate and plug this variable in equation (1.12). The second 
stage results are shown in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 for OtO and non-OtO migration flows, 
respectively. Besides this, we also calculate the predicted years since broadband was 
introduced to the country pairs at the same time and plug this in equation (1.12).  
Models with odd numbers are all second stage of the instrumental variable model with OLS; 
whereas models with even number are second stage instrumental variable model with the 
36 
 
country pair fixed effect. To account for the fact that broadband penetration rate is predicted by the 
first stage of the non-linear model, standard errors are bootstrapped (200 repetitions) in the second 
stage of the non-linear models. Broadband penetration rate seems to have a positive and 
significant effect on both OtO and non-OtO migration flows. The significance improves 
greatly in fixed effect models. The coefficient of broadband penetration rate is much higher 
for the non-OtO country pairs. This suggests that broadband connections between non-OECD 
and OECD countries affect migration flows from origin to home country more that between 
OECD and OECD countries by improving the flow of information about the host that affects 
migration decisions from the origin. This can be explained by the fact that the inflexion point 
is around 2007 for non-OtO country pairs - approximately two years later than the inflexion 
point for OtO country pairs. Broadband usage has been a more important communication tool 
between non-OECD and OECD than OECD and OECD countries between 1995 to 2009, 
therefore it is sensible that broadband penetration rate has more effect on migration flow for 
non-OtO than OtO flows. Consistent with the gravity literature, distance and relative RGDP 
are found to be a significant deterrent both for OtO and non-OtO migration flows for all 
thresholds. When it comes to wages in the host country, we observe a positive and significant 
relation with migration flows as expected. It is only negative in OtO flows with 0.3 and 0.5 
thresholds and non-OtO with 0.3 thresholds and second-stage OLS, but is not significant. 
Unemployment in the origin country has a positive and significant effect on migration flows 
for fixed effect models of OtO and non-OtO flows with all thresholds. To some extent, higher 
unemployment in the country of origin will trigger individuals to seek for a job in other 
places. This also confirms the finding that employment rate in the host country is a decisive 
factor that facilitates migration flows in all fixed effect models for OtO and non-OtO 
migration flows. In other words, individuals tend to move to where the employment rate is 
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higher. The dummy variable 
ijFREE is again found to be positive and significant in all cases. 
Predicted years since broadband introduced is found to be significant and negatively related to 
migration flows in fixed effect models. The coefficients of the predicted years since 
broadband was introduced seem to be much higher for the non-OtO country pairs. This 
confirms the consistent idea that the effect of broadband penetration rate is much higher for 
non-OtO country pairs. 
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Table1.5 The effect of broadband penetration rate on OtO migration flows: second stage results 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows  
( )log
,tij
FLOWS  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.007(0.017) 0.048***(0.012) 0.034**(0.017) 0.044***(0.012) 0.044**(0.018) 0.045**(0.014) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.540***(0.046)  -0.367***(0.047)  -0.172***(0.048)  
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.249***(0.018) -0.869**(0.407) -0.257***(0.017) -1.585***(0.419) -0.212***(0.018) -1.663***(0.450) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.114**(0.037) 0.056**(0.024) -0.033(0.033) 0.046*(0.025) -0.020(0.031) 0.045*(0.025) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
0.032(0.009) 0.002**(0.009) 0.039(0.009) 0.001***(0.010) 0.034 (0.009) 0.002***(0.010) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.011(0.003) 0.024*(0.014) -0.007(0.003) 0.025**(0.013) 0.001(0.003) 0.029**(0.014) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.614***(0.088) 0.707***(0.138) 0.349***(0.092) 0.992***(0.158) 0.450***(0.094) 1.024***(0.166) 
Predicted years )_, hatT tij
  0.061(0.024) -0.003*(0.015) 0.048(0.023) -0.006*(0.013) 0.030(0.024) -0.014*(0.014) 
Constant  3.034***(4.478) -1.063(0.983) 3.452***(0.462) -1.010(0.883) 1.665(0.478) -1.143(0.979) 
2R  0.17 0.27 0.15 0.37 0.12 0.36 
N  2064 2064 1644 1644 1409 1409 
Country pairs 148 148 118 118 100 100 
Table1.6 The effect of broadband penetration rate on non-OtO migration flows: Second Stage results 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows  
( )log
,tij
FLOWS  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.078***(0.012) 0.103***(0.021) 0.089***(0.012) 0.101***(0.023) 0.072***(0.012) 0.109**(0.030) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.071(0.066)  -0.179**(0.063)  -0.466***(0.054)  
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.287***(0.021) -0.923**(0.371) -0.249***(0.021) -0.950**(0.382) -0.196***(0.019) -0.928**(0.440) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.080**(0.041) 0.062*(0.037) 0.053(0.041) 0.082**(0.036) 0.200***(0.038) 0.089**(0.037) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
-0.062(0.007) 0.016*(0.013) -0.058(0.007) 0.015*(0.014) -0.060(0.006) 0.013*(0.015) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
0.030*(0.003) 0.039*(0.002) 0.022*(0.003) 0.042*(0.023) 0.022(0.003) 0.049*(0.033) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.062(0.299) 0.709***(0.153) 0.158(0.298) 0.725***(0.161) 0.961***(0.264) 0.739***(0.199) 
Predicted years  )_( , hatT tij
  0.030(0.073) -0.025*(0.048) -0.088(0.072) -0.032*(0.050) -0.219(0.081) -0.062*(0.061) 
Constant  3.289***(0.609) -3.470**(1.695) 4.152***(0.562) -3.607(1.747) 5.475***(0.496) -3.732(2.398) 
2R  0.20 0.34 0.19 0.36 0.28 0.36 
N  1397 1397 1277 1277 1049 1049 
Country pairs 101 101 92 92 76 76 
Models (1)-(3)-(5) and Models (2)-(4)-(6) of Table 0.11 and Table0.12  present the second stage of instrumental variable and second stage of instrumental variable with country pair and time fixed effect, respectively. Models (1)-(2), Models (3)-(4), 
and Models (5)-(6) are for 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate thresholds for OtO and non-OtO migration flows, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
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1.4.1 Validity of Instruments  
In order to see whether our instruments, the voice telephony and cable networks, might have 
an independent direct effect on migration flows, or affect migration flows through other 
channels than broadband, we consider whether other communication technologies such as 
mobile phones and number of subscriptions to the integrated services digital network (ISDN) 
which enables voice or data transmission might also affect the migration flows. In order to 
estimate the diffusion curves for mobile telephones and ISDN, we apply the same ceiling 
1997,21997,10 ijijij
CABLETEL    based on voice telephony and cable TV penetration rate 
per 100 individuals for each flow rate threshold for both OtO and non-OtO flows. Then we 
follow the logistic curve ( 
 )(1 

 t
ij
e
) for both mobile phones and ISDN. The use of 
broadband comes considerably later than the use of voice telephony and cable TV. The fact 
that we measure the predicted broadband penetration rate based on these two variables at year 
1997- that is before broadband introduced to country pairs sampled- it is safe to say our 
instruments are predetermined when considering broadband diffusion. Yet, predetermination 
may be necessary but not sufficient condition for exogeneity in an econometric sense 
Czernich et al. (2011). Thus, first of all, we analyse whether our instruments- TEL and 
CABLE might have an indirect effect on migration flows, or they affect migration flows 
through other channels then broadband. Our instruments, TEL and CABLE may not only 
effect the deployment of broadband network but also the diffusion of other technologies 
which may also trigger migration flows. For that, we pick one of the most common 
communication tool- mobile phones in which the adoption and diffusion has started since the 
1980s (Kalba, 2008) and the oldest telecommunication tool - ISDN which has being used 
since 1970s (https://www.nfon.com/gb/solutions/resources/glossary/isdn/) (4) To test our 
claim, we estimate diffusion curves with the same ceiling (Please see Model 1.16) for MOB 
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and ISDN. We presented the results from Table 1.24- 1.29 in Appendix E and as can be seen 
from these tables there is no significant effect is found. Thus, we found no significance of 
penetration of the traditional networks – TEL and CABLE- on the diffusion of MOB and 
ISDN. We conclude that our instruments, TEL and CABLE only determine broadband 
diffusion and not the diffusion of other potential telecommunication tools that might have an 
impact on migration flows, underlying the validity of our instruments.  TEL and CABLE 
could also have a direct impact on migration flows. To see whether our instruments have 
direct impact on migration flows, we inserted them in the same model as broadband but find 
no significance. (Please see Table 1.30 and 1.31 in Appendix F)   
As can be seen from Table 1.24- Table 1.29 in Appendix E, we observe no significant effect 
of voice telephony and cable TV on either of the alternative communication channels, mobile 
telephony and ISDN at a conventional level. This confirms the validity of our instruments. 
Here, we obtained both mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants and ISDN 
subscriber per 100 inhabitants from the ITU World telecommunication –ICT database. The F-
test of joint significance for voice telephony and cable TV suggest that the null hypothesis 
that is the estimated coefficients for both are different from zero at a 99% confidence interval. 
 
1.4.2 Robustness Checks  
Our first stage results are based on voice telephony penetration rate and cable TV penetration 
rate per 100 inhabitants in the population. This is to estimate the predicted broadband 
penetration rate per 100 inhabitants in the population. However, such a measurement may 
cause a correlation in the first stage result, as both the endogenous and instrumental variables 
have common denominator. Thus we estimate the first stage diffusion curve with voice 
telephony penetration rate per 100 inhabitants and cable TV penetration rate per 100 
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inhabitants to estimate broadband penetration rate at household level as in Table 1.7 for OtO 
migration flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate thresholds and Table 1.8 for non-OtO migration 
flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds. The levels of both instruments, voice telephony 
penetration rate per 100 inhabitants and cable TV penetration rate per 100 inhabitants, remain 
positive and significant for both OtO and non-OtO cases. In fact, the coefficients are much 
higher, suggesting that both instrumental variables determine broadband penetration rate to be 
higher if measured at the household level. The inflexion point remains around 2005 for OtO 
flows, and 2007 for non-OtO flows.  
Table1.7 Diffusion Curve: first stage of the Instrumental Variables for OtO flows 
Dependent variable:
ijBROADHH  (1) (2) (3) 
Voice telephony penetration rate 
1997,ijVOICE ) 
1.251*** 
(0.047) 
1.236*** 
(0.052) 
1.221*** 
(0.056) 
Cable TV penetration rate 
1997,ijCABLE ) 
0.926*** 
(0.144) 
1.059*** 
(0.143) 
0.835*** 
(0.184) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.905*** 
(0.030) 
0.893*** 
(0.033) 
0.891*** 
(0.035) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2005.783*** 
(0.070) 
2005.785*** 
(0.080) 
2005.840*** 
(0.087) 
Constant 0.084*** 
(0.008) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.088*** 
(0.009) 
2R  0.96 0.96 0.96 
N  1981 1580 1342 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 459.54(0.000) 375.74(0.000) 312.76(0.000) 
ijBROADHH is measured as a multiplication of broadband subscribers per household in the population in origin and host 
Table1.8 Diffusion Curve: first stage of the Instrumental Variables for non-OtO flows  
Dependent variable:
ijBROADHH  (1) (2) (3) 
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 
0.709*** 
(0.141) 
0.662*** 
(0.113) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) 
0.708*** 
(0.265) 
0.684*** 
(0.154) 
0.671*** 
(0.100) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.961*** 
(0.103) 
0.962*** 
(0.106) 
0.918*** 
(0.112) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2007.347*** 
(0.298) 
2007.348*** 
(0.306) 
2007.477*** 
(0.381) 
Constant 0.065*** 
(0.010) 
0.063*** 
(0.010) 
0.069*** 
(0.012) 
2R  0.80 0.80 0.78 
N  1359 0.85 1015 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 35.26(0.000) 34.10(0.000) 22.82(0.000) 
ijBROADHH is measured as a multiplication of broadband subscribers per household in the population in origin and host 
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Following the first stage results based on household level of broadband subscription, the 
second stage of the estimation results are presented in Table 1.9 for OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3, 
and 0.5 thresholds, and Table 1.10. for non-OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds. As 
can be seen from both tables, the significance and the sign of the coefficients remain the 
same. The pattern of how coefficients change across different thresholds also remains the 
same. The F-test of joint significance for voice telephony and cable TV suggests that the null 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients for both are different from zero at a 99% confidence 
interval for both OtO and non-OtO country pairs. 
Table1.9 Second stage of the Instrumental Variables Model for OtO flows 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows  (1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.052(0.018) 0.056**(0.017) 0.049**(0.018) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  -0.543***(0.047) -0.371***(0.047) -0.175***(0.049) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.251***(0.018) -0.257***(0.017) -0.212***(0.018) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.098**(0.037) -0.043(0.033) -0.024(0.031) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
0.028**(0.009) 0.037***(0.009) 0.034***(0.009) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.009(0.003) -0.006(0.003) 0.002(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.634***(0.087) 0.353***(0.093) 0.451***(0.095) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  -0.033(0.023) 0.004(0.021) 0.019(0.022) 
Constant  3.392(0.476) 3.587***(0.455) 1.628**(0.470) 
2R  0.16 0.15 0.12 
N  2064 1644 1409 
(I), (II), (III) present the OLS estimation of the second stage results of instrumental variables for OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate 
thresholds, respectively. We also obtained a fixed effect estimation of the second stage results, but do not present it here as the time invariant 
variable is dropped from the model. The sign and significance of the coefficients remain the same in the fixed effect model. They are 
available upon request. 
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Table1.10 Second stage of the Instrumental Variables Model for non-OtO flows 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.082***(0.013) 0.094**(0.013) 0.077***(0.012) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  -0.080(0.066) -0.187**(0.062) -0.452***(0.054) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.286***(0.021) -0.247***(0.021) -0.195***(0.019) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.078*(0.041) 0.049(0.041) 0.196*(0.038) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
-0.062(0.007) -0.058(0.007) -0.060(0.006) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
0.029(0.003) 0.022(0.003) 0.022(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.064(0.230) 0.159(0.298) 0.961***(0.264) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.032(0.073) -0.090(0.071) -0.221**(0.081) 
Constant  3.208***(0.606) 4.080***(0.558) 5.414***(0.491) 
2R  0.20 0.20 0.28 
N  1397 1277 1015 
(I), (II), (III) present the OLS estimation of the second stage results of instrumental variables for non-OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate 
thresholds, respectively. We also obtained a fixed effect estimation of the second stage results, but do not present it here as the time invariant 
variable is dropped from the model. The sign and significance of the coefficients remain the same in the fixed effect model. They are 
available upon request 
Additional robustness checks have been presented in Table 32-37 in Appendix G .One can 
argue that, apart from broadband, digital landline phones might have an effect on migration 
flows. In order to check this, we controlled the second stage results with an extra variable of 
landline phone penetration rate per 100 inhabitants in the population, obtained from the ITU 
(International Telecommunication Union) ICT Database. Table 32 and Table 33 in Appendix 
G present the results for OtO and non-OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds. As can be 
seen from the tables, we observe no significant effect of landline phone penetration rate in 
either case under any thresholds, while broadband penetration rate still remains positive and 
significant. 
However, high or low landline phone penetration might not be the factor that affects 
individuals’ decision to migrate, it may be international phone traffic between origin and host. 
Thus, we calculated the variable: 
                      jiij phntrafficphntrafficphntraffic                               (1.18) 
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where iphntraffic  stands for international incoming phone traffic to the origin, and 
jphntraffic is international outgoing phone traffic from the host country. This variable will 
give the approximate international phone traffic between country i  and country j at time t . 
Table 34 and Table 35 in Appendix G present the results for OtO and non-OtO countries with 
0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 thresholds under Models (I), (II) and (III) respectively. Indeed, phone traffic 
within country pairs is found to have a positive and significant effect on OtO migration flows, 
whereas there is not much evidence that this holds for non-OtO flows. All in all, broadband 
penetration rate is still positive and significant; also the sign of the remainder of the control 
variables remains the same.  
The different effect of phone traffic for OtO and non-OtO country pairs attracts our attention. 
Thus, this time, we intend to see the individual effect of international incoming phone traffic 
in the origin county and international outgoing phone traffic in the host. Table 36 and Table 
37 in Appendix G  present the OtO and non-OtO migration flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 
thresholds with Models (I), (II), and (III) respectively. Both the OtO and non-OtO flows 
suggest that international outgoing phone traffic in the host has a positive and significant 
effect on migration flows, while international incoming phone traffic in the origin shows no 
significant effect on the flows of migration. This may in a sense suggest that the direction of 
information flows is from host to origin, which in return results in migration flows from 
origin to host. Broadband penetration rates is still found to be positive and significant for both 
OtO and non-OtO country pairs.  
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1.5 Conclusion 
Our non-linear instrumental approach to broadband penetration rates find a positive and 
strong effect on migration flows. This effect appears to be even stronger for non-OtO flows in 
comparison to OtO flows.  
Our results are robust to a number of different specifications. For instance, measuring 
broadband penetration rate at household level while keeping instrumental variables - voice 
telephony and cable TV penetration rate - at per 100 inhabitants level did not affect the 
second stage results in terms of the sign of coefficients nor significance: in fact, the 
significance improved. Additionally, we checked whether landline phone traffic between 
country pairs, or international calling-in or out phone traffic also have a similar effect along 
with broadband, controlling for them all in the models. Broadband penetration rate is still the 
main determinant of migration decisions, while the sign of other variables remains the same 
for all three thresholds.  
The effect of broadband penetration rate is higher in non-OtO migration flows. This maybe is  
likely not only for information exchange purposes, but also job applications and interviews 
are more likely to take place online, whereas, job-orientated travelling can be undertaken 
more easily within closer countries. In other words, migrants of non-OtO flows make more 
use of broadband in terms of ensuring a place to work or place to stay, while migrants of OtO 
flows can interact with the host country not only through broadband but also in person. 
We have different thresholds, namely 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 (100, 300 and 500 people or more 
people), as we want to capture the relationship between broadband penetration rate and 
migration flows at different levels. The lowest threshold we focus on is 0.1 (100 and more 
people as we believe that the flows should be at a countable level in order to analyse the effect 
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of broadband penetration rates on migration flows. To give even more accountability, we 
chose the other thresholds of 0.3 and 0.5. The results for each threshold, particularly 0.3 and 
0.5, are quite similar, and they are all consistent. The results improve above the larger (that is 
0.5) constraint. This is due to the fact that we believe higher frequency of moving - although 
capturing fewer country pairs.  
The different thresholds for OtO flows give consistent results with each other, and the results 
improving from the 0.1 to 0.5 rate thresholds. This holds the same for non-OtO flows, where 
the significance of the right-hand side variables improves from the 0.1 to 0.5 rate threshold. 
We found inflexion points for OtO and non-OtO flows as 2005 and 2007 respectively. This 
could be explained by the way in which more developed countries (OECD ones) adopt 
technology versus developing or undeveloped countries (non-OECD ones). The inflexion 
point of 2007 for non-OECD countries suggests that they adopt technology and reach 
saturation point around two years later. 
What is more, having no legal restriction is always found to be positively and significantly 
correlated with migration flows, both OtO and non-OtO migration flows; this relationship is 
stronger for the latter. In this regard, considering legal restriction as a migration cost, flows 
from more distant countries will take legal restrictions more into account. That is also 
consistent with the result for distance which is found to be consistent with the gravity models 
of migration across the literature, as one of the essential demotivating factors in deciding 
where to move.  
Overall, we found that broadband penetration rate has a significant and positive effect on 
migration flows. This effect is stronger for non-OtO migration flows. Broadband appears to 
be preferred in comparison to landline phones amongst migrant candidates between 1995 and 
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2009. Further research is needed to investigate whether smart phones facilitate migration 
flow, which we believe to be true, as mobile phones also provides cheaper and easier 
communications overseas, and so may be preferred by migrant candidates. However, we were 
unable to investigate whether such an effect exists due to lack of data. The ITU World 
telecommunications ICT indicators have only few years of data available on smart phone 
subscriptions, but more data will be available in several years’ time which will enable 
researchers to investigate this in more detail.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table1.11 Country Pairs for OtO Flows at Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
Origin Host No of pairs 
1.AT DE, HU ,NL, ES, PL,  5 
2.BE AT, DE, LU, NL, ES 5 
3.CZ AT, DE, NL, ES. 4 
4.DK AT,  BE , DE, LU, NO, ES ,SE 7 
5.EE DK ,FI, DE, ES,  4 
6.FI AT, DK, DE, NL , NO, ES, SE  7 
7.FR BE , DK, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE ,UK 12 
8.DE AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK 14 
9.HU AT, FR, DE, NL, ES 5 
10.IT AT, BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, UK, HU 11 
11.NL AT, BE, DK, DE, LU, NO, PL, ES, SE,  9 
12.NO DK, DE, ES, SE,  4 
13.PL AT, BE, CZ, DK, FR, DE, HU, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE, UK. 13 
14.SK AT, CZ, DE, HU, NO, ES 6 
15.ES AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, LU, NL, , NO, PL, SE 10 
16.SE AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, LU, NO, ES. 8 
17.TR AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, NL, NO, ES, SE,  11 
18. UK AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, , SE 13 
18 Origin  16 Different host countries 148 Pairs 
 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK  
 
Table1.12 Country Pairs for OtO Flows at Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
Origin Host No of pairs 
1.AT DE, NL, ES,  3 
2.BE DE, LU, NL, ES 4 
3.CZ AT, DE, NL, ES. 4 
4.DK BE, DE, NO, ES ,SE 5 
5.FI DE, NL , NO, ES, SE  5 
6.FR BE, DK, DE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK 11 
7.DE AT, BE, CZ, DK, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK 13 
8.HU AT, DE, NL, ES 4 
9.IT AT, BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, PL, ES, UK 9 
10.NL AT, BE, DK, DE, NO, ES, SE,  7 
11.NO DK, DE, ES, SE,  4 
12.PL AT, BE, CZ, DK, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE, UK. 12 
13.SK AT, CZ, DE, HU, ES 5 
14.ES AT, BE, DK, DE, NL, ,SE 6 
15.SE AT, BE, DK, FI, DE, NO, ES. 7 
16.TR AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, NL, NO, SE,  8 
17. UK AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE 11 
17 Origin  16 Different host countries 118 Pairs 
 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK  
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Table1.13 Country Pairs for OtO Flows at Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
Origin Host No of pairs 
1.BE DE, LU, NL, ES 4 
2.CZ AT, DE, ES. 3 
3.DK DE, NO, ES ,SE 4 
4.FI DE, NO, ES, SE  4 
5.FR BE, DE, IT, LU, NL, PL, ES, SE, UK 9 
6.DE AT, BE, CZ, DK, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK 13 
7.HU AT, DE, NL, ES 4 
8.IT AT, BE, DE, LU, NL, ES, UK, 7 
9.NL AT, BE, DE, ES, SE,  5 
10.NO DK, DE, ES, SE,  4 
11.PL AT, BE, CZ, DK, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE, UK. 12 
12.SK AT, CZ, DE, HU, ES 5 
13.ES BE, DE, NL,  3 
14.SE BE, DK, FI, DE, NO, ES. 6 
15.TR AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, NL, SE,  7 
16.UK AT, BE, DK, DE, IT, NL, NO, PL, ES, , SE 10 
16 Origin  16 Different host countries 100 Pairs 
 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK   
 
Table1.14 Country Pairs for non-OtO Flows at Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
Origin Host No of pairs 
1.DZ AT, BE, FR, DE, ES 5  
2.AM FR, DE, PL, ES 4 
3.BA AT, DK, FR, DE, NO, SE 6 
4.BG AT, CZ, FR, DE, PL, ES,  6 
5.CN AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK 15 
6.EG AT, FR, DE, IT, ES 5 
7.MA AT, BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, NO, ES 8 
8.NG AT, FR, DE, ES, UK 5 
9.PK AT, DK, FR, DE, IT, NO, ES, UK 8 
10.RO AT, BE, CZ, DK, FR, DE, HU, IT, NO, PL, ES, SE. 12 
11.RU AT, BE, CZ DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, NO, PL, ES, SE 13 
12.TN AT, BE, FR, DE, IT 5 
13.UA AT, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, PL 9 
13 origin  16 Different host countries 101 pairs 
 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK  
 
  
50 
 
Table1.15 Country Pairs for non-OtO Flows at Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
Origin Host No of pairs 
1.DZ BE, FR, DE, ES 4 
2.AM FR, DE, PL, ES 4 
3.BA AT, FR, DE, NO, SE 5 
4.BG AT, CZ, FR, DE, PL, ES,  6 
5.CN AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK 14 
6.EG AT, FR, DE, IT, ES 5 
7.MA BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, ES 6 
8.NG AT, DE, ES, UK 4 
9.PK AT, DK, FR, DE, IT, NO, ES, UK 8 
10.RO AT, BE, CZ, DK, FR, DE, HU, IT, NO, ES, SE. 11 
11.RU AT, BE, CZ DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, NO, PL, ES, SE 13 
12.TN BE, FR, DE, IT 4 
13.UA, AT, CZ, DK, FR, DE, HU, IT, PL 8 
13 origin  16 Different host countries 92 pairs 
 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK  
 
Table1.16 Country Pairs for non-OtO Flows at Threshold 0.5(500 and more people)  
Origin Host No of pairs 
1.DZ BE, FR, DE, ES 4 
2.AM FR, DE, PL, ES 4 
3.BA AT, DE, SE 3 
4.BG AT, DE, ES,  3 
5.CN AT, BE, DK, FR, DE, HU, IT, NL, PL, ES, SE, UK 12 
6.EG AT, FR, DE, IT,  4 
7.MA BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, ES 6 
8.NG AT, DE, ES, UK 4 
9.PK FR, DE, IT, NO, ES, UK 6 
10.RO AT, BE, FR, DE, HU, IT, ES, SE. 8 
11.RU AT, BE, CZ FI, FR, DE, IT, NO, PL, ES, SE 11 
12.TN FR, DE, IT 3 
13.UA AT, CZ, DK, FR, DE, HU, IT, PL 8 
13 origin  16 Different host countries 76 pairs 
 AT, BE, CZ, DK, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, ES, SE, UK  
 
51 
 
APPENDIX B 
Figure1.1 Actual and Predicted broadband penetration rates for country pairs OtO Flows at 
Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
Poland-Germany             Turkey-Germany             Poland-UK                 Germany-Austria             Italy-Germany 
       
  Netherlands-Belgium        Sweden-Norway        Belgium-Luxembourg     Turkey-Netherlands     Denmark-Sweden 
       
         
Figure1.2 Actual and Predicted broadband penetration rates for country pairs OtO Flows at 
Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
    Poland-Germany                  Turkey-Germany            Poland-UK            Germany-Austria Italy-Germany 
         
Netherlands-Belgium Sweden-Norway    Belgium-Luxembourg Turkey-Netherlands     Denmark-Sweden 
         
 
Actual broadband penetration rate                            Predicted broadband penetration rate- - - - - - - - -  
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Figure1.3 Actual and Predicted broadband penetration rates for country pairs OtO Flows at 
Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
Poland-Germany           Turkey-Germany      Poland-UK            Germany-Austria       Italy-Germany 
         
Netherlands-Belgium        Sweden-Norway   Belgium-Luxembourg   Turkey-Netherlands     Denmark-Sweden 
        
 
Figure1.4 Actual and Predicted broadband penetration rates for country pairs non-OtO Flows 
at Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
  
   Algeria-France             Russia-Germany                Bosnia -Austria                  Bulgaria-Spain         China-Spain 
       
  Ukraine-Germany         Morocco-France                  Morocco-Spain               Romania-Germany                Romania-Spain 
       
 
Actual broadband penetration rate                             Predicted broadband penetration rate- - - - - - - - -  
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 Figure1. 5 Actual and Predicted broadband penetration rates for country pairs non-OtO Flows 
at Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
   Algeria-France   Russia-Germany                Bosnia -Austria                Bulgaria-Spain              China-Spain 
       
   Ukraine-Germany          Morocco-France          Morocco-Spain                 Romania-Germany            Romania-Spain 
       
 
Figure1.6 Actual and Predicted broadband penetration rates for country pairs non-OtO Flows 
at Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
   Algeria-France         Russia-Germany        Bosnia -Austria                Bulgaria-Spain             China-Spain 
       
  Ukraine-Germany  Morocco-France           Morocco-Spain Romania-Germany               Romania-Spain 
       
 
Actual broadband penetration rate                             Predicted broadband penetration rate- - - - - - - - -  
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APPENDIX C 
Table1. 17 Descriptive Statistics for Actual and Predicted Broadband 
 Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
OTO 0.1 Threshold 
ijBROAD  2220 0.0176976 0.02768 8.89e-0.7 0.1304825 
ijhatBROAD _  1981 0.0194699 0.0293502 0 0.1342842 
OTO 0.3 Threshold  
ijBROAD  1770 0.0182054 0.0282747 9.46e-07 0.1304609 
ijhatBROAD _  1580 0.0200022 0.0300073 0 0.1342842 
OTO 0.5 Threshold  
ijBROAD  1500 0.0175877 0.0275892 9.87e-07 0.1291897 
ijhatBROAD _  1342 0.019256 0.029271 0 0.122237 
Non-OTO 0.1 Threshold  
ijBROAD  1515 0.0026988 0.0058787 2.35e-08 0.0504853 
ijhatBROAD _  1359 0.0029813 0.0068128 0 0.0470337 
Non-OTO 0.3 Threshold  
ijBROAD  1380 0.0027747 0.0060423 2.31e-0.8 0.0501948 
ijhatBROAD _  1233 0.0030777 0.0069958 0 0.0470337 
Non-OTO 0.5 Threshold  
ijBROAD  1140 0.0025518 0.0055387 3.68e-08 0.0480635 
ijhatBROAD _  1015 0.0028398 0.0064991 0 0.0410672 
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APPENDIX D 
Table1.18 Migration flows from OECD to OECD countries and broadband penetration rate 
Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Broadband penetration rate (
tijBROAD , ) 
-0.031(0.024) 0.007(0.009) 0.004(0.008) 0.024*(0.013) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.507***(0.054) -0.461**(0.158)  -0.702*(0.390) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.236***(0.022) -0.241**(0.067) -0.167(0.441) -0.340*(0.132) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.344***(0.077) 0.205**(0.084) 0.205**(0.087) 0.348(0.244) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 0.049***(0.012) -0.020(0.015) -0.021(0.015) -0.001(0.019) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.017***(0.003) 0.011(0.009) 0.026**(0.013) 0.015(0.018) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.420**(0.132) 0.319**(0.111) 0.315**(0.113) 0.008(0.140) 
Years since broadband introduced (
B
tijT , ) 
0.277**(0.127) 0.116**(0.040) 0.095**(0.042) 0.139**(0.041) 
Constant  1.233(0.750) 0.991(1.489) -3.221**(1.213) 3.552(2.692) 
2R  0.16 0.17 0.17  
N  1413 1413 1413 1403 
Country pairs 148 148 148 148 
Notes: A panel of data for 148 country pairs for OtO flows estimations for 1995-2009. Model (1)-Model (4) present the OLS, random effect, 
fixed effect, dynamic GMM, respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. AR (1) and AR(2) 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test for GMM are, -2.556(0.011) and 1.108(0.268) respectively and AR(2) shows no evidence of 
autocorrelation at a conventional level of significance.  
 
Table1.19 Migration flows from OECD to OECD countries and broadband penetration rate 
Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
( )log
,tij
FLOWS  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Broadband penetration rate (
tijBROAD , ) 
-0.007(0.024) -0.003(0.009) -0.005(0.008) 0.003(0.016) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.389***(0.057) -0.302*(0.166)  -0.733(0.579) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.233***(0.020) -0.316***(0.066) -0.917*(0.472) -0.306(0.198) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.053(0.082) 0.219**(0.090) 0.206**(0.091) 0.139(0.188) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 0.054***(0.011) -0.013(0.016) -0.021(0.016) 0.021(0.059) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.013***(0.003) 0.014(0.010) 0.029**(0.013) 0.011(0.017) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.240*(0.136) 0.560***(0.124) 0.574***(0.127) 0.117(0.190) 
Years since broadband introduced (
B
tijT , ) 
0.218*(0.122) 0.118**(0.039) 0.093**(0.041) 0.156***(0.037) 
Constant  3.114***(0.857) -0.265(1.602) -3.125**(1.247) 4.751(3.554) 
2R  0.15 0.24 0.25  
 N  1130 1130 1130 1121 
Country pairs 118 118 118 118 
Notes: A panel of data for 118 country pairs for OtO flows estimations for 1995-2009. Model (1)-Model (6) present the OLS, random effect, 
fixed effect, dynamic GMM, 2nd stage of Instrumental variable, second stage of instrumental variable with fixed effect, respectively. Robust 
t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. AR (1) and AR (2) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test for GMM are, --
1.664(0.096) and 0.717(0.473) respectively and AR(2) shows no evidence of autocorrelation at a conventional level of significance. 
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Table1.20 Migration flows from OECD to OECD countries and broadband penetration rate 
Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Broadband penetration rate (
tijBROAD , ) 
-0.015(0.024) -0.003(0.009) -0.001(0.009) 0.000(0.014) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.155**(0.059) -0.108(0.170)  -0.641*(0.379) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.188**(0.022) -0.271***(0.068) -1.263**(0.508) -0.286*(0.149) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.119*(0.069) 0.128*(0.076) 0.095(0.069) 0.095(0.141) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 0.046***(0.012) 0.015(0.018) 0.027(0.018) 0.019(0.092) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.004(0.003) 0.015(0.010) 0.024(0.015) 0.005(0.020) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.374**(0.139) 0.582***(0.131) 0.603***(0.133) 0.193(0.136) 
Years since broadband introduced (
B
tijT , ) 
0.215*(0.125) 0.107*(0.043) 0.083*(0.046) 0.136*(0.071) 
Constant  0.475(0.796) -0.702(1.545) -1.642(1.238) 4.128(2.679) 
2R  0.10 0.23 0.25  
N  953 953 953 948 
Country pairs 100 100 100 100 
Notes. A panel of data for 100 country pairs for OtO flows estimations for 1995-2009. Model (1)-Model (6) present the OLS, random effect, 
fixed effect, dynamic GMM, second stage of Instrumental variable, second stage of instrumental variable with fixed effect, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. AR (1) and AR (2) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test for GMM are, 
-1.637(0.102) and 0.807(0.420) respectively and both results show no evidence of autocorrelation at a conventional level of significance. 
 
 
 
Table1.21 Migration flows from non-OECD to OECD countries and broadband penetration rate 
Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Broadband penetration rate (
tijBROAD , ) 
0.025(0.019) 0.026**(0.009) -0.011(0.012) 0.007(0.008) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
0.050(0.090) -0.116(0.243)  0.211(0.197) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.354***(0.031) 0.039(0.074) 1.090**(0.309) -0.074(0.057) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.028(0.101) 0.035(0.153) 0.047(0.149) 0.104(0.233) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) -0.087***(0.009) 0.015(0.011) 0.021*(0.012) 0.030**(0.010) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.036***(0.004) -0.008(0.012) 0.019(0.017) -0.029(0.018) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
-0.200(0.279) 0.705***(0.163) 0.801***(0.154) 0.361**(0.139) 
Years since broadband introduced (
B
tijT , ) 
0.343**(0.162) -0.011(0.052) -0.160**(0.056) -0.037(0.086) 
Constant  3.031**(1.052) 2.461(2.196) 0.303(1.549) 1.649(2.122) 
2R  0.25 0.21 0.26  
N  770 770 770 768 
Country pairs 101 101 101 101 
Notes. A panel of data for 101 country pairs for non-OtO flows estimations for 1995-2009. Model (1)-Model (6) present the OLS, random 
effect, fixed effect, dynamic GMM, 2nd stage of Instrumental variable, second stage of instrumental variable with fixed effect, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. AR (1) and AR (2) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test for GMM are, 
-2.904(0.003) and -1.935(0.060) respectively and AR(2) shows no evidence of autocorrelation at a 5% level of significance. 
 
 
57 
 
Table1.22 Migration flows from non-OECD to OECD countries and broadband penetration rate 
Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Broadband penetration rate (
tijBROAD , ) 
0.029(0.018) 0.031***(0.009) -0.005(0.012) 0.008(0.010) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.090(0.084) -0.219(0.232)  0.068(0.219) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.296***(0.031) 0.052(0.068) 1.042**(0.314) -0.027(0.073) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
-0.006(0.103) 0.055(0.145) 0.140(0.148) -0.071(0.249) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) -0.081***(0.009) 0.015(0.011) 0.022*(0.012) -0.019*(0.011) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.029***(0.004) -0.006(0.011) 0.020(0.017) -0.024(0.022) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
-0.158(0.275) 0.731***(0.166) 0.827***(0.156) 0.384***(0.104) 
Years since broadband introduced (
B
tijT , ) 
0.192(0.156) -0.044(0.053) -0.185**(0.056) -0.045(0.060) 
Constant  4.263***(0.998) 2.765(2.134) -0.277(1.557) 2.241(2.536) 
2R  0.23 0.25 0.30  
N  702 702 702 700 
Country pairs 92 92 92 92 
Notes. A panel of data for 92 country pairs for non-OtO flows estimations for 1995-2009. Model (1)-Model (6)  present the OLS, random 
effect, fixed effect, dynamic GMM, 2nd stage of Instrumental variable, second stage of instrumental variable with fixed effect, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. AR (1) and AR (2) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test for GMM are, 
-2.958(0.003) and -1.744(0.081) respectively and AR (2) shows no evidence of autocorrelation at a 5% level of significance. 
 
Table1.23 Migration flows from non-OECD to OECD countries and broadband penetration rate 
Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Broadband penetration rate (
tijBROAD , ) 
0.008(0.016) 0.027**(0.009) -0.007(0.013) -0.002(0.009) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.362***(0.070) -0.394*(0.203)  -0.312(0.266) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.225***(0.026) 0.029(0.063) 0.877**(0.342) 0.091(0.090) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.346***(0.077) 0.159(0.168) 0.202(0.180) 0.085(0.166) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) -0.075***(0.008) 0.006(0.011) 0.017(0.013) -0.016(0.015) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.029(0.003) -0.008(0.011) 0.025(0.019) -0.011(0.020) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.574**(0.263) 0.735**(0.214) 0.813***(0.202) 0.441***(0.11
3) Years since broadband introduced (
B
tijT , ) 
0.179(0.155) -0.050(0.054) -0.182**(0.060) -0.061(0.071) 
Constant  3.865***(0.774) 3.858**(1.924) -0.755(1.815) 3.461(2.266) 
2R  0.31 0.20 0.25  
 N  575 575 575 573 
Country pairs 76 76 76 76 
Notes. A panel of data for 76 country pairs for non-OtO flows estimations for 1995-2009. Model (1)-Model (6) present the OLS, random 
effect, fixed effect, dynamic GMM,  second stage of Instrumental variable,  second stage of instrumental variable with fixed effect, 
respectively. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at *10%, **5%, ***1%. AR (1) and AR (2) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
for GMM are, -2.835(0.005) and -1.598(0.110) respectively and AR (2) shows no evidence of autocorrelation at a conventional level of 
significance. 
 
58 
 
APPENDIX E 
Table1.24 Diffusion curve for first stage of Instrumental Variable Model: OtO flows at 
Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
 Dependent variable: 
ijMOB  Dependent variable:: ijISDN  
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 
0.235*(0.122) 0.032*(0.002) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) 
-0.534(0.326) 0.010(0.008) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.403**(0.195) 0.117***(0.010) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2003.572***(2.845) 1995.204***(0.232) 
Constant -0.132 (0.780) 6.087***(0.221) 
2R  0.11 0.19 
N  2078 1794 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 122.12(0.000) 117.83(0.000) 
 
Table1.25 Diffusion curve for first stage of Instrumental Variable Model: OtO flows  at 
Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
 Dependent variable: 
ijMOB  Dependent variable:: ijISDN  
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 
0.265*(0.149) 0.034*(0.002) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) 
-0.627(0.401) 0.004(0.008) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.415*(0.238) 0.122***(0.010) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2003.440***(3.172) 1995.082***(0.231) 
Constant -0.403(0.914) 5.917***(0.215) 
2R  0.11 0.19 
N  1475 1275 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 99.16(0.000) 98.12(0.000) 
 
Table1.26 Diffusion curve for first stage of Instrumental Variable Model: OtO flows at 
Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
 Dependent variable: 
ijMOB  Dependent variable:: ijISDN  
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 
0.069(0.036) 0.033*(0.003) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) 
-0.183(0.086) 0.015(0.010) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.396*(0.104) 0.117***(0.012) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2003.343***(1.745) 1995.064***(0.280) 
Constant 2.008*(0.734) 5.999***(0.262) 
2R  0.30 0.19 
N  1177 1014 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 91.08(0.000) 87.11(0.000) 
In Table 1.23-1.25, 
ijMOB is calculated as ji MOBMOB   where and iMOB are the mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the 
origin and 
jMOB are the mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the host. ijISDN is calculated as ji ISDNISDN  where 
iISDN is the integrated services digital network subscribers per 100 in the origin and jISDN  is the integrated services digital network 
subscribers per 100 in the host. 
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Table1.27 Diffusion curve for first stage of Instrumental Variable Model: non-OtO flows at 
Threshold 0.1 (100 and more people) 
 Dependent variable: 
ijMOB   Dependent variable:: ijISDN  
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 0.191*(0.074) 0.000(0.011) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) -0.353*(0.167) 0.125*(0.055) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.785**(0.296) -9.193(5.081) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2005.563***(0.980) 2008.178***(9.872) 
Constant 0.815**(0.239) 6.419***(0.065) 
2R  0.29 0.14 
N  1425 1163 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 7.33(0.000) 6.11(0.000) 
 
Table1.28 Diffusion curve for first stage of Instrumental Variable Model: non-OtO flows at 
Threshold 0.3 (300 and more people) 
 Dependent variable: 
ijMOB   Dependent variable:: ijISDN  
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 0.201*(0.082) 0.000(0.010) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) -0.300(0.170) 0.072(0.055) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.789**(0.336) -7.866(4.708) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2005.558***(1.098) 2008.355***(21.283) 
Constant 0.635**(0.203) 6.112***(0.066) 
2R  0.29 0.15 
N  1275 1047 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 6.15(0.000) 5.39(0.000) 
 
Table1.29 Diffusion curve for first stage of Instrumental Variable Model: non-OtO flows at 
Threshold 0.5(500 and more people) 
 Dependent variable: 
ijMOB   Dependent variable:: ijISDN  
Voice telephony penetration rate (
1997,ijVOICE ) 0.247(0.108) 0.008(0.012) 
Cable TV penetration rate (
1997,ijCABLE ) -0.320(0.195) 0.233(0.062) 
Diffusion speed (  ) 0.836*(0.446) -7.791(7.523) 
Inflexion point ( ) 2005.527***(1.243) 2008.398***(38.495) 
Constant 0.373**(0.185) 5.351***(0.075) 
2R  0.28 0.15 
N  1035 855 
F-test (p-values in parenthesis) 5.12(0.000) 4.27(0.000) 
In Table 1.26-1.28
ijMOB is calculated as ji MOBMOB   where and iMOB is the mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the 
origin and 
jMOB is the mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in the host. ijISDN is calculated as ji ISDNISDN  where iISDN
is the integrated services digital network subscribers per 100 in the origin and 
jISDN  is the integrated services digital network subscribers 
per 100 in the host. 
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APPENDIX F 
Table1.30 Additional Robustness Checks for OtO Flows 
 Dependant variable: Log of migration flows  (1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, ) 0.0447***(0.0130) 0.0359***(0.0124) 0.0370***(0.0138) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  -0.689***(0.208) -0.744***(0.222) -0.489**(0.224) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) -0.327***(0.0742) -0.439***(0.0734) -0.390***(0.0778) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 0.0442*(0.0254) 0.0342(0.0232) 0.0323(0.0253) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 0.003(0.00964) 0.00517(0.00949) 0.00712(0.0112) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) -0.0193(0.0128) 0.0224**(0.0111) 0.0273**(0.0119) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  0.675***(0.148) 0.912***(0.151) 0.929***(0.177) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  
0.009(0.017) 0.007(0.015) -0.002(0.016) 
ijTEL  0.577(0.581) 0.836(0.587) 0.650(0.707) 
ijCABLE  -0.748(0.522) -1.665 (0.541) -1.354*(0.692) 
Constant 3.697**(1.605) 4.042**(1.601) 2.136(1.560) 
2R  0.26 0.34 0.34 
Country pairs 148 118 100 
 
Table1.31 Additional Robustness Checks for non-OtO Flows 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, ) 0.086***(0.016) 0.086***(0.015) 0.091***(0.018) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  -0.073(0.29) -0.172(0.252) -0.395*(0.240) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) -0.312***(0.100) -0.260***(0.094) -0.183**(0.092) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 0.071*(0.043) 0.089**(0.037) 0.100***(0.036) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 0.002(0.012) 0.001(0.013) 0.005(0.014) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 0.015(0.017) 0.018(0.016) 0.012(0.017) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  0.785***(0.157) 0.807***(0.163) 0.847***(0.209) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  -0.052(0.0526) -0.065(0.0496) -0.096(0.065) 
ijTEL  -0.578(0.395) -0.874*(0.392) -0.768*(0.395) 
ijCABLE  0.195(0.279) 0.498(0.242) 0.274(0.257) 
Constant -1.233(2.500) 0.941(2.293) 3.540*(2.029) 
2R  0.32 0.35 0.33 
Country pairs 101 92 76 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Table1.32 Robustness check with additional control variables: OtO for Thresholds 0.1 0.3 0.5 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.011(0.017) 0.035*(0.017) 0.044**(0.018) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.528**(0.045) -0.364**(0.046) -0.175***(0.048) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.267**(0.018) -0.275**(0.016) -0.224***(0.018) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.094*(0.036) -0.042(0.033) -0.025(0.031) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
0.049*(0.009) 0.051*(0.009) 0.043**(0.010) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.018(0.003) -0.011(0.003) -0.001(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.260*(0.105) 0.114*(0.107) 0.289**(0.109) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.113(0.025) 0.081(0.023) 0.054(0.024) 
Voice telephony penetration rate(
ijTELlog_ ) 
0.688(0.098) 0.465(0.101) 0.324*(0.104) 
Constant  4.699***(0.515) 4.517***(0.512) 2.417***(0.532) 
2R  0.18 0.16 0.13 
N  2064 1644 1409 
Country pairs 148 118 100 
Estimation results for the second stage results for panels of 148, 118, and 100 OtO country pairs in (I), (II), (III) respectively. Here, 
ijTELlog
is the digital landline telephone penetration rate per 100 inhabitants, obtained from the ITU (International Telecommunication 
Union) ICT Database.  
 
Table1.33 Robustness check with additional control variables non-OtO for Thresholds 0.1 0.3 
0.5 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.073**(0.013) 0.097***(0.013) 0.076***(0.013) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.045(0.072) -0.216**(0.067) -0.462**(0.058) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.295**(0.023) -0.238**(0.022) -0.191**(0.020) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.082*(0.041) 0.047(0.041) 0.197***(0.038) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
-0.063(0.007) -0.057(0.007) -0.059(0.006) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.030(0.003) -0.022(0.003) -0.022(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.076(0.298) 0.140*(0.300) 0.959***(0.265) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.021(0.073) -0.078(0.072) -0.215*(0.081) 
ijTELlog_  
0.062(0.047) -0.092(0.046) -0.045(0.043) 
Constant  3.211***(0.624) 4.269***(0.570) 5.522***(0.503) 
2R  0.20 0.20 0.28 
N  1397 1277 1049 
Country pairs 148 118 100 
Estimation results for the second stage results for panel of 148, 118, and 100 OtO country pairs in (I), (II), (III) respectively. Here, 
ijTELlog
is the digital landline telephone rate per 100 inhabitants, obtained from the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) ICT Database.  
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Table1.34 Robustness check with additional control variables: OtO for Thresholds 0.1 0.3& 0.5 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.022*(0.016) 0.026*(0.016) 0.038**(0.017) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.745**(0.045) -0.528**(0.045) -0.329**(0.047) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.694**(0.024) -0.605**(0.027) -0.529**(0.028) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.001*(0.000) 0.002*(0.000) 0.002*(0.000) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
0.058*(0.008) 0.056*(0.009) 0.053*(0.009) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
0.007**(0.003) 0.004(0.003) 0.011(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.039(0.090) -0.085(0.096) 0.062(0.096) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.066*(0.023) 0.060(0.022) 0.046(0.023) 
ijphntrafficlog_  
0.872*(0.034) 0.659*(0.037) 0.587*(0.037) 
Constant  -13.937***(0.804) -10.243***(0.871) -10.399***(0.875) 
2R  0.35 0.29 0.25 
N  1906 1517 1300 
Country pairs 148 118 100 
Models (I), (II), (III) present the results for OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate thresholds, respectively. Here,
ijphntrafficlog_ is calculated as international incoming fixed-telephone traffic itrafficinlog_  in the origin times by 
international outgoing fixed-telephone traffic 
jtrafficoutlog_  in the host in minutes, respectively. 
Table1.35 Robustness check with additional control variables: non-OtO for Thresholds 0.1, 0.3 
& 0.5   
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.077***(0.013) 0.087***(0.013) 0.106***(0.013) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.125*(0.070) -0.237**(0.065) -0.429**(0.058) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
-0.556**(0.033) -0.491**(0.034) -0.380**(0.031) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.010(0.007) 0.011*(0.006) 0.011*(0.008) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
-0.053(0.007) -0.051(0.007) -0.052(0.007) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.023(0.003) -0.016(0.003) -0.015(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.162(0.297) 0.246(0.295) 0.793*(0.273) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.039(0.081) -0.076(0.080) -0.191*(0.086) 
ijphntrafficlog_  
0.670(0.070) 0.623(0.069) 0.429*(0.062) 
Constant  -10.366***(1.513) -8.037***(1.493) -2.155(1.364) 
2R  0.30 0.28 0.33 
N  1243 1132 923 
Country pairs 101 92 76 
Models (I), (II), (III) present the results for non-OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate thresholds, respectively. Here,
ijphntrafficlog_ is calculated as international incoming fixed-telephone traffic itrafficinlog_  in the origin multiplied by 
international outgoing fixed-telephone traffic 
jtrafficoutlog_  in the host in minutes, respectively. 
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Table1.36 Robustness check OtO for Thresholds 0.1, 0.3 & 0.5 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  0.006(0.017) 0.007*(0.018) 0.014*(0.019) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.931***(0.050) -0.740***(0.048) -0.603***(0.053) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) 
0.213(0.057) -0.178*(0.059) -0.197*(0.064) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 0.010(0.001) 0.011(0.006) 0.012*(0.001) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 0.030**(0.009) 0.022*(0.009) 0.026**(0.010) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
0.010**(0.004) 0.006(0.004) 0.009*(0.004) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  -0.309(0.086) -0.399(0.092) -0.281(0.095) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.079(0.028) 0.081(0.029) 0.064(0.031) 
Log of incoming phone traffic in origin (
itrafficinlog_ ) 0.135*(0.055) 0.069(0.054) 0.045(0.060) 
Log of outgoing phone traffic in host (
jtrafficoutlog_ ) 1.186**(0.066) 1.055**(0.072) 0.979***(0.077) 
Constant  -22.051***(1.251) -18.670***(1.385) -17.514***(1.377) 
2R  0.54 0.45 0.41 
N  1257 1003 859 
Country pairs 148 118 100 
Models (I), (II), (III) present the results for non-OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate thresholds, respectively. Here,
ijphntrafficlog_ is calculated as international incoming fixed-telephone traffic itrafficinlog_  in the origin multiplied by 
international outgoing fixed-telephone traffic 
jtrafficoutlog_  in the host in minutes, respectively. 
Table1.37  Robustness check non-OtO for Thresholds 0.1, 0.3 &0. 5 
Dependant variable: Log of migration flows 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Predicted penetration rate ( hatBROAD tij _, )  
0.028**(0.013) 0.049***(0.013) 0.065***(0.013) 
Log of distance ( )log ijDIST  
-0.701***(0.075) -0.767***(0.068) -0.835***(0.061) 
Log of relative real GDP (
tijRGDP ,log ) -0.154(0.044) -0.195(0.043) -0.117(0.041) 
Log of wage in the host country (
tjwage ,log ) 
0.011*(0.002) 0.009(0.006) 0.004*(0.007) 
Unemployment rate in the origin (
tiUnempr , ) 
-0.007(0.007) -0.006(0.007) -0.019(0.007) 
Employment rate in the host (
tjEmpr , ) 
-0.023(0.003) -0.019(0.003) -0.020(0.003) 
Dummy=1if no restriction )( ,tijFREE  
0.921**(0.330) 0.897**(0.325) 1.198***(0.336) 
Predicted years )_( , hatT tij
  0.034(0.121) -0.059(0.118) -0.159(0.134) 
Log of incoming phone traffic in origin (
itrafficinlog_ ) 0.300(0.060) 0.239(0.060) 0.200(0.057) 
Log of outgoing phone traffic in host (
jtrafficoutlog_ ) 
0.973**(0.057) 0.928***(0.056) 0.718*(0.050) 
Constant  -18.830***(1.376) -15.963***(1.359) -9.676***(1.312) 
2R  0.43 0.43 0.46 
N  1012 929 744 
Country pairs 101 92 76 
Models (I), (II), (III) present the results for non-OtO flows with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 rate thresholds, respectively. Here,
ijphntrafficlog_ is calculated as international incoming fixed-telephone traffic itrafficinlog_  in the origin multiplied by 
international outgoing fixed-telephone traffic 
jtrafficoutlog_  in the host in minutes, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2  
The Impact of Immigration on Productivity:  
Industry-level Evidence for Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK 
“Productivity is not everything, but in the long run it is almost everything” 
Paul Krugman (1990, p.9) 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, labour has become increasingly mobile but little attention has been 
paid to its effect on firms’ productivity in the host country. By contrast, the effect of labour 
mobility has been extensively analysed for the host county’s wages, employment, 
unemployment, house prices, Gross Domestic Product, imports, exports, public welfare, 
foreign direct investment, labour costs and business activity (Angrist and Kugler, 2003; 
Rowthorn, 2008; González and Ortega, 2008; Borjas, 1994:1995; Zorlu and Hartog, 2005; 
Card, 2005; Mete, 2004). Immigration’s effect on firms’ productivity remains unnoticed, and 
only a few studies have recently paid attention to it. As Gatto et al. (2011) pointed out in their 
extended survey on productivity measurement, attention on productivity research has moved 
from country level towards firm level, since the effects on productivity can be investigated 
more clearly at a disaggregate level.  
One motivation of this chapter is to explore the various ways there are for measuring 
productivity and we provide further insights on this in Section 2.2.3. Another motivation is to 
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focus on the productivity effect of migration on the host country’s firms, to redress the 
absence of such studies. 
The chapter will focus on the productivity effects of migration in four European Union (EU) 
countries: the UK, Spain and the Netherlands for 1995-2008 and Germany for 2002-2008. 
This analysis was carried out using EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) and EU-KLEMS data. 
Though potentially interesting, it was not possible to investigate the migration and 
productivity links for Italy, France, Belgium and Sweden because of data limitations. Limited 
industry codes were available for Belgium and Finland. For Italy, we only found three 
discontinuous years of migration data. Finally, for Sweden we could not find enough labour 
input variables. Detailed descriptions of the databases are provided in Section 2.3. 
The UK and Germany have similar long histories of migration as they have both attracted 
numerous migrants from across the world. Spain has become a new popular alternative host in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. The Netherlands has been a host with steady migration flows and 
stock according to figures from the OECD Migration Database. The different migration 
patterns for these countries mean that we are able to analyse their effect on different 
productivity outcomes. To do this, the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts 
Database and the EU LFS database are used together. The EU KLEMS database captures a 
wide range of productivity variables such as gross output, gross value added and intermediate 
inputs. The EU LFS is used to calculate migrant labour composition, which enables us to 
disaggregate immigrant workers by their educational attainment. Because the demand for skill 
groups may differ across host countries (Bauer and Kunze, 2004), we expect to observe 
variation in the productivity results. 
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In this chapter, the large range of productivity variables provided by the EU KLEMS database 
is combined with the EU LFS, so that detailed information on the share of migrants in each 
industry is calculated. Descriptions for all the variables in the EU KLEMS database are 
available in Timmer et al. (2007a). 
According to the EU LFS database, a migrant is defined as someone whose country of birth is 
different from their country of residence. The productivity implications of migration are more 
likely to be seen in the long run than in the short-run. Using a Cobb Douglas production 
function, we provide both the short-run and long-run effects of migration across industries for 
the four EU countries. While doing so, we desegregate migrants into high, medium and low 
skill groups as described by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 
(5-6), ISCED (3-4), ISCED (1-2) codes within the EU LFS database. This allows us to pay 
attention to the different effects of migration by different skill groups.  
In order to investigate the long-run impact of migration on firm productivity, we apply the 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) variant for the autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) estimator. 
The PMG estimator constrains the long-run coefficients to be identical across firms but allows 
short-run coefficients and error variances to vary across units. The PMG estimator has been 
shown to deliver consistent results if the lag order is specified correctly (Pesaran et al. 2012). 
We use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to determine the optimal lag length.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature in two dimensions. First, it 
covers the general effects of migration on the host country’s economic activity; it then 
continues by reviewing the literature on the effects of migration on in the host country at 
country and industry level. Section 2.3 describes the data capture while Section 2.4 
empirically analyses the data and present the results, and provide some robustness checks. 
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Section 2.5 concludes and summarises the results. Appendix H presents descriptive statistics 
for the UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany. Finally, Appendix I provides some 
additional robustness checks. 
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Effect of international migration on the economic activity of the host 
country 
Numerous studies have shown that there is an absolute effect of migration on the host 
country’s economy in several ways. For instance, Mete (2004) showed that migration had a 
positive and significant effect on GDP per capita, and an adverse and significant effect on 
unemployment, in Finland between 1981 and 2001. Nikolaj et al. (2009) investigated whether 
immigrant workers take jobs away from native workers by looking at the Integrated Database 
of Labour Market Research (IDA) for Denmark for 1980-2004 and found no strong evidence 
of this, but stated that a negligible number of highly skilled workers may be displaced by 
migrant workers. Similarly, Venturini and Villosio (2006) analysed whether migrant workers 
displaced natives’ job in regions of Italy between 1993 and 1997, and found a positive but not 
remarkable effect; in fact natives and migrant workers were found to complement each other. 
However, Angrist and Kugler (2003) found a significant adverse effect of migration on 
natives’ employment opportunities within European countries from 1983 to 1999. 
 Looking at the well-known Mariel Boatlift migration of unskilled workers from Cuba to 
Miami in the 1980s, Card (1990) showed no negative migration effect on the unemployment 
and wages of non-Cuban workers but in the long run it result in a decrease in the number of 
Cuban migrants. Borjas et al. (1996) suggested that migration effects on native workers’ 
outcomes may depend on regional labour market conditions, and found a negative effect on 
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low skilled native wages, but a slightly positive effect on medium skilled native wages in the 
American labour market in the 1980s and 1990s. Following this, Borjas (2003) pointed out 
that in general, migration was found to have an adverse wage effect on natives in the USA 
between 1960 and 2000, but the magnitude of the effect varies across different age groups of 
natives. Card (2005), however, found little evidence of migration’s effect on low skilled 
native wages in the USA in the 1990s. Most empirical research has found that in the long run 
migrants earn more than native workers, and have an adverse effect on the employment 
opportunities of natives, and yet make a promising positive contribution to the host country’s 
economy (Borjas 1994, 1995; Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Zorlu and Hartog 2005). According 
to Gonzáles and Ortega (2008), immigration has a negative employment rate effect on 
Spanish industries only for low-educated workers, using cross-section data OLS with effects 
fixed for region and education. The migration effect is not limited to the host country’s 
economy; there is also bilateral trade between home country and host country, as migrants 
have good knowledge of market opportunities in both country pairs. For instance, Head and 
Ries (1998) showed that migrants contributed to trade between Canada and 136 different 
origin countries between 1980 and1992. Also, migration may have different effects in regard 
to immigrants’ legal status. As Borjas and Tienda (1993) pointed out, legal migrants tend to 
earn much more than those who are illegal. To an extent, legal migrants may find better 
quality jobs than illegal migrants, whereas illegal migrants might take less well paid and more 
demanding jobs as they are not in a position to be selective. Jean and Jiménez (2011) found 
no significant effect of migration on any economic activity of the host country, but found a 
slight adverse impact on native employment in the long run within eighteen OECD countries 
for 19 years. Rowthorn (2008) investigated advanced economics with a high percentage of 
migration to examine whether migration caused any fiscal issues in the host country, but 
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found no evidence of positive or negative effect, only a slight adverse effect for temporary 
migration. Migration’s effect on the labour market is generally found to crucially depend on 
skill distribution, meaning that if the skill of migrants and natives is perfectly elastic, or in 
another word, they are perfect substitutes, then no essential adverse effect of migration on the 
labour market is observed, but it is negative and significant if otherwise (Dustmann et al., 
2008; D’Amuri et al., 2010; Card, 1997; Brücker and Jahn, 2011). 
Thus, migration appears to affecting the host countries’ economy in several ways, depending 
upon the migrants’ skill distribution, the prosperity of the host country, migration policy in 
the host, the duration of stay in the host country and suchlike. The following section will 
capture the productivity effect of migration at country and firm level separately.  
2.2.2. Migration and productivity 
In order to gain a general perspective on the productivity effect of migration, we review both 
country and firm level effects of productivity separately as follows: 
2.2.2.1. Country level 
Rozelle et al. (1999) suggested that migrants have negative and significant effects on 
agricultural productivity, at least in the short run, under the consideration of households and 
migrants characteristics using a survey of 787 farm households across 31 villages in north-
east China in 1995. Based on the fact that over 130 million farmers migrated to rural China, 
Bhattacharyya and Parker (1999) showed that in the short run there was a negligible 
contribution of migration on agriculture productivity in rural regions of China, however the 
productivity appeared to increase in the longer run, using the Chinese Agricultural Statistics 
Yearbooks for 1980-1995. Taylor and Feldman (2010) looked at a contrasting perspective that 
a higher migration share raised the rural productivity of the origin country via flows of 
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remittance in the Mexico-to-US case, looking at the extent to which flows of remittance can 
be considered as capital flows to an origin country which results in increasing productivity. 
According to Peri (2012), migration is found to have a significant contribution to the total 
factor productivity of US states amongst less skilled jobs. On the contrary he found that high 
skilled immigrants affect the total factor productivity adversely. Because, although there is no 
shortage of high skilled natives in the US states, they are replaced by high skilled migrant for 
less wage but do not perform as natives particularly for a short period. Goldsmith et al. 
(2004), suggested that migrants from rural to urban areas of Senegal increased investment in 
agriculture significantly, which resulted in a productivity increase in agriculture. Using 
establishment-level database and census population data for 1990 and 2000, Lewis (2003) 
showed that migration has little impact on the industry mix and wages across firms in the 
USA. He suggested that the change in the industry mix of labour result in the technology 
adoption of those firms which is followed up by the change in productivity of firms. 
Conde-Ruiz et al. (2008) found a significant and negative effect of migration on the 
productivity of regions in Spain between 2000 and 2006. This time period spans the period 
when new EU countries joined the EU in 2004. As a result, a sudden rise in migration shares 
in several regions of Spain reduced labour costs and that is believed to have decreased 
productivity. However, observing the effect of a sudden change of migration on productivity 
for only two years may not be enough to analyse the genuine productivity effect.  
2.2.2.2. Firm level 
In contrast to country level productivity patterns, the impact of migration on productivity at 
firm level has been paid much less attention. Considering how migrant workers become 
included in the labour force of a host country and how this changes the composition of 
employment across hiring companies, this impact might well deserve investigation. To begin 
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with, Grossman (1982) showed that although migration led capital growth and a small price 
elasticity difference between natives and migrants, in the long run migration was found to 
have a negative contribution across firms in terms of migrants’ effects on natives’ 
employability in the short run, and the wages of natives in the long run in the USA in the 
1970s. Moreover, Winkelman (2001) drew attention to firms recruiting highly educated 
migrants by conducting a survey across 850 firms in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and 
France in 2000, and found that despite the proportion of migrants that firms hired being low, 
the main reasons why firms hire migrants is because it allowed firms to exchange information, 
build rapport in respect of bilateral trade and fulfil a need for a composition of labour skills  
that complements the labour where it is needed most. Thus, it is safe to assume that the 
demand for immigrant workers results from firms taking their productivity into account by 
balancing what they have and what they need. According to Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny 
(2002), a high foreign share of employees in both low and high skill sectors – but especially 
in high skill sectors - resulted in smaller increases in the productivity of firms across US firms 
between 1982 and 1992, this is the fact that the obstacles that immigrants have, such as 
language. However, they found that migration have almost no effect on the total output mix of 
firms. In their paper, the effect of migration on the productivity of firms appeared to be more 
severe if migrants were disaggregated by their skill level. Paserman (2013) investigated 
whether high skilled immigrants from the former Soviet Union increased the productivity of 
manufacturing firms in Israel between 1990 and 1999 by applying both panel data and pooled 
OLS regression, and showed that neither a pooled nor cross-section analysis found any 
correlation between high skilled migrants and productivity across industries in Israel in the 
1990s, while their first difference results indicated some negative effect although not very 
significant effect on  productivity of manufacturing firms, especially amongst low-tech firms 
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compared to high-tech firms, by combining Israel’s Industrial survey and labour force survey. 
More comprehensively, Robinson et al. (2010) analysed how EU and non-EU migrants 
affected productivity across 13 EU countries in various firms using the econometric 
estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function and growth accounting method. They 
aggregated all industries in those 13 EU countries which can give a snapshot of general 
productivity effect of migration. We believe this effect varies for individual host countries in 
the sample- and this is the reason why we investigate such link between migration and 
productivity per country at a time. They also took ICT (information and computing 
technology)/non-ICT based industries into account separately, and concluded that migration 
had a positive contribution to the productivity of the host countries’ industries, mainly in ICT 
based firms. Kangasniemi et al. (2012) analysed productivity changes in Spain and the UK in 
1984-2005 by using Spain and the UK’s Labour Force Surveys (LFS) for the composition of 
migration, respectively, combining these datasets with growth accounting variables provided 
by the EU KLEMS database. They showed negative effects of migration for Spain and 
positive effects for the UK.  Accetturo et al. (2012) drew attention to the effect of low skilled 
migrants on capital intensity across Italian manufacturing firms over the period 1996-2007 
and found a positive and significant impact. Investigating productivity change in accordance 
with migration change is challenging. This is mainly due to the fact that there are multiple 
ways to measure productivity - which will be covered in Section 2.2.3. Another difficult 
aspect of investigating such relationships is the nature of migrants. For instance, migrants 
from EU countries and non-EU countries may act differently in the labour market. Moreover, 
different skill levels might have different effects in the same host country depending upon the 
skill level need in that country. In order to examine whether results varied in line with migrant 
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features, we disaggregated immigrants into EU and non-EU origins, as well as low, medium 
and high skill level.  
2.2.3. Productivity Measurement and Productivity Performance across Europe 
2.2.3.1. Productivity Measurement 
Measuring productivity is challenging, because, multiple factors affect productivity at the 
same time and they may not be easy to either observe or calculate. Several scholars have 
conducted research on how to measure productivity. For instance, according to Ahn (2001), 
measuring productivity can be carried out by either observing changes in productivity levels 
in individual firms relative to the market or observing firm dynamics at a given size of firms. 
Firm dynamics refer to the growth of a firm since the establishment of the firm. Additionally, 
the productivity level of a company has been found to be highly correlated with the skill of 
workers and the technology used in the firms. Thus, labour composition in terms of skills may 
be seen as a crucial factor in terms of measuring productivity. In the European Company 
Survey Overview Riedmann et al. (2009) gave a broad approach to measuring the 
productivity of companies. In this report, the number of employees and personnel, work 
climate, quality of products and services, and quality of the labours were mostly found to be 
relevant for measuring the productivity of firms. However, some of these factors are 
qualitative, and the measurements may depend on assessments by the respondents.  
Throughout the productivity literature, either gross output (GO) or value added (VA) are 
considered as output measurements for assessing firms productivity. These factors are 
positively correlated with both labour and capital inputs. The country or sectoral levels of 
output measures are GDP, GNP , Multi factor productivity (MFP), value added and gross 
output, whereas firm level output measurements are considered to be value added, gross 
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output, MFP and TFP. According to Corrado et al.’s (2006) revised productivity elements 
report, MFP is calculated as the real growth of the country/firm minus the real inputs of the 
country/firm; VA is the cost of both labour and capital inputs; GO is the sum of both finished 
work and work under process; TFP is every single component that operates the growth. The 
question here is how to measure labour input or capital input. The following Table2.1and 
Table 2.2 summarise how the measurement of output and input variables differs for the 
country and firm level base across studies: 
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Table2.1 Measurement of country level productivity 
Authors Output Measurement Labour Input Capital input Methodology 
Nahm and Tani 
(2014) 
Gross contribution of skilled 
migrant based on data 
envelopment analysis. 
Skilled migrant compensation per unit Capital compensation 
per unit 
Econometric estimation of a form 
of a production function 
Kravtsova 
(2013) 
Change in Total Factor 
Productivity (Hungarian 
industries are aggregated) 
Share of foreign ownership and 
engagement in exporting 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Econometric estimation of 
Malmquist productivity index 
Solow (1957) GNP per head of employees 
 
% labour force employed Capital stocks in 
million dollars 
Growth accounting method 
Freeman (2008)  GDP 
 
Total hours worked by employees/ 
alternatively total employment 
Output gained per hour Growth accounting method 
Nordhaus (2001) Growth rate of real income 
(index is used) 
GDP per hour worked (index is used) Changes in output 
gained per hour (index 
is used) 
Growth accounting method 
Inklaar et al 
(2003) 
Gross value added (four 
countries’ industries are 
aggregated) 
 
Labour quality growth as measured by 
the difference between the growth of 
labour and total hours worked 
Capital service flows Growth accounting method 
O’Mahony and 
Timmer (2009) 
Multi factor productivity (value 
added based) 
  
Changes in labour composition Changes in capital 
composition 
Growth accounting method 
Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) 
Total output as an index (first 
value is private domestic 
product prices) 
Sum of labour services as an index Sum of capital services 
as an index 
Theory/Econometric estimation 
of a form of a production function 
 
 
 
81 
 
Table2.2 Measurement of firm level productivity 
Authors Output Measurement Labour Input Capital input Methodology 
Kangasniemi et 
al. (2012) 
Gross value added 
 
Labour services Capital services Growth accounting method 
Robinson et al 
(2010) 
 Multi factor 
productivity value 
added based 
 
Total hours worked by employees 
plus adjustment for migrant labour 
ICT and non-ICT capital 
services 
Growth accounting method and 
econometric estimation of Cobb-
Douglas production function 
Paserman (2013) Gross output 
 
Total hours worked by the share of 
employees plus adjustment for share 
of migrant labour 
Intermediate inputs plus 
material inputs 
Econometric estimation of Cobb-
Douglas production function 
Bettin et al. 
(2012) 
Real output 
 
Average share of foreign employees 
to total employees 
Material plus service inputs Econometric estimation of generalised 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
Bartelsman et al. 
(2013) 
Gross value added Number of employees minus total 
overhead per employee 
Quasi-fixed total capital 
stocks 
Econometric estimation of Cobb-
Douglas production function 
Bartelsman  
(2010) 
Gross value added Knowledge stock as a state of 
technology and weighted (based on 
output) labour service 
Weighted (based on output) 
capital-energy and material 
services 
Econometric estimation of generalised 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
Bartelsman et al. 
(2009) 
Value added and gross 
output separately 
Weighted number of employees 
based on expenditure shares of input 
Weighted capital stocks 
based on expenditure shares 
of input 
Growth accounting method 
Grossman (1982) Quantity produced Number of employees Capital stock Econometric estimation of Translog 
production function 
Navaretti et al. 
(2008) 
Value added Total number of employees Total sales made Econometric estimation of a form of a 
production function 
Schreyer and 
Pilat (2001) 
Gross output and value 
added separately 
 
Total hours worked by employees 
based on gross output and value 
added 
Total machine hours based 
on gross output and value 
added 
Growth accounting 
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As can be seen from Tables 2.1 and 2.2, labour input is mostly measured by active hours 
worked by employees, which is why we also consider hours worked by employees as labour 
input. As for the capital input variable, we take both ICT and non-ICT capital services 
together into account. Finally, in order to see how immigrant workers affect productivity, we 
include the migration share of each industry in our model. 
The following section will describe the total data sources and deliver descriptive statistics.  
2.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
The EU KLEMS March 2011 March database is used to retrieve measures by industry and 
year for productivity (as measured by gross value-added), for total hours worked and for 
capital stocks. Monetary values for output and capital are provided in real terms for each 
industry, in each year, deflated using each country’s GDP PPP price deflator (see O’Mahony 
and Timmer 2009, p.F381). Output is measured as gross value added (EU KLEMS variable 
GVA) and we use the capital stock series that is adjusted for Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(EU KLEMS variable CAP_GFCF). The GFCF adjustment is based on the assumption that 
investment in buildings produces returns for many decades while investment in ICT 
equipment produces returns for less than five years (see O’Mahony and Timmer 2009, p.F398 
for details of this). Data for the UK, Spain, and the Netherlands for 1995-2008 and in 
Germany for 2002-2008.  
We then combine this dataset with the EU LFS dataset with its variables of the share of 
migrants and education attainment of migrants for the same period of time. In order to 
combine the two datasets we match the same industries and only use the same codes which 
correspond to the same industries. However, in the EU LFS data the codes are desegregated 
for electricity and gas supply as D, for water supply as E, for professional, scientific and 
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technical activities as M and for administrative and support service activities as N, whereas in 
the EU KLMES, the database codes for electricity, gas and water supply are already 
aggregated as D-E and professional, scientific, technical, administrative and support service 
activities are aggregated as M-N. Thus, for consistency, we aggregate the industries from the 
EU LFS such that D is joined with E and M with N, so that we could match the two datasets 
based on the same industries. Table 2.3 shows the NACE codes with corresponding industries 
that we use. 
 Table2.3 NACE codes and corresponding industries 
NACE CODES INDUSTRIES 
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
B Mining and quarrying 
C Manufacturing 
D-E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
F Construction 
G Wholesale and retail; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H Transportation and storage 
I Accommodation and food service activities 
J Information and communication 
K Financial and insurance activities 
L Real estate activities 
M-N Professional, Scientific, Technical, Administrative & Support Service Activities 
O Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 
P Education 
Q Health and Social Work  
 
In Appendix H Table 2.24 - 2.27    presents the descriptive statistics for the UK, Spain, the 
Netherlands and Germany, respectively. We present value added, labour input- total hours 
worked by employees, capital input- total capital services and a share of migration over the 
total employment. In addition, we also present the disaggregated migration shares in regard of 
skill level as well as EU and non-EU origin countries.  
The average value added is around 61478.4 for the UK, 42509.75 for Spain, 25877.83 for the 
Netherlands and 131694.3 for Germany. For the UK, capital input is more or less similar to 
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Spain, while surprisingly, the total hours worked by persons engaged seem to be almost 
double comparing to Spain. The average value for total hours worked is quite low in the 
Netherlands in comparison to other three countries. When presenting the results for the 
Netherlands in Section 2.4.2.3. no significance is observed for labour inputs across multiple 
estimated models and this might be the main reason.  
The highest figure of value added and capital input is observed in Germany might be 
explained by the more advanced industry comparing to the UK, Spain and the Netherlands. 
According to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s World Factbook (2014), Germany has the 
largest and most technologically advanced producers of certain materials across the world.  
The average labour input –total hours worked by employees 3212.264, 1839.057, 727.8724, 
and 3577.8 for the UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany, respectively. The average 
capital services are 19528.21, 16174.35, 9008.549, and 44609.67 for the UK, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Germany.  As can be seen from Tables 2.24-2.27 in Appendix H, migration 
share figures vary greatly across countries. The share of the average non-EU migrants is 
around 6 percent in the UK, where only 2% of the immigrants are from EU countries- Table 
2.24. As legal restrictions are much higher for non-EU migrants, we find this figure quite 
surprising.  In Spain it displays different aspects from the UK, having EU and non-EU 
migrants at around 1% and 3% in average, respectively- Table 2.25. Whereas, for Netherlands 
the average share of EU immigrants appears to be around 3% of total labour across firms 
which could reach up to 63 % maximum depending upon industry, the share of non-EU 
migrants however, is around 3% in average which does not exceed 17 % across industries- 
Table 2.26.  
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As can be seen from Table 2.27, Germany, however, seems to have around 3% of its labour 
from the EU while around 5% from non-EU countries in average. We would expect to have 
more migration rate in average as Germany is well-known to have hosted multiple numbers of 
migrants since the 1960s, but we assume that 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 or more generation immigrants are 
considered as natives in the EU LFS, because according to the EU LFS definition, only 
individuals whose country of origin is different from the host are considered as migrants (EU 
LFS user guide, 2012). 
2.4. Model and Empirical Analysis 
In order to investigate whether migration share has an impact on productivity, we estimate the 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
      itnonEUnonEUEUEUDit ALLLKY itit 21 11
    (2.1) 
where Y is output, K is capital input, DL are work hours by domestic labour, EUL are work 
hours non-domestic EU workers, nonEUL  are work hours by non-EU migrants and A is time-
varying technology usually referred to a Total Factor Productivity (TFP). EU  and nonEU are 
parameters that capture the higher, or lower if negative, productivity of the two types of 
migrant workers. 1 and 2 are the usual Cobb-Douglas production function parameters. 
Finally, i  indexes the industry and t  indexes the year.  
We need to log-linearise production function (2.1) in order to estimate it by linear methods. 
Let us start by dropping the it subscripts to simplify the notation and by defining a new 
variable Lwhich is total work hours for all worker types. We also define DS as the share of 
work hours by domestic workers, EUS  as the share of work hours by non-domestic EU 
workers and nonEUS as the share of work hours by non-EU migrant workers: 
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The second line in the derivation of equation (2.2) is simply due to the fact that the shares in 
work hours must add up to one: nonEUEUD SSS 1 . Log linearising equation (2.2) using 
the approximation )()1ln( nonEUEUEUnonEUEUEU SS   , and then defining two new 
parameters 3 2 EU    and nonEU 24   gives: 
 
 






ASSLK
ASSLK
ASSLKY
nonEUEU
nonEUnonEUEUEU
nonEUnonEUEUEU
logloglog
logloglog
log1loglogloglog
4321
221
221
 (2.3) 
where   is an error term accommodating approximations in the model but also the 
measurement error that is always present. Finally, we disaggregate Aln , the measure of TFP, 
into time-varying and industry-varying components: 
   


1
1
04321 logloglog
N
j
jjnonEUEU ISSLKY                     (2.4) 
where is a linear time-trend, and the jI  are industry fixed effect dummies for each N
industry except one. If 3 is greater (less) than zero, then EU migrant workers are more (less) 
productive per hour than the workforce as a whole. Similarly, if 4  is greater (less) than zero, 
then migrant workers from the rest of the world are more (less) productive per hour than the 
workforce as a whole. 
By substituting all the variables into Equation (2.4) and taking logs the final estimated 
equation is: 
itti
ititititit
TI
NEUMigShrEUMigShrCAPHRSGVA



 54210 loglnlog
         (2.5) 
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Output is measured as gross value added (EU KLEMS variable GVA) and we use the capital 
stock series that is adjusted for Gross Fixed Capital Formation (EU KLEMS variable 
CAP_GFCF) as CAP, HRS is the number of hours worked. EUMigShr is the share of EU 
immigrants, NEUMigShr is the share of non-EU immigrants-we include migration as 
proportion in total employment and do not differenced or take logarithm to see how the 
proportion of migrants affects productivity level- ; 
iI and tT  are industry and time fixed 
effects, respectively, and finally 
ti ,  is the error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the input variables. In order to distinguish between short- and long-run specifications, we 
alternatively estimate the error correction (ECM) form of Model (2.5). Additionally, we use a 
basic autoregressive distributed lag (henceforth ARDL) for Model (2.5): 
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0
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0
,2
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                (2.6) 
If we stack the time series observations for each industry groups (2.6) can be written in the 
error correction form as (Pesaran et al. 2012) where, to make the notation more compact, tY  
represents the dependent variable tGVAlog and tX represents the vector at time t of 
explanatory variables: 
     i
q
j
jiijji
p
j
ijiiii XYXYY   





0
,,
1
1
*
1,                               (2.7) 
It is a standard form of ARDL. The change in productivity is a perfect natural experiment but 
nonetheless, it takes several years to play out. Thus, we include lagged productivity in model. 
We leave migration share without taking the difference or log to see how far immigration 
variables with different features will affect the productivity level in (2.7). Also, we 
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disaggregate migration shares into different skill groups. The EU LFS data provides 
international standard classification of education (henceforth ISCED) codes as low-skilled 
(ISCED 1- 2), medium-skilled (ISCED 3-4) and high-skilled (ISCED 5-6). With this, we 
expect to see the different migration effects on productivity as each country has different 
labour force statuses. Also, we expect to have different results for EU and non-EU migrants 
which may be the result of the skill difference and labour market integration (Dustmann and 
Frattini, 2011). 
As is well known, the productivity function comes with its endogeneity problem. To fix this 
problem, the GMM method might be useful; however, the number of observations for each 
country is not sufficient to apply this method. However, according to Pesaran and Shin 
(1998), ARDL can also produce convenient results if the lag order for ARDL is well 
specified.  Also, one may argue that migration flows could be endogenous as migrants 
workers may want to choose to work in industries with faster productivity growth. However, 
when there is a massive inflow of immigration, immigrant workers are generally filling more 
intensive jobs that are often at the bottom of the career ladder for natives which implies that it 
is not the decision for immigrant worker to make it rather is a decision for natives to make. 
Indeed, in comparison to immigrant workers, native workers move more rapidly towards 
communication-intensive and well paid jobs (Lewis and Peri, 2014). Thus we treat migration 
flows as exogenous.   
We use both Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
to determine the number of lags. The number of lags for the UK, Spain, and Netherlands it is 
suggested to be 2. For the Germany data we can only use 1 lag due to the limited number of 
observations.  
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The PMG estimator of ARDL constrains the long-run coefficient to be identical but allows 
short-run coefficients and error variances to vary across units (Pesaran et al. 2012), and this 
method has been used in several productivity and human capital models (Kangasniemi et al., 
2012; Goswami and Junayed, 2006; O’Mahony and Vecchi, 2005; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 
2002). We use xtpmg command in Stata13 to obtain estimation results. This command 
provides both short run and long run results. In order to distinguish between the PMG 
estimator and standard estimations, we also apply OLS, fixed effect (FE thereafter) and first 
difference (FD thereafter).  
One disadvantage of the PMG estimator is that it can only be applied if there is enough time 
period – that is 14 for the UK, Spain and the Netherlands, and but only 7 for Germany.  
Therefore, we are not able to apply the PMG to Germany. However, we use the alternative 
pooled estimate, the dynamic fixed effect (thereafter DFE), which constrains both short- and 
long-run coefficients to be identical (Pesaran et al., 2012). Thus, for Germany some caution 
should be used when interpreting the results. 
 
2.4.1. Effects of 2004 accession on EU migrant shares 
Our sample captures the years from 1995 to 2008 for the UK, Spain and the Netherlands, and 
2002 to 2008 for Germany. One concern is the trend in the share of migration after the 2004 
EU accession. Because, although the sudden increase in migrants is a natural experiment we 
still need to check how it affects productivity. To be able to see how this sudden change 
effects productivity we control for the sudden increase particularly after 2007 in the share of 
EU migrants and set a dummy that is equal to 1 for the year 2007 and 2008, and zero 
otherwise. According to EUROSTAT, Germany allowed workers from 2004-EU member 
90 
 
states to work from 1
st
 May 2011, while the UK, Spain, and the Netherlands allowed them to 
work right after accession.   
One way to check whether there was a particular change in migration share after 2004 is to 
plot a graph of all four host countries with the number of EU-Migrants. The numbers of EU 
migrants (thousands) are presented in Figure 2.1 and it should be noted that the new 
accession countries in 2004 and 2007 are classified into non-EU countries. As can be seen 
from the Figure 2.1 both the UK and the Netherlands show a gradual increase from 
approximately 2005, and we believe that this may not cause a serious bias in our sample. 
Spain illustrates a different pattern, in that the number of EU migrants is almost stable from 
1995 to 1998 and increases gradually thereafter. However, for Germany a sharp increase in 
migration share after 2007 is not unnoticeable. In order to take this sudden increase into 
account we set a time dummy i.e. 2007D that is equal to 1 for the years 2007 and 2008 where 
a sharp increase seen in EU migration share, and 0 otherwise. Still, caution is again to be 
taken with Germany when interpreting the results.  
Figure2.1 Numbers of EU-Migrants in the host country 
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2.4.2. Empirical Results 
Results are presented for the UK, Spain, Netherland and Germany as follows: 
2.4.2.1. Results for the UK 
Table 2.4 presents the results for the UK without distinction of skill level. Table 2.5, Table 
2.6, and Tables 2.7 show the results with high skilled, medium skilled, and low skilled EU/ 
non-EU and total migration share, respectively. As much as we look for the impact of 
migration share on the productivity, we additionally split EU and non-EU migration share in 
the same model to be able to see if they operate in the same or the opposite directions. Model 
(1)-(2) of  Table 2.4 presents the OLS results, Model (3)-(4) fixed effect results, Model (5)-
(6) first difference results, Model(7)-(9)  short run PMG, and Model (8)-(10) presents long 
run PMG results.  
The OLS result, that is Model (1)-(2), displays quite significant and positive results across all 
independent variables, although biased due to endogeneity. We present an industry and time 
fixed effect in Model (3)-(4), both labour input variable- that is total hours worked by 
employees- and capital input variables – that is capital stocks-  have quite a positive and 
significant impact on value added, whereas migration share (EU, non-EU and total) shows a 
non-significant impact, although positive. We apply FD in Model (5)-(6) in order to resolve 
the possible omitted variable bias. However, FD suggests that the only significant variable 
that affects productivity is hours worked by employees, which might indeed be the case in the 
short run. When working on productivity functions, it is too simplistic to assume that FD will 
solve the endogeneity problem. In addition, one should not expect to see the effects of any 
input variables on productivity in the short run, since it needs several years to see the 
outcomes play out. Therefore, we apply PMG, which produces both short- and long-run 
effects. The PMG estimator of ARDL constrains the long-run coefficient to be identical, and 
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as mentioned in 2.1. Introduction section, as long as the lag order is specified correctly, it 
produces unbiased results in spite of the endogeneity. Model (7)-(9) and Model (8)-(10) of 
Table 2.4 presents the short and long-run PMG results, respectively. Both short and long run 
results show the significance of labour and capital inputs, whereas EU migration share 
remains insignificant both in the short and long run. Non-EU migration share, on the other 
hand, appears to be positive and significant only in the long run. When it comes to the total 
migration share, the impact appears to be insignificant in the short run, positive and 
significant in the long run, suggesting that non-EU migrants contributes to productivity 
significantly in the long run. The positive and significant impact of non-EU migration share 
could be explained by the fact that selective migration policies for non-EU countries.  
 
As to the total migration share from EU and non-EU effect on productivity, in the short run, 
migration share appears to have an insignificant effect on the added value, confirmed by 
Model (9) of the Table 2.4. In the long run, however, this impact appears to be positive and 
quite significant. It may suggest that the impact of non- EU migration share outweighs the 
impact of EU migration share.  
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Table2.4 Value added regressions for UK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.439*** 
(0.0202) 
0.449*** 
(0.0206) 
0.950** 
(0.384) 
0.952** 
(0.382) 
0.628*** 
(0.158) 
0.629*** 
(0.159) 
0.180* 
(0.128) 
0.451*** 
(0.0796) 
0.312** 
(0.123) 
0.552*** 
(0.0473) 
itCaplog  
0.322*** 
(0.0557) 
0.314*** 
(0.0543) 
0.186* 
(0.0938) 
0.186* 
(0.0936) 
0.0669* 
(0.0778) 
0.0668* 
(0.0775) 
0.281*** 
(0.0785) 
0.549*** 
(0.0796) 
0.273*** 
(0.0770) 
0.448*** 
(0.0473) 
itEUMigShr  
0.499*** 
(0.171) 
 1.277 
(0.949) 
 -0.0535 
(0.113) 
 -0.544 
(1.218) 
-0.3451 
(0.4921) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.448** 
(0.191) 
 0.831 
(1.249) 
 0.0387 
(0.132) 
 -0.0736 
(0.195) 
0.4231** 
(0.2115) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.207 
(0.154) 
 0.884 
(1.174) 
 0.0195 
(0.102) 
  -0.230 
(0.297) 
0.192** 
(0.094) 
Constant 4.349*** 
(0.534) 
4.408*** 
(0.526) 
1.721 
(2.519) 
1.711 
(2.513) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00370) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00366) 
0.498* 
(0.276) 
-0.0484* 
(0.0291) 
0.0184 
(0.0176) 
-0.0337 
(0.0590)  
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.692 0.685 0.513 0.513       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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We also aim to investigate whether migration with different skill groups acts differently on 
the output. To do that, we disaggregate educational attainment as high, medium and low 
skilled. The EU LFS database uses ISCED codes 5 and 6 for high educated immigrants, 
ISCED 4 and 3 for medium educated immigrants, and finally ISCED codes 2 and 1 for low 
educated immigrants.  
Table 2.5 presents the results with high skilled EU, non-EU and total migration share in the 
UK.  Model (1)-(2) presents the OLS results and as can be seen from Table 2.5 all input 
variables as well as high skilled EU, non-EU and total migration share seem to be quite 
significant and positive, although biased. We fail to see any significant effect of high skilled 
migration effect on productivity both in FE and FD models in Model (3)-(4) and Model (5)-
(6), respectively. Labour input as total hours worked by employees is found to be positive and 
significant at all times across all models. We find no significance of EU, non-EU and total 
migration share in the short run- that is Model (7)-(9).  In the long run - Model (8)-(10) – 
however, high skilled non-EU migration share seem to have significant effects while no 
significance is observed for high skilled EU migration share, and we believe that the 
significance in the total immigration share comes from the predominant effects of non-EU 
migrants. This result may again be explained by the selective migration policies for non-EU 
countries. 
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Table2.5 Value added regressions for high skilled UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.445*** 
(0.0205) 
0.452*** 
(0.0208) 
0.932** 
(0.391) 
0.940** 
(0.390) 
0.630*** 
(0.158) 
0.630*** 
(0.159) 
0.241** 
(0.118) 
0.542*** 
(0.0684) 
0.286** 
(0.118) 
0.540*** 
(0.0506) 
itCaplog  
0.308*** 
(0.0526) 
0.311*** 
(0.0526) 
0.188* 
(0.0941) 
0.188* 
(0.0943) 
0.0668* 
(0.0775) 
0.0668* 
(0.0777) 
0.289*** 
(0.0763) 
0.458*** 
(0.068) 
0.270*** 
(0.0771) 
0.460*** 
(0.0506) 
itEUMigShr  
0.864*** 
(0.305) 
 0.394 
(0.198) 
 -0.0477 
(0.678) 
 0.156 
(0.356) 
0.098 
(0.0.47) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.939** 
(0.433) 
 1.103 
(1.812) 
 0.0582 
(0.828) 
 0.199 
(0.195) 
0.1122* 
(0.7233) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.267* 
(0.279) 
 1.400 
(1.777) 
 0.0419 
(0.744) 
  -0.225 
(0.809) 
0.1094* 
(0.097) 
Constant 4.480*** 
(0.515) 
4.417*** 
(0.516) 
1.872 
(2.578) 
1.815 
(2.573) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00362) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00361) 
0.428** 
(0.180) 
-0.0724** 
(0.0349) 
0.0231 
(0.0142) 
-0.0337 
(0.0499) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.687 0.684 0.506 0.504       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Apart from high skilled migrants, we introduce the results for medium skilled EU, non-EU 
and total migration share in Table 2.6. Model (1)-(2) present OLS results, Model (3)-(4) FE, 
Model (5)-(6) FD, Model (7)-(9) short run PMG, and Model (8)-(10) presents the long run 
PMG results. Both labour and capital input variables are positive and significant across all 
models. The labour input variable displays a positive and significant effect on productivity 
across all Models (1)-(10), so as the capital input variables apart from first differenced results-
Model (5)-(6). The medium skilled non-EU migration share shows no significant effect in the 
short- Model (7) or long run-Model (8). When it comes to medium skilled EU migrants, it has 
an insignificant effect on productivity in the short run –Model (7), but negative and 
significant effects in the long run- Model (8). As to total migration shares as can be seen from 
Model (9) - (10) of  Table 2.6. in the long run does the significance of total migration share 
make us consider that the effect of medium skilled EU migration share outweighs the effect of 
the medium skilled non-EU migrant share on productivity, because we detect no significant 
effect of the medium skilled non-EU migrant share, while it is negative and significant for 
total migration share. The negative impact of medium skilled migrants might be explained 
due to the fact that the mobility across medium skill jobs may be greater comparing to low or 
high skilled jobs due to skill mismatch.   
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Table2.6 Value added regressions for medium skilled UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.443*** 
(0.0199) 
0.451*** 
(0.0206) 
0.952** 
(0.386) 
0.953** 
(0.385) 
0.628*** 
(0.157) 
0.629*** 
(0.158) 
0.229* 
(0.133) 
0.109* 
(0.0876) 
0.306** 
(0.131) 
0.598*** 
(0.0650) 
itCaplog  
0.321*** 
(0.0554) 
0.313*** 
(0.0542) 
0.187* 
(0.0948) 
0.187* 
(0.0945) 
0.0669 
(0.0776) 
0.0668 
(0.0776) 
0.308*** 
(0.0741) 
1.109*** 
(0.0876) 
0.269*** 
(0.0775) 
0.402*** 
(0.0650) 
itEUMigShr  
0.724 
(0.284) 
 1.474 
(1.515) 
 -0.0393 
(0.226) 
 -0.247 
(2.577) 
-0.192* 
(6.520) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.667* 
(0.344) 
 0.769 
(1.639) 
 0.0325 
(0.157) 
 0.1002 
(0.0801) 
-0.0782 
(0.3287) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.300 
(0.275) 
 0.863 
(1.489) 
 0.0183 
(0.136) 
  -0.235 
(0.546) 
-0.855* 
(0.215) 
Constant 4.341*** 
(0.535) 
4.405*** 
(0.526) 
1.728 
(2.537) 
1.724 
(2.534) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00368) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00367) 
-0.0251 
(0.0220) 
-0.250 
(0.250) 
0.0782 
(0.0557) 
-0.0782 
(0.0557) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.689 0.684 0.504 0.504       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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When it comes to the low skilled immigrants which are presented in Table 2.7 for EU, non-
EU and total migration share, the results draw attention to the positive and significant impact 
of EU and non-EU migration share on productivity in the long run- Model (8), and not 
surprisingly positive and significant impact of total migration share on productivity in the 
long run- Model (10).  In the short run- Model (7)-(9), however, we observe an adverse 
impact of the EU and non-EU migration share, where the former is positive but insignificant 
and latter is negative and still insignificant. One explanation for the different effects of low 
skilled EU and non-EU immigrants could be the fact that non-EU migrants are less 
advantageous than EU migrants in terms of migration costs, and tend to work in less skilled 
jobs. Thus, it takes longer for non-EU migrants to settle in.  
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Table2.7 Value added regressions for low skilled UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.444*** 
(0.0208) 
0.441*** 
(0.0203) 
0.944** 
(0.387) 
0.943** 
(0.392) 
0.626*** 
(0.161) 
0.633*** 
(0.162) 
0.159 
(0.131) 
0.112* 
(0.0681) 
0.304*** 
(0.114) 
0.537*** 
(0.0368) 
itCaplog  
0.350*** 
(0.0716) 
0.337*** 
(0.0662) 
0.188* 
(0.0961) 
0.189* 
(0.0955) 
0.0669 
(0.0788) 
0.0669 
(0.0774) 
0.296*** 
(0.0819) 
0.888*** 
(0.0681) 
0.296*** 
(0.0743) 
0.463*** 
(0.0368) 
itEUMigShr  
0.247** 
(0.116) 
 -5.777 
(7.195) 
 -0.685 
(1.168) 
 0.099 
(0.115) 
0.379* 
(0.186) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.232 
(0.274) 
 2.692 
(4.907) 
 0.626 
(0.548) 
 -0.731 
(1.891) 
0.367* 
(0.816) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.628* 
(0.323) 
 0.904 
(3.175) 
 0.254 
(0.496) 
  0.288 
(0.461) 
0.295* 
(0.499) 
Constant 4.032*** 
(0.690) 
4.199*** 
(0.629) 
1.824 
(2.536) 
1.811 
(2.583) 
0.0417*** 
(0.00376) 
0.0418*** 
(0.00367) 
0.0481* 
(0.0267) 
-0.0279 
(0.0449) 
0.0600 
(0.0598) 
-0.0311 
(0.0561) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.701 0.696 0.500 0.495       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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2.4.2.2. Results for Spain 
Compared to the UK, the labour market composition, demand in the labour market and 
working conditions are not the same in Spain. Therefore, we do not expect to find exactly the 
same results here. Table 2.8 presents the results for Spain without distinction of skill level of 
immigrants. The OLS results, Model (1)-(2), display positive and very significant effects of 
the input variables as well as EU/non-EU/ total migration share, although biased due to 
endogeneity. The labour and capital input variables are also found to be positive and 
significant in the FE and FD models - Models (3)-(4) and Model (5)-(6), respectively, but no 
significance found for EU, non-EU and total migration share. Model (7) and (9) suggest that 
there is no significant effect of EU migration share on productivity in the short run, while it is 
positive and significant for non-EU migration share. This is again, could be result of the 
selective migration policy for non-EU migrants. The effect of non-EU migration share 
remains the same in the long run, which can be seen in Model (8) and (10), of Table 2.8. 
When it comes to the total migration share, both short run and long run results show positive 
impact on productivity with only latter is significant. Thus, in general, it can be said that 
migrants contribute to productivity in Spain. 
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Table2.8 Value added regressions for Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.384*** 
(0.0173) 
0.384*** 
(0.0172) 
0.624*** 
(0.134) 
0.613*** 
(0.130) 
0.465*** 
(0.140) 
0.466*** 
(0.139) 
0.439*** 
(0.0971) 
0.0526* 
(0.0307) 
0.420*** 
(0.0948) 
0.294** 
(0.0364) 
itCaplog  
0.512*** 
(0.0219) 
0.512*** 
(0.0218) 
0.426*** 
(0.0726) 
0.435*** 
(0.0688) 
0.179*** 
(0.0488) 
0.179*** 
(0.0486) 
0.141** 
(0.0648) 
0.947*** 
(0.0307) 
0.146** 
(0.0653) 
0.971*** 
(0.0364) 
itEUMigShr  
1.089*** 
(0.274) 
 0.238 
(0.0806) 
 0.0275 
(0.385) 
 -0.223 
(0.158) 
-0.279 
(0.171) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
1.521*** 
(0.263) 
 0.610 
(0.409) 
 0.0144 
(0.229) 
 0.198* 
(0.370) 
0.359** 
(0.355) 
  
itMigShr  
 1.360*** 
(0.226) 
 0.445 
(0.285) 
 0.0208 
(0.172) 
  0.255 
(0.266) 
0.182* 
(0.467) 
Constant 2.861*** 
(0.158) 
2.863*** 
(0.158) 
2.015*** 
(0.661) 
2.009*** 
(0.657) 
0.0375*** 
(0.00649) 
0.0375*** 
(0.00645) 
0.109** 
(0.0425) 
0.111* 
(0.0668) 
0.0862*** 
(0.0324) 
0.105 
(0.0703) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.921 0.921 0.911 0.910       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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When disaggregating in to skill level, the results for high skilled EU, non-EU and total 
migration share is presented in Table 2.9.Both labour and capital input variables are positive 
and significant across all models. We find no significance of EU and non-EU migration share 
effect on productivity in OLS – Model (1), although it is positive and significance for total 
migration share- Model (2). Fixed effect models – Model(3)-(4) suggest a negative effect for 
EU migration share, positive for non-EU and total migration share, where all quite significant. 
No significant impact is observed in first differenced models- Model (5)-(6) for any migration 
shares. As can be seen from Model (7) and (8) of Table 2.9 , high skilled EU migrants has no 
significant affect in the short run but it is negative and significant in the long run, whereas 
high skilled non-EU migration share appears to be positive and significant both in the short 
run and in the long run. As to the total migration share effect, in Model (9) and (10), we 
observe no significance in the short run, although positive, but it is positive and significant in 
the long run. As can be seen from Model (8) of  Table 2.8  the negative impact of non-EU 
migration share remains same with high skilled EU migration share- Model (8) of Table 2.9. 
This can be explained by the fact that in Spain - as a member of EU- , migrants from EU 
countries are more likely to be substitutes due to similar labour market conditions than non-
EU countries.   
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Table2.9 Value added regressions for High skilled Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.402*** 
(0.0179) 
0.404*** 
(0.0174) 
0.668*** 
(0.119) 
0.603*** 
(0.138) 
0.473*** 
(0.139) 
0.466*** 
(0.140) 
0.415*** 
(0.0888) 
0.0116** 
(0.0291) 
0.323*** 
(0.0796) 
0.403*** 
(0.0175) 
itCaplog  
0.494*** 
(0.0228) 
0.494*** 
(0.0223) 
0.365*** 
(0.0680) 
0.460*** 
(0.0647) 
0.183*** 
(0.0490) 
0.183*** 
(0.0490) 
0.149** 
(0.0659) 
0.988*** 
(0.0291) 
0.150** 
(0.0672) 
0.597*** 
(0.0175) 
itEUMigShr  
-0.241 
(0.232) 
 -0.171*** 
(0.377) 
 -0.354 
(0.153) 
 -0.189 
(0.126) 
-0.191*** 
(0.568) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.347 
(0.273) 
 0.104*** 
(0.209) 
 0.270 
(0.507) 
 0.392* 
(0.211) 
0.476* 
(0.146) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.298*** 
(0.356) 
 0.192** 
(0.552) 
 -0.626 
(0.208) 
  0.167 
(0.113) 
0.171*** 
(0.290) 
Constant 2.947*** 
(0.171) 
2.944*** 
(0.166) 
2.239*** 
(0.568) 
1.860** 
(0.699) 
0.0372*** 
(0.00621) 
0.0377*** 
(0.00633) 
0.0855** 
(0.0336) 
-0.118* 
(0.0718) 
0.223** 
(0.103) 
-0.121* 
(0.0651) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.911 0.910 0.935 0.905       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Regarding medium skilled immigrants, Table 2.10 present the results for medium skilled EU, 
non-EU and total migration share. As can be seen from Model (1)-(10), all input variables are 
positive and quite significant. OLS results –Model (1)-(2) - suggest that both medium skilled 
EU and non-EU migration share as well as total migration share has significant contribution 
to productivity. On the other hand, no significance is observed in FE, that is Model (3)-(4), as 
well as FD models, that is Model (5)-(6), apart from EU migration share.   Medium skilled 
EU migration share has no significant impact on productivity, although negative, in the short 
run, that is Model (7), but it is quite significant in the long run, that is Model (8), although the 
coefficient is smaller. When it comes to the medium skilled non-EU migration share, both in 
the short run and in the long run, the impact is seen to be positive and significant as can be 
seen from Model (7)-(8). However, in total, medium skilled migration shares has negative and 
significant impact on productivity in the long run. Thus, the effect of EU migration shares 
happen to outweighs the effect of non-EU migration. One explanation could be the fact that 
the share of medium skilled non-EU migrants is far less than that of medium skilled EU 
migrants in in Spain (EU LFS Database). 
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Table2.10 Value added regressions for Medium skilled Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.385*** 
(0.0174) 
0.385*** 
(0.0173) 
0.616*** 
(0.130) 
0.606*** 
(0.126) 
0.464*** 
(0.139) 
0.465*** 
(0.138) 
0.420*** 
(0.0881) 
0.0506* 
(0.0288) 
0.416*** 
(0.0915) 
0.0168** 
(0.0361) 
itCaplog  
0.510*** 
(0.0223) 
0.510*** 
(0.0222) 
0.427*** 
(0.0705) 
0.435*** 
(0.0675) 
0.179*** 
(0.0489) 
0.179*** 
(0.0487) 
0.137** 
(0.0685) 
0.949*** 
(0.0288) 
0.145** 
(0.0668) 
0.983*** 
(0.0361) 
itEUMigShr  
0.459*** 
(0.117) 
 0.112*** 
(0.360) 
 0.161 
(1.553) 
 -0.137 
(0.932) 
-0.454* 
(0.057) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.788*** 
(0.109) 
 0.303 
(0.197) 
 0.0510 
(1.057) 
 0.387* 
(0.211) 
0.118* 
(0.151) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.666*** 
(0.101) 
 0.221 
(0.133) 
    0.1482 
(0.1190) 
-0.319* 
(0.179) 
Constant 2.883*** 
(0.160) 
2.883*** 
(0.159) 
2.066*** 
(0.636) 
2.055*** 
(0.636) 
0.0376*** 
(0.00650) 
0.0375*** 
(0.00647) 
0.115** 
(0.0518) 
0.112 
(0.0775) 
0.0890*** 
(0.0344) 
0.108 
(0.0741) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.922 0.921 0.912 0.911       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Finally, as to the results with low skilled migration share Table 2.11 present the results for 
low skilled EU, non-EU and total migration share, respectively. The long-run results – that is 
Model (8) and (10) of Table 2.11- show that both EU and non-EU migrants determine the 
gross output positively and significantly, where the coefficient for EU migrants share is much 
higher than the non-EU migrant share, and in total the coefficient is getting smaller, although 
it remains positive and significant. The OLS results – Model (1)-(2) of Tables 2.11 - suggest 
that all input variables as well as EU/non-EU/total migration share significantly contribute to 
productivity, although biased. The FE and FD results - Model (3)-(4) and Model (5)-(6) from 
Table 2.11- found no significance for migration share. Similarly, short run results- Model (7) 
and (9) of Table 2.11 displays no significant effect of low skilled of EU/non-EU/total 
migration share on productivity, although positive.  
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Table2.11 Value added regressions for Low Skilled Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.384*** 
(0.0173) 
0.385*** 
(0.0171) 
0.632*** 
(0.139) 
0.629*** 
(0.133) 
0.469*** 
(0.140) 
0.468*** 
(0.139) 
0.434*** 
(0.0956) 
0.222*** 
(0.0204) 
0.408*** 
(0.0958) 
0.405*** 
(0.0178) 
itCaplog  
0.513*** 
(0.0216) 
0.512*** 
(0.0214) 
0.419*** 
(0.0772) 
0.421*** 
(0.0742) 
0.179*** 
(0.0488) 
0.179*** 
(0.0487) 
0.141* 
(0.0726) 
0.778*** 
(0.0204) 
0.144** 
(0.0674) 
0.595*** 
(0.0178) 
itEUMigShr  
0.354*** 
(0.049) 
 0.840*** 
(0.240) 
 0.0829 
(0.684) 
 0.2589 
(0.198) 
0.697*** 
(0.316) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.226*** 
(0.040) 
 1.160 
(0.830) 
 0.130 
(0.325) 
 0.463 
(0.283) 
0.0374 
(0.217) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.242*** 
(0.348) 
 1.097 
(0.664) 
 0.111 
(0.243) 
  0.153 
(0.162) 
0.105*** 
(0.029) 
Constant 2.861*** 
(0.158) 
2.861*** 
(0.158) 
2.016*** 
(0.647) 
2.021*** 
(0.639) 
0.0371*** 
(0.00643) 
0.0372*** 
(0.00638) 
0.154*** 
(0.0581) 
0.142** 
(0.0634) 
0.193** 
(0.0819) 
0.128** 
(0.0594) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.920 0.919 0.912 0.912       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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2.4.2.3. Results for the Netherlands 
 
Table 2.12 presents the results for the EU migration share, non-EU migration share and total 
migration share, without distinction of skill level. Both labour and capital variables are 
positive and quite significant in our short run and long run PMG models, Model (7) and (9) 
and Model (8) and (10), respectively. As can be seen from Model (7)-(10), unlike the results 
in Spain and the UK, EU migration share has quite significant contribution to productivity 
both in the short run and long run. Non-EU migration share, however, seem to affect 
productivity in Netherlands quite the opposite, which is significant in the long run only. As to 
the total migration share, the effect of migration share still has positive and significant impact 
on productivity of industries. Another difference here in comparison to both the UK and 
Spain is that capital inputs seem to be positive and significant across all Models (1)-(10. But 
the labour input variable is insignificant for the FE that is Model (3)-(4), and FD models that 
is Model (5)-(6). This situation is opposite for the UK and Spain. In other words, the labour 
inputs is positive and significant across all models, while capital inputs found insignificant 
mostly in FE and FD results. This might suggest that firms in the Netherlands are more capital 
intensive and less labour intensive firms, whereas the UK and Spain have more labour 
intensive and less capital intensive firms. 
109 
 
Table2.12 Value added regressions for Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.341*** 
(0.0146) 
0.341*** 
(0.0146) 
0.423 
(0.336) 
0.426 
(0.335) 
0.0609 
(2.325) 
0.0611 
(2.335) 
0.673*** 
(0.128) 
0.246*** 
(0.0132) 
0.607*** 
(0.114) 
0.417*** 
(0.0198) 
itCaplog  
0.527*** 
(0.0156) 
0.527*** 
(0.0153) 
0.664*** 
(0.0959) 
0.665*** 
(0.0957) 
0.347*** 
(0.131) 
0.347*** 
(0.125) 
0.355*** 
(0.0741) 
0.754*** 
(0.0132) 
0.376*** 
(0.0663) 
0.583*** 
(0.0198) 
itEUMigShr  
0.455*** 
(0.154) 
 0.154 
(0.129) 
 0.0471 
(0.524) 
 0.481* 
(0.531) 
0.530*** 
(0.108) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.171 
(0.347) 
 -0.783** 
(0.312) 
 0.189 
(1.496) 
 -0.463 
(0.454) 
-0.479** 
(0.400) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.371*** 
(0.0823) 
 0.181 
(0.151) 
 0.0487 
(0.333) 
  0.304 
(0.380) 
0.3012*** 
(0.103) 
Constant 3.258*** 
(0.157) 
3.259*** 
(0.156) 
1.547 
(1.501) 
1.536 
(1.495) 
0.0310* 
(0.0184) 
0.0310* 
(0.0178) 
0.0825 
(0.101) 
-0.0409 
(0.0418) 
-0.291*** 
(0.0637) 
-0.0831*** 
(0.0172) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.892 0.891 0.848 0.847       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.13 presents the results for high skilled EU, non-EU and total migration share. 
Migration share seems to be positive but insignificant in the short run as can be seen from 
Model (7) and (9), for high skilled EU, non-EU and total migrants in Netherlands. The long-
run results - that is in Model (8) and (10) of Table 2.13 suggest  that high skilled  EU and 
non-EU migration share, and so not surprisingly total migration share, has significant 
contribution to productivity. Again, capital inputs seem to contribute to productivity 
significantly across all models, as does labour inputs apart from FE and FD – that are Model 
(3)- (4) and (5)-(6), respectively. OLS results that are Model (1)-(2)  of Table 2.13 display 
significant and positive results for all inputs as well as migration share, although biased.
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Table2.13 Value added regressions for High Skilled Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.340*** 
(0.0145) 
0.340*** 
(0.0144) 
0.429 
(0.334) 
0.436 
(0.336) 
0.0801 
(2.536) 
0.0658 
(2.309) 
0.655*** 
(0.137) 
0.242*** 
(0.0108) 
0.655*** 
(0.126) 
0.113*** 
(0.0114) 
itCaplog  
0.528*** 
(0.0154) 
0.529*** 
(0.0155) 
0.666*** 
(0.0955) 
0.669*** 
(0.0962) 
0.348** 
(0.157) 
0.347*** 
(0.124) 
0.360*** 
(0.0783) 
0.758*** 
(0.0108) 
0.349*** 
(0.0793) 
0.887*** 
(0.0114) 
itEUMigShr  
0.109 
(0.934) 
 0.0866 
(0.533) 
 -0.229 
(7.216) 
 0.3331 
(0.2032) 
0.527*** 
(0.422) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
0.705*** 
(0.246) 
 0.175** 
(0.618) 
 0.131 
(0.265) 
 0.5023 
(0.1411) 
0.178* 
(0.466) 
  
itMigShr  
 2.846*** 
(0.634) 
 0.802 
(0.680) 
 0.223 
(5.270) 
  0.178 
(0.109) 
0.156*** 
(0.486) 
Constant 3.251*** 
(0.156) 
3.252*** 
(0.156) 
1.483 
(1.477) 
1.456 
(1.483) 
0.0307* 
(0.0184) 
0.0310* 
(0.0176) 
0.0267 
(0.0469) 
0.00488 
(0.0584) 
-0.00299 
(0.0463) 
-0.00141 
(0.0451) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.893 0.893 0.848 0.846       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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 Furthermore, Table 2.14 presents the results for medium skilled EU, non-EU and total 
migration share, respectively.  The capital inputs found to be always positive and significant 
across all Models (1)-(10). EU, non-EU and total migration share as well as labour and capital 
inputs are found to be positive and significant in the OLS results – that is Model (1)-(2), 
although biased. Both the FE and FD results suggest no significance of medium skilled 
EU/non-EU/total migration share as a determinant of productivity as can be seen from Model 
(3)-(4) and Model (5)-(6) of Table 2.14. Short run results – that are Model (7) and (9) of 
Table 2.14, showed significance of inputs but no significance for EU, non-EU or total 
migration share. Finally, the long-run results - that is Model (8) and (10). - suggest that both 
labour and capital input variables significantly contribute to productivity, while medium 
skilled EU migration has negative and significant impact on productivity. However, non-EU 
migration share has significant contribution to productivity, which is the same for total 
migration share. 
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Table2.14 Value added regressions for Medium Skilled Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.341*** 
(0.0145) 
0.341*** 
(0.0146) 
0.425 
(0.332) 
0.425 
(0.332) 
0.0642 
(2.285) 
0.0599 
(2.348) 
0.698*** 
(0.136) 
0.243*** 
(0.00732) 
0.622*** 
(0.120) 
0.280*** 
(0.00805) 
itCaplog  
0.528*** 
(0.0156) 
0.527*** 
(0.0154) 
0.666*** 
(0.0954) 
0.666*** 
(0.0952) 
0.347*** 
(0.124) 
0.347*** 
(0.125) 
0.348*** 
(0.0781) 
0.757*** 
(0.00732) 
0.373*** 
(0.0684) 
0.720*** 
(0.00805) 
itEUMigShr  
0.180*** 
(0.398) 
 0.386 
(0.275) 
 0.108 
(1.108) 
 0.205 
(0.244) 
-0.281*** 
(0.0683) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.0335 
(0.844) 
 1.617 
(0.806) 
 0.983 
(1.228) 
 0.011 
(1.238) 
0.302*** 
(0.336) 
  
itMigShr  
 0.822*** 
(0.207) 
 0.460 
(0.293) 
 0.151 
(0.604) 
  0.369 
(0.794) 
0.799*** 
(0.210) 
Constant 3.254*** 
(0.157) 
3.254*** 
(0.157) 
1.516 
(1.472) 
1.536 
(1.473) 
0.0309* 
(0.0173) 
0.0310* 
(0.0179) 
0.0259 
(0.0490) 
-0.0398 
(0.0505) 
-0.0048 
(0.186) 
-0.0040 
(0.0378) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 210 210 210 210 
2R  0.892 0.891 0.848 0.848       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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When it comes to the results with low skilled migration share, similar to the results for 
medium skilled EU, non-EU and total migration share, we observe no significance of low 
skilled migration in the short run which can be seen from Model (7) and (9) of Table 2.15.In 
the long run, however, although both significant, EU and non-EU migration shares operates in 
opposite direction, where the latter is positive, Model (8) and (10). Repeatedly, capital input is 
always found to be a positive and significant determinant of productivity across Models (1)-
(10) of Table 2.15. In contrast to high skilled migrants, both medium and low skilled EU 
migration shares have negative and significant impact on productivity, in the long run. This 
effect is positive but insignificant in the short run. This makes us consider that in Netherlands, 
EU migrants with medium or low skills do not accommodate themselves into more 
demanding and less paid jobs unlike non-EU migrants. The positive and significant effect of 
the low skilled EU/non-EU/total migration share makes us consider that the Netherlands is in 
need of low skilled workers. Thus, implementing this scarcity across firms might have a 
significant contribution on productivity. 
In general, it can be said that apart from low and medium skilled EU migration share, 
migration seems to have a positive and quite significant effect on the gross value added in the 
Netherlands.  
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Table2.15 Value added regressions for Low Skilled Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD PMG-SR PMG-LR PMG-SR PMG-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.341*** 
(0.0141) 
0.344*** 
(0.0145) 
0.439 
(0.332) 
0.445 
(0.334) 
0.0419 
(3.137) 
-0.0312 
(8.889) 
0.650*** 
(0.134) 
0.220*** 
(0.0173) 
0.636*** 
(0.125) 
0.284*** 
(0.0102) 
itCaplog  
0.525*** 
(0.0157) 
0.530*** 
(0.0155) 
0.662*** 
(0.0974) 
0.668*** 
(0.0959) 
0.345** 
(0.153) 
0.344 
(0.245) 
0.370*** 
(0.0755) 
0.780*** 
(0.0173) 
0.374*** 
(0.0696) 
0.716*** 
(0.0102) 
itEUMigShr  
0.323*** 
(0.112) 
 1.064 
(0.968) 
 0.260 
(1.227) 
 0.260 
(0.411) 
-0.460*** 
(0.456) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.302 
(0.929) 
 -2.196 
(2.109) 
 0.0302 
(1.613) 
 0.325 
(2.117) 
0.390*** 
(1.279) 
  
itMigShr  
 1.202** 
(0.507) 
 0.298 
(0.563) 
 0.213 
(1.646) 
  0.170 
(1.069) 
0.625*** 
(0.576) 
Constant 3.302*** 
(0.158) 
3.213*** 
(0.157) 
1.516 
(1.494) 
1.402 
(1.485) 
0.0313 
(0.0266) 
0.0320 
(0.0545) 
-0.0125 
(0.0409) 
-0.0010 
(0.0428) 
-0.0384 
(0.186) 
-0.0079 
(0.0365) 
N  210 210 210 210 195 195 180 180 180 180 
2R  0.892 0.890 0.847 0.846       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the PMG model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the PMG model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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2.4.2.4. Results for Germany 
 
Germany comes with multiple caveats which must be explained. First of all, the EU LFS 
database only provides data for migration share only for 2002-2008. A seven-year time period 
might not be enough to analyse such panel data. Secondly, as explained in Section 2.4.1, 
Germany had a massive EU migration influx after the 2004 EU accession, especially after 
2007. We, additionally, control for the sudden increase particularly after 2007 in the share of 
EU migrants and set a dummy that is equal to 1 for the year 2007 and 2008, and zero 
otherwise. Also, for the long-run results we are not able to use PMG for the reasons we 
explained in Section 2.4. In order to picture the long-run trend, we apply another pooled 
estimator, the Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE). One difference of DFE in comparison to PMG is 
that it constrains both the short- and long-run coefficients to be identical. For all these 
reasons, therefore, one should be careful when interpreting the results for Germany.  
Table 2.16 present the results for EU, non-EU and total migration share. As can be seen from 
short and long run DFE models, which are Model (7)-(8) of Table 2.16, the effect of non-EU 
migration share is negative both in the short run and in the long run, although it does not seem 
to have a significant effect on the output. EU migration share, however, operates in the 
opposite direction, and yet no significance is observed both in the short and long run. When it 
comes to the total migration share, both short and long run DFE results, which are Model (9)-
(10) of Table 2.16 suggest again that there is no significant impact of migration share on 
productivity in Germany, in the short run and in the long run.   These long-run effects might 
have been significant if firms were not measured as identical, or if we were to have more time 
period available. Only, the FE results – Model (3) of Table 2.16 - suggest a positive and 
significant effect of the EU/total migration share on productivity, but no significance is 
detected for the non-EU migration share. Apart from the FD results – Model (5)and (6) of 
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Table 2.16, the labour input variable, which is total hours worked by employees, is found to 
be a significant determinant of productivity across all Models (1)-(10) Capital input variables 
are found to be significant across all Models (1)-(10).  Time dummy seem to be significant in 
the short run but insignificant in the long run. This may suggest that the sudden change in the 
composition of the labour market had affected productivity in the short run, but this mix 
settled down in the longer period so no more significance of the change observed in the long 
run. In contrast with the results, we expected to see a significant impact of migration on 
productivity in Germany, as it has hosted a significant number of immigrants from all around 
the world. This might be related to the survey by Winkelman (2001), in that native workers 
believe that immigrants are recruited because of the lack of skilled labours across firms in 
Germany, but they do not work as hard as they are expected. Thus, migrant workers fill in the 
scarcity but do not work hard enough to contribute to productivity. We also fail to see any 
remarkable results in the FD model- that is Model (5)-(6) of Table 2.16. In fact, FD results 
suggest no significance across all series, apart from capital input, in which we strongly 
believe that this might be the result of the very limited number of observations.  
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Table2.16 Value added regressions for Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD DFE-SR DFE-LR DFE-SR DFE-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.479*** 
(0.0517) 
0.472*** 
(0.0515) 
0.903*** 
(0.0120) 
0.911*** 
(0.0111) 
0.940 
(1.715) 
0.940 
(1.578) 
0.920*** 
(0.0318) 
0.800*** 
(0.0740) 
0.922*** 
(0.0295) 
0.796*** 
(0.0679) 
itCaplog  
0.355*** 
(0.0318) 
0.352*** 
(0.0334) 
0.155*** 
(0.0236) 
0.154*** 
(0.0234) 
0.129 
(0.0925) 
0.128* 
(0.0754) 
0.113*** 
(0.0417) 
0.200*** 
(0.0740) 
0.116*** 
(0.0376) 
0.204*** 
(0.0679) 
itEUMigShr  
0.404 
(2.551) 
 0.297* 
(0.146) 
 0.172 
(2.840) 
 0.161 
(0.242) 
0.789 
(1.085) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.582 
(1.294) 
 -0.0198 
(0.0865) 
 -0.0900 
(0.610) 
 -0.0302 
(0.118) 
-0.085 
(0.141) 
  
itMigShr  
 -0.311 
(0.665) 
 0.110 
(0.105) 
 -0.128 
(0.332) 
  0.0712 
(0.185) 
0.469 
(0.454) 
2007D  0.031 
(0.081) 
0.029 
(0.090) 
0.068** 
(0.032) 
0.071** 
(0.028) 
0.018* 
(0.012) 
0.019* 
(0.015) 
0.012* 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.034* 
(0.016) 
0.036 
(0.017) 
Constant 4.300*** 
(0.273) 
4.366*** 
(0.271) 
2.877*** 
(0.160) 
2.815*** 
(0.157) 
0.0129 
(0.0284) 
0.0130 
(0.0198) 
1.142 
(0.704) 
-0.326** 
(0.145) 
1.093 
(0.687) 
-0.323** 
(0.149) 
N  105 105 105 105 90 90 90 90 90 90 
2R  0.862 0.860 0.977 0.977       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the DFE model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the DFE model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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We disaggregated migration shares into their skill level as high, medium and low skilled ones 
and presented them in Tables 2.17-2.19. To begin with, Table 2.17 presents the results for 
high skilled EU, non-EU and total migration share. We fail to observe any significant impact 
of migration share in the short run that is Model (7) and (9)) of Tables 2.17. Furthermore, we 
still see no evidence for significance in the long run- Model (8)and (10) of Tables 2.17, 
although the sign of the coefficients remains positive for high skilled EU migrants share and 
negative for both high skilled non-EU and high skilled total migration share..  
The results of the OLS that is Model (1)-(2) from Table 2.17  in terms of significance repeat 
for high skilled immigrants for EU and total migrant share, only here, the non-EU migration 
share displays a negative and significant effect on productivity, yet biased. Time dummy - 
2007D seem to be positive and significant in the short run, but insignificant in the long run 
from Models (7)-(10) of Table 2.17. Again, the sudden change in the composition of the 
labour market had affected productivity in the short run but in a longer time this affect 
diminished.
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Table2.17 Value added regressions for High Skilled Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD DFE-SR DFE-LR DFE-SR DFE-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.476*** 
(0.0491) 
0.466*** 
(0.0513) 
0.886*** 
(0.0194) 
0.906*** 
(0.0179) 
0.903 
(2.326) 
0.958 
(1.530) 
0.917*** 
(0.0386) 
0.807*** 
(0.0770) 
0.923*** 
(0.0301) 
0.798*** 
(0.0661) 
itCaplog  
0.365*** 
(0.0310) 
0.353*** 
(0.0334) 
0.154*** 
(0.0237) 
0.154*** 
(0.0234) 
0.134 
(0.127) 
0.126* 
(0.0743) 
0.110** 
(0.0464) 
0.193** 
(0.0770) 
0.118*** 
(0.0344) 
0.202*** 
(0.0661) 
itEUMigShr  
0.398 
(0.296) 
 0.626** 
(0.682) 
 0.517 
(0.701) 
 0.2926 
(0.406) 
0.9548 
(0.1412) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.404** 
(16.82) 
 0.114 
(1.912) 
 -0.177 
(0.241) 
 -0.1930 
(0.1925) 
-0.2824 
(0.3270) 
  
itMigShr  
 -0.658 
(17.42) 
 1.929 
(2.143) 
 -4.135 
(8.119) 
  0.125 
(0.2214) 
0.3555 
(0.5639) 
2007D  0.028 
(0.079) 
0.026 
(0.092) 
0.071** 
(0.031) 
0.074** 
(0.030) 
0.020* 
(0.013) 
0.017* 
(0.019) 
0.014* 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
0.034 
(0.019) 
Constant 4.242*** 
(0.268) 
4.386*** 
(0.274) 
3.007*** 
(0.142) 
2.858*** 
(0.144) 
0.0114 
(0.0505) 
0.0145 
(0.0210) 
1.205 
(0.769) 
-0.327** 
(0.138) 
1.060 
(0.708) 
-0.312** 
(0.148) 
N  105 105 105 105 90 90 90 90 90 90 
2R  0.868 0.859 0.977 0.977       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the DFE model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the DFE model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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As to the medium skilled migration share Table 2.18 presents the results for medium skilled 
EU, non-EU, and total migration share. The OLS results –that is Model (1)-(2) show negative 
yet insignificant effect of medium skilled non-EU and total migration share, and positive but 
insignificant effect of medium skilled EU migration share, although biased.  
We fail to observe any significance of medium skilled EU/non-EU/ total migration share both 
in the short run – Model (7) and (9) of Table 2.18 and in the long run –that is Model (8) and 
(10) of Table 2.18. Again, we believe that if we were to have sufficient observations, both the 
short run and long-run DFE - Model (7) and (9) and Model (8) and (10) of Table 2.18 results 
would be more satisfactory and factual. The results for time dummy remains same in here, 
that is positive and significant in the short and positive but insignificant in the long run.
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Table2.18 Value added regressions for Medium Skilled Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD DFE-SR DFE-LR DFE-SR DFE-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.484*** 
(0.0533) 
0.480*** 
(0.0517) 
0.901*** 
(0.0138) 
0.908*** 
(0.0129) 
0.943 
(1.444) 
0.941 
(1.563) 
0.921*** 
(0.0331) 
0.797*** 
(0.0790) 
0.922*** 
(0.0289) 
0.795*** 
(0.0687) 
itCaplog  
0.352*** 
(0.0322) 
0.351*** 
(0.0334) 
0.155*** 
(0.0240) 
0.155*** 
(0.0237) 
0.127* 
(0.0768) 
0.127 
(0.0783) 
0.112*** 
(0.0423) 
0.203** 
(0.0790) 
0.117*** 
(0.0360) 
0.205*** 
(0.0687) 
itEUMigShr  
0.922 
(4.668) 
 0.764** 
(0.355) 
 -0.507 
(3.823) 
 0.397 
(0.638) 
0.2050 
(0.2387) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.2483 
(0.2444) 
 0.289 
(0.274) 
 -0.302 
(1.145) 
 -0.0507 
(0.309) 
0.0385 
(0.581) 
  
itMigShr  
 -1.151 
(0.970) 
 0.413 
(0.306) 
 -0.351 
(0.635) 
  0.117 
(0.432) 
0.1072 
(0.1229) 
2007D  0.029 
(0.068) 
0.026 
(0.088) 
0.021** 
(0.033) 
0.069** 
(0.031) 
0.021* 
(0.015) 
0.019* 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
Constant 4.301*** 
(0.281) 
4.345*** 
(0.270) 
2.876*** 
(0.152) 
2.831*** 
(0.154) 
0.0135 
(0.0247) 
0.0135 
(0.0203) 
1.135 
(0.710) 
-0.327** 
(0.147) 
1.070 
(0.681) 
-0.320** 
(0.153) 
N  105 105 105 105 90 90 90 90 90 90 
2R  0.861 0.860 0.977 0.977       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the DFE model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the DFE model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Finally, Table 2.19 presents the results with low skilled EU/ non-EU and total migration 
share. The OLS results –Model (1)-(2) of the low skilled migration share as presented in 
Table 2.19, apart from the EU migrant share, neither the non-EU nor total migration share 
seem to affect productivity, although the coefficient of non-EU and total migration share is 
negative. No significance of the low skilled migration share is observed for the EU/non-
EU/total migration share in either the short run- Model (7) and (9) of Table 2.19 and in the 
long run- Model (8) and (10) of Table 2.19. Repeatedly, labour input seems to be always 
positive and significant apart from in FD – Model (5)-(6).. The results for time dummy 
remains same in here as well, that is positive and significant in the short and positive but 
insignificant in the long run.
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Table2.19 Value added regressions for Low Skilled Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
itVAlog  
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD DFE-SR DFE-LR DFE-SR DFE-LR 
itHRSlog  
0.473*** 
(0.0554) 
0.472*** 
(0.0540) 
0.911*** 
(0.0114) 
0.918*** 
(0.00850) 
0.933 
(1.845) 
0.935 
(1.630) 
0.916*** 
(0.0323) 
0.796*** 
(0.0798) 
0.919*** 
(0.0264) 
0.793*** 
(0.0691) 
itCaplog  
0.352*** 
(0.0329) 
0.351*** 
(0.0338) 
0.155*** 
(0.0238) 
0.154*** 
(0.0234) 
0.129 
(0.0975) 
0.128* 
(0.0766) 
0.117*** 
(0.0416) 
0.204** 
(0.0798) 
0.120*** 
(0.0381) 
0.207*** 
(0.0691) 
itEUMigShr  
0.1236 
(0.145) 
 1.231 
(1.112) 
 -0.261 
(19.92) 
 0.1482 
(0.2368) 
0.3342 
(0.5056) 
  
itNEUMigShr  
-0.2962 
(0.7842) 
 -0.267 
(0.420) 
 -0.235 
(3.748) 
 0.0867 
(0.436) 
0.1227 
(0.1242) 
  
itMigShr  
 -1.483 
(1.712) 
 0.0601 
(0.464) 
 -0.305 
(2.851) 
  0.464 
(0.736) 
0.2304 
(0.1932) 
2007D  0.024 
(0.080) 
0.023 
(0.085) 
0.067** 
(0.031) 
0.070** 
(0.029) 
0.025* 
(0.017) 
0.016* 
(0.019) 
0.015* 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.017) 
0.030* 
(0.014) 
0.028 
(0.015) 
Constant 4.360*** 
(0.283) 
4.372*** 
(0.274) 
2.821*** 
(0.156) 
2.772*** 
(0.165) 
0.0124 
(0.0263) 
0.0126 
(0.0206) 
1.101* 
(0.654) 
-0.319** 
(0.137) 
1.072 
(0.652) 
-0.320** 
(0.147) 
N  105 105 105 105 90 90 90 90 90 90 
2R  0.860 0.860 0.977 0.977       
(1)-(2) present OLS results, (3)-(4) is the time fixed effect, (5)-(6) the first differenced effect (7)-(9) short-run results of the DFE model  (8)-(10) long-run results of the DFE model Clustered t-stats are in 
parenthesis for (1),(2),(3),(4),(7),(8),(9),(10) and bootstrap z-stats in parenthesis for (5),(6) *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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2.4.3. Robustness Checks 
We run all robustness check separately for each individual country. As a first robustness 
check, we calculate the multi-factor productivity (thereafter MFP) based on MFP 
measurement in Timmer et al. (2007b) and Gullickson and Harper (1999), that is the gross 
value added minus both capital and labour input. The necessary element for this calculation is 
taken from the 2008 MArch release of the EU KLEMS database.  
In order to see how EU and non-EU migration share affects multi-factor productivity, we run 
the following regression: 
itititit NEUMigShrEUMigShrMFP   210                  (2.8) 
The results are as follows: 
2.4.3.1 Robustness Check: Multi-factor Productivity 
 
The UK and MFP: Model (1) of Table 2.20 presents the OLS results for total migration share 
regardless of skill level. Models (2), (3) and (4) are disaggregated models of high, medium 
and low skilled migration shares respectively. Across all models, the sign of the coefficients 
remains the same as the OLS result for the EU and non-EU migration share. In fact, for the 
medium skilled EU migration shares and low skilled non-EU migration share, the results 
improve in significance. However, the coefficients of the low skilled EU migration share 
seem to be insignificant here, though positive.  
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Table2.20 MFP Regression Results for EU and non-EU immigrants in the UK 
Dep var:MFP  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itEUMigShr  0.314* 
(0.109) 
0.578** 
(0.196) 
0.479** 
(0.173) 
0.437 
(0.591) 
itNEUMigShr  0.296* 
(0.142) 
0.344* 
(0.287) 
-0.331* 
(0.291) 
0.221* 
(0.153) 
Constant 5.168*** 
(0.201) 
6.101*** 
(0.159) 
6.028*** 
(0.201) 
5.767*** 
(0.186) 
2R  0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 
N  208 208 208 208 
 (1)Total EU and non-EU Migrants (2) High Educated EU and non-EU Migrants (3) Medium Educated EU and non-EU Migrants (4) Low 
educated EU and non-EU Migrants. Clustered t-stats in parenthesis.*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
Spain and MFP: As for Spain, Table 2.21  illustrates the OLS results  with all migrant shares 
without distinction of skill- Model (1), and high, medium and low skilled migration shares in 
Models (2), (3) and (4), respectively. In all models presented below, the sign of the 
coefficients remains the same as the OLS model results with the EU and non-EU migration 
share. Some coefficients lose significance while others improve. 
Table2.21 MFP Regression Results for EU and non-EU immigrants in Spain 
Dep var:MFP  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itEUMigShr  0.478** 
(0.114) 
-0.112 
(0.110) 
0.231** 
(0.481) 
0.173* 
(0.054) 
itNEUMigShr  0.121* 
(0.116) 
0.131* 
(1.012) 
0.115** 
(0.514) 
0.301 
(1.462) 
Constant -3.039*** 
(0.131) 
-3.894*** 
(0.186) 
-3.101*** 
(0.119) 
-3.796*** 
(0.134) 
2R  0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 
N  210 210 210 210 
 (1)Total EU and non-EU Migrants (2) High Educated EU and non-EU Migrants (3) Medium Educated EU and non-EU Migrants (4) Low 
educated EU and non-EU Migrants. Clustered t-stats in parenthesis.*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
The Netherlands and MFP: As can be seen from Table 2.22, the signs of the coefficients 
remain the same as the OLS results of Netherlands with the EU and non-EU migrant share as 
well as high-medium-low skilled migrants, although it loses significance in most cases.  
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Table2.22 MFP Regression Results for EU and non-EU immigrants in Netherlands 
Dep var:MFP  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itEUMigShr  0.713 
(0.567) 
0.174 
(0.500) 
0.162 
(0.149) 
0.141 
(0.578) 
itNEUMigShr  0.457** 
(0.173) 
0.601 
(0.782) 
-0.764** 
(0.294) 
-0.403 
(0.876) 
Constant 5.197*** 
(0.124) 
5.124*** 
(0.111) 
5.201*** 
(0.146) 
5.024*** 
(0.121) 
2R  0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N  206 206 206 206 
 (1)Total EU and non-EU Migrants (2) High Educated EU and non-EU Migrants (3) Medium Educated EU and non-EU Migrants (4) Low 
educated EU and non-EU Migrants. Clustered t-stats in parenthesis.*, *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
Germany and MFP: Similar to other countries, the sign of the coefficients remains the same 
for Germany when comparing the OLS results of Germany with EU and non-EU migration 
shares as well as the results with high, medium and low skilled migration shares, as can be 
seen from Table 2.23 below, while the significance of the coefficients loses power. 
Table2.23 MFP Regression Results for EU and non-EU immigrants in Germany 
Dep var:MFP  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itEUMigShr  0.116 
(0.118) 
0.224** 
(0.091) 
0.242* 
(0.261) 
0.316* 
(0.654) 
itNEUMigShr  -0.658 
(0.905) 
-0.119 
(0.127) 
-0.141 
(0.208) 
-0.647 
(0.469) 
Constant 5.591*** 
(0.102) 
5.573*** 
(0.112) 
5.607*** 
(0.108) 
5.586*** 
(0.104) 
2R  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
N  95 95 95 95 
 (1)Total EU and non-EU Migrant (2)High Educated EU and non-EU Migrant (3)Medium Educated EU and non-EU Migrant (4)Low 
educated EU and non-EU Migrant. Clustered t-stats in parenthesis.*,  **, and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
As another robustness check, we also check the short run of the DFE results for the UK, Spain 
and Netherlands to see how it differs from FE results. In other words, we aim to see how the 
short and long run DFE results vary from FE models when industries are assumed to be 
identical. Find the Table 2.28-2.35 in Appendix I. As explained in Section 2.4, for Germany 
we already applied DFE in replacement of PMG. Thus, we discuss about DFE and FE results 
for Germany from the Tables 2.16-2.19, in the end of this section.   
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The UK and short-run DFE;  Model (1) of Table 2.28  in Appendix I presents the results 
with EU and non-EU migrant share, Models (2), (3) and (4) are with the high, medium and 
low skilled EU and non-EU migrant share in the UK, respectively. As can be seen from 
Model (1) of Table 2.28, the coefficient of short run DEF results remain same as regular FE 
which is presented in Model (3) of Table2.4.In fact, the significance improves for capital 
input variable. As to high skilled EU and non-EU migration share, Model (2) of Table 2.28 
shows that the sign of the coefficients remains same with regular FE results. However, the EU 
migration share loses its significance while non-EU migration share becomes stronger in 
significance. The coefficients for the medium skilled EU and non-EU migration share- Model 
(3) of Table 2.28 remains same with regular FE results, in fact most variables improves in 
significance. As can be seen from Model(4) of Table 2.28, when comparing regular FE with 
DFE results for low skilled EU and non-EU migration share, as well as the coefficients 
remain same, it in fact improves in terms of significance. . Table 2.29 present the same 
models for total migration share. Model (1), presents the model with total migration share 
without distinction of skill level, and Model (2), (3), (4) presents the models with high, 
medium and low skilled total migration share, respectively. As can be seen from Model (1) of 
Table2.29 the coefficients of all series of DFE results remain same as regular FE which is 
presented in Table 2.4-2.7. In fact, the significance improves much more for the capital and 
labour input variable, while still no significance is present for migration share. As to the high 
skilled total migration share ,Models (2) in Table 2.29  present the results where the capital 
and labour input variable as well as migration share variable becomes more significant 
compared to regular FE models – that is, Model (4) of Tables 2.4- 2.7. The short run DFE 
results for medium skilled migration share- Model (3) of Table 2.29, is not much different 
from regular FE- Model (3) of Table 2.4-2.7. As to the results for low skilled migration rate- 
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Model (4) - Table 2.29, the coefficients for the input variables remain same and improve in 
significance. However, the sign for low skilled migration changes from positive to negative 
while remaining insignificant.  
Spain and short-run DFE: Model (1) of Table 2.30 presents the results with EU and non-EU 
migration share, Models (2), (3) and (4) with the high, medium and low skilled EU and non-
EU migration share in Spain. The regular FE results with industry distinction in Spain, 
presented in Model (3) of Tables 2.8, in Section 2.4.2.2., suggest no significance for non-EU 
migration share. However, the DFE results - which assume all firms are identical - provide 
significant results, as can be seen in Models (1) in Table 2.30, while the sign of all 
coefficients and significance for other variables remains the same. Model (2) of Table 2.30 
presents the models with high skilled EU and non-EU migration share. Here, although the 
sign of the coefficients of short run DFE remain same as regular FE- which is presented in 
Model (3) of Table 2.9, we see that high skilled EU and non-EU migration share variables 
lose their significance. Similarly, the short run DFE results for medium skilled EU and non-
EU migration share- Model (3) of Table 2.30 provides us that apart from the coefficients 
remaining the same, the significance for migration share variables improves in comparison to 
regular FE.  We observe the same pattern for the low skilled EU and non-EU migration share- 
Model (4) of Table 2.30 
Furthermore, Model (1) of Table 2.31 presents the results with total migration share, Model 
(2), (3) and (4) presents the short run DFE results of high, medium and low skilled total 
migration share. The pattern is same across all Models (1)-(4), that the sign of the coefficient 
remains same. In fact, the migration shares across models become significant in short run 
DFE results in comparison to regular FE. This might be due to the fact that the firms are 
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assumed to be identical, because migrants have different effects across different firms, and 
one should take this difference into account when analysing the actual effects. 
The Netherlands and short-run DFE: Table 2.32 present  the short run DFE results for EU 
and non-EU migration share- Model (1), high skilled EU and non-EU migration share- Model 
(2), medium skilled EU and non-EU migration share- Model (3) , and finally low skilled EU 
and non-EU migration share- Model (4). Labour input variable becomes significant in the 
short run DFE, comparing to FE in all Models (1)-(4).  EU migration share becomes 
significant, while non-EU migration share lose significance Model (1)-(2), although the sign 
of them remains same.  Both medium skilled EU and non-EU migration share becomes 
stronger in terms of significant as can be seen from Model (3), however the still no 
significance is observed for low skilled EU and non-EU migration share- Model (4),although 
the sign of the coefficients remain same. 
Table 2.33 presents models with total migration share- Model (1) as well as high, medium 
and low skilled total migration share, Model (1), (2) and (3), respectively. In all cases, labour 
input variables improves in significance in short run DFE models in comparison to regular FE 
results.  Apart from the model with low skilled migration share- Model (4), total migration 
share becomes significant in the short run DFE models when comparing to FE results.  
 
Germany and short-run DFE: Table 2.34 presents the short run DFE models with EU and 
non-EU migration share- Model (1), and high, medium, low skilled EU and non-EU migration 
share- Model (2), (3), and (4), respectively.  Labour input variables, are almost identical in all 
Models (1)-(4). Same applies for capital inputs variables in most cases. The sign of the 
coefficients remain same for each variable, although some loses significance in the short run 
DFE models. 
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Table 2.35 present the short run DFE models with total migration share- Model (1), high, 
medium and low skilled total migration share- Model (2), (3), and (4).  Both capital and 
labour input variables keeps the significance in the short run DFE models as in FE results. 
Also, time dummy appears to be stronger in DFE results in comparison to FE results. 
 In general, our results for the UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany suggest robustness to 
many specifications 
2.5. Conclusion 
The effect of migration on productivity at industrial level varies in the UK, Spain, the 
Netherlands and Germany. Investigating productivity effects led us to divide this effect into 
short- and long-run periods, as productivity changes from migration share might take several 
years to play out thus short run and long run results might act differently. Also, in order to 
investigate whether EU and non-EU migrants have dissimilar productivity effects, we 
disaggregated total migration into EU and non-EU migrants. Similarly, in order to investigate 
whether the skill level of migrants would have similar effects, we disaggregated all migrants 
as low, medium and high skilled. 
The results for the UK showed that migration has a positive and significant effect on the 
productivity of industries in the long run, particularly those who are highly educated non-EU 
migrants. The effect of EU migrants, however, appears to be negative both in the short run 
and long run, although insignificant.  When disaggregating migrants by skill level both high 
and low skilled migrants have a positive and significant correlation with value added. When it 
comes to medium skilled migrants, this effect seems to be quite the opposite both for EU and 
non-EU migrants. This might be the fact that, migrants in medium skilled do upgrade their 
jobs to high skilled ones once they gain enough experience.  When it comes to Spain, the 
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effect of migration on the productivity of firms in the short run seems to be positive and 
significant, only for high and medium skilled non-EU migrants.  In the long run, we still 
observe the significant contribution of non-EU migration to productivity. However, the 
impact of EU migration share on productivity operates in opposite direction, and still 
significant. The different effect of skilled migrants from EU and non-EU might be the results 
of labour market requirements in Spain. Moreover, as an EU member country, Spain might 
have similar technology to other EU countries, thus EU migrants might not have difficulty 
adapting to the Spanish labour market, but this enable them to be more mobile comparing to 
non-EU migrants, so the effect of the EU migrant share is observed  rather  negative..  
Although the catching up process for technology for non-EU migrants might take longer than 
the EU migrants, the positive and significant results of non-EU migrants might suggest that 
they have more restrictions in terms of moving from one job to another, thus they start 
making progress to secure the job they have.  
The results for both the UK and Spain suggested that labour inputs is always a significant and 
positive determinant of value added, this is varying for capital inputs.  
As to the Netherlands, the effect of migration on productivity in the short run is positive and 
significant for EU migrants only.  In the long run, the effects of EU and total migrants have a 
significant effect on the productivity of firms in the Netherlands. Only non-EU migrants seem 
to have negative and significant effect on productivity. From the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 2.26 in Appendix H, some of the industries might have up to 62% of their 
employees from EU; this has never exceeded 17% for non-EU migrants. Thus, this may be 
explained that the labour market is more prone to EU migrants than non-EU so the effect is 
rather positive.  
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Finally for Germany, there are several cautions to be considered when interpreting the results. 
Neither a short-run nor a long-run effect of migration on the productivity of firms was found 
to be significant, although mostly positive. This is interesting, particularly because of the 
change in labour composition after 2007. The time dummy seem to have positive and 
significant effect on the value added, but this does not reflected to the migration share effect 
on productivity. We believe, this is mostly due to the fact that the number of observations is 
not enough to carry out such analysis. As the number of observations is already low, we were 
not able to take the lag length suggested by AIC. For the long-run analysis, we were not able 
we applied long run DFE instead of PMG.  
All in all, the Netherlands appears to be the only country that shows significance of EU 
migration share on productivity of firms in the short run. Splitting the EU and non-migration 
share allow us to see that the direction of their effect on productivity is opposite in most cases. 
The coefficient of the total migration share appears to be less than EU and non-EU migration 
share when splitting up, although significance remains same.   The fact that the results for the 
impact of high educated migration share is always positive and significant, apart from 
Germany, might be result of high skilled migration prone migration laws across developed 
countries.  In Germany, although we found no significance, having positive sign for total 
migration share without distinction of education make us consider that if we had more 
observations, we could have seen more accurate figure 
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APPENDIX H 
Table2.24 Descriptive Statistics for UK 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Value added 210 61478.4 37213.41 7915 152849 
Hours worked 210 3212.264 2443.395 121.6678 8712.018 
Capital 210 19528.21 18972.77 12.66508 102573.1 
EU-migrants 210 0.023848 0.023989 0.003891 0.139535 
Non-EU migrants 210 0.062036 0.124581 0.001957 0.6875 
Total migrants 210 0.082979 0.141953 0.007035 0.75 
Low educated migrants 210 0.010601 0.014055 0.00077 0.0816 
Medium educated migrants 210 0.047956 0.080574 0.003494 0.443857 
High educated migrants 210 0.026687 0.058106 0.000943 0.34375 
 
Table2.25 Descriptive Statistics for Spain 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Value added 210 42509.75 29711.62 1611.217 138178 
Hours worked 210 1839.057 1518.152 64.3178 5656.352 
Capital 210 16174.35 13819.44 342.7132 62841 
EU-migrants 210 0.011755 0.04093 0.000211 0.34512 
Non-EU migrants 210 0.029464 0.054349 0.000238 0.346273 
Total Migrants 210 0.039789 0.070103 0.000476 0.5 
Low educated migrants 210 0.022199 0.037284 0.000157 0.243553 
Medium educated migrants 210 0.008022 0.014803 0.000124 0.099349 
High educated migrants 210 0.000503 0.002074 0.000001 0.01241 
 
Table2.26 Descriptive Statistics for Netherlands 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Value added 210 25877.83 16004.87 5113 67700 
Hours worked 210 727.8724 570.5508 11.8857 2011.965 
Capital 210 9008.549 7699.71 574.2202 38544.41 
EU-migrants 210 0.025972 0.0765 0.001553 0.625 
Non-EU migrants 210 0.033497 0.037757 0.007529 0.166667 
Total migrants 210 0.055612 0.105593 0.002356 0.777314 
Low educated migrants 210 0.014463 0.022634 0.001045 0.247722 
Medium educated migrants 210 0.023832 0.045637 0.001189 0.366302 
High educated migrants 210 0.004848 0.015611 0.000052 0.117382 
 
Table2.27 Descriptive Statistics for Germany 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Value added 105 131694.3 110911.1 3840 502420 
Hours worked 105 3577.8 2882.071 135 11101 
Capital 105 44609.67 60848.47 33.54986 253428.3 
EU-migrants 105 0.026607 0.03068 0.002897 0.191 
Non-EU migrants 105 0.048563 0.039976 0.004089 0.224299 
Total migrants 105 0.074408 0.061702 0.008762 0.333333 
Low educated migrants 105 0.015297 0.017273 0.000645 0.069473 
Medium educated migrants 105 0.043025 0.032406 0.005179 0.140726 
High educated migrants 105 0.004994 0.003971 0.000673 0.023846 
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APPENDIX I 
Table2.28 EU and non-EU migration share in the UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  DFE-SR 
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.437*** 0.464*** 0.451*** 0.420** 
 (0.162) (0.153) (0.166) (0.173) 
itCaplog  
0.274*** 0.280*** 0.270*** 0.291*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0514) (0.0489) (0.0473) 
itEUMigShr
 
0.254 0.361 0.428** -3.175*** 
 (0.207) (0.192) (0.177) (0.825) 
itNEUMigShr
 
0.0914 0.190** 0.104 0.640*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0967) (0.0931) (0.143) 
Constant 1.021*** 1.026*** 1.050*** 1.127*** 
 (0.277) (0.280) (0.272) (0.248) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE model. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with EU and non-EU migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
Table2.29  Total migration share in the UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.456*** 0.466*** 0.462*** 0.455*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) 
itCaplog  
0.278*** 0.281*** 0.269*** 0.271*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0512) (0.0506) (0.0511) 
itMigShr  0.0845 0.174** 0.0727 0.203 
 (0.0543) (0.0817) (0.0827) (0.404) 
Constant 1.043*** 1.036*** 1.048*** 1.111*** 
 (0.272) (0.277) (0.266) (0.253) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE model. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with total  migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
Table2.30 EU and non-EU migration share in Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.468*** 0.438*** 0.470*** 0.462*** 
 (0.0808) (0.0871) (0.0800) (0.0821) 
itCaplog  
0.152*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0480) (0.0494) (0.0477) (0.0480) 
itEUMigShr  
0.514** -0.233 0.217** 0.453** 
(0.227) (0.546) (0.0899) (0.742) 
itNEUMigShr  
0.259* 0.443 0.202* 0.509 
(0.236) (0.638) (0.116) (0.120) 
Constant -0.223* -0.293** -0.241** -0.222* 
(0.123) (0.142) (0.123) (0.120) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE models. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with EU and non-EU migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
 
136 
 
Table2.31  Total migration share in Spain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.388*** 0.454*** 0.477*** 0.463*** 
 (0.0632) (0.0823) (0.0794) (0.0790) 
itCaplog  
0.162*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.151*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0486) (0.0469) (0.0474) 
itMigShr  0.429* 0.724*** 0.194* 0.0321* 
 (0.0236) (0.827) (0.115) (0.723) 
Constant -0.126 -0.276** 0.245** 0.209* 
 (0.0857) (0.127) (0.121) (0.114) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE models. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with total  migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
Table2.32 EU and non-EU migration share in the Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.924*** 0.924*** 0.931*** 0.970*** 
 (0.296) (0.296) (0.293) (0.311) 
itCaplog  
0.375*** 0.375*** 0.372*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0924) (0.0924) (0.0940) (0.0921) 
itEUMigShr  
0.0391*** 0.0391*** 0.127*** 0.0876 
 (0.00895) (0.00895) (0.0263) (0.147) 
itNEUMigShr  
0.289 0.289 1.136* -0.159 
 (0.275) (0.275) (0.688) (0.402) 
Constant 0.192 0.192 0.183 0.196 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.187) (0.219) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE models. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with total  migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
Table2.33  Total migration share in the Netherlands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR FE 
itHRSlog  
0.919*** 0.908*** 0.932*** DFE-SR 
 (0.296) (0.287) (0.301) 0.975*** 
itCaplog  
0.376*** 0.379*** 0.374*** (0.321) 
 (0.0906) (0.0911) (0.0914) 0.360*** 
itMigShr  0.0337*** 0.382*** 0.0402**  
 (0.00922) (0.115) (0.0184) 0.0372 
Constant 0.193 0.197 0.193 (0.114) 
 (0.163) (0.145) (0.177) 0.209 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE models. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with total  migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table2.34 EU and non-EU migration share in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.920*** 0.917*** 0.921*** 0.916*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0386) (0.0331) (0.0323) 
itCaplog  
0.113*** 0.110** 0.112*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0464) (0.0423) (0.0416) 
itEUMigShr  
0.161 2.926 0.397 1.482 
 (0.242) (4.606) (0.638) (2.368) 
itNEUMigShr  
-0.0302 -1.930 -0.0507 0.0867 
 (0.118) (1.925) (0.309) (0.436) 
2007D  0.128* 0.127* 0.103* 0.101* 
 (0.101) (0.089) (0.098) (0.115) 
Constant 1.142 1.205 1.135 1.101* 
 (0.704) (0.769) (0.710) (0.654) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE models. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with total  migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
Table2.35  Total migration share in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
itVAlog  
DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR DFE-SR 
itHRSlog  
0.922*** 0.923*** 0.922*** 0.919*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0301) (0.0289) (0.0264) 
itCaplog  
0.116*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0344) (0.0360) (0.0381) 
itMigShr  0.0712 0.125 0.117 0.464 
 (0.185) (2.214) (0.432) (0.736) 
2007D  0.108* 0.135* 0.117* 0.117* 
 (0.094) (0.076) (0.064) (0.015) 
Constant 1.093 1.060 1.070 1.072 
 (0.687) (0.708) (0.681) (0.652) 
Model (1)-(4) presents the short run DFE models. Model (1), (2), and (3) is high, medium and low  
skilled with total  migration share, respectively. Clustered t-stats are in parenthesis.  
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
Migration and Human Capital: Costs and Benefits, 
A Panel Data Analysis 
3.1. Introduction 
In the migration literature, the impact of emigration - due to the decrease in labour, 
particularly skilled labour - on the labour market in origin countries has been paid little 
attention. In fact, according to Clemens’ (2011) extensive survey of the economics of 
emigration, only less than a quarter of the research on the effects of international migration 
has been on aspects related to origin countries rather than host countries.  
The link between emigration and human capital gained wide publicity in the late 1960s  due 
to an increase in skilled emigrants rather than in general emigration, according to Commander 
et al.’ (2004) survey. This is a result of pro-skilled migration laws across the world. Questions 
remain open to be explored in more detail, for instance, on how remittances by emigrants in 
host countries contribute to origin countries’ economies; how return migration helps to form 
human capital which has been improved by the host country; or how the decrease in the 
number of high skilled emigrants stimulates the skilled population level in the origin country.  
In order to be able to measure such relationships between skilled emigration and its direct and 
indirect consequences on human capital level in the origin country, we need to have a 
database presenting emigration flows by educational attainment.  Alternatively, proxy 
variables should be investigated for emigration rate and emigrants’ educational attainment. 
For instance, Beine et al. (2001) used gross migration rates to proxy high skilled workers who 
emigrated. However, it does not provide us the full picture of such relationship. 
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Numerous theories have been presented on this matter but very few empirical papers exist. 
One reason is the fact that databases on emigration flows by educational attainment have been 
available for only a few decades and is based on estimated figures.  
For instance, Kyriacou (1991) constructed panel data in the form of a human capital database 
from 1970 to 1985 for total labour force in the origin country based on years of schooling as a 
proxy for human capital level and school enrolment rate in origin country as a proxy for high 
skilled population . Carrington and Enrica (1998) estimated the stock of emigrants by their 
educational attainment for 61 developing countries to the USA and OECD countries.  Adams 
(2003) constructed a dataset that includes information on the estimated educational attainment 
of emigrants from 24 most labour origin countries to the USA and some OECD countries.   
Data on human capital for extended origin countries were available only after 2004 (Docquier 
and Marfouk, 2004), sponsored by the World Bank. Their dataset provides a time series of 
human capital levels and emigration rate for 170 countries in 1990 and 190 countries in 2000.  
In addition to census and register data, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) (from now on referred 
to as D&M) also used survey data from all the OECD countries and organised their previous 
dataset for a cross-section of 174 countries in 1990 and 195 countries in 2000: this has been 
used by many scholars for cross-sectional analysis (Beine et al., 2008, 2010; Di Maria and 
Lazarova, 2011;     Docquier et al., 2005; Docquier and Marfouk 2004, 2006). Moreover, 
Dumont and Lemaître (2005) constructed a similar database to D&M, but included far fewer 
countries, and also defined migration differently.  
Based on the D&M database, Docquier et al. (2007) controlled it for age of entry and 
extended the database. This was followed by Docquier et al. (2009) who built up a more 
insightful database which enables gender distinction in addition to educational attainment of 
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emigrants. Clearly, looking at a relationship between high skilled emigration and human 
capital formation in origin countries requires a longer time dimension so that one can explore 
the possible dynamic effects.   
Such panel data analysis was conceivable only after Defoort (2008) collected such a dataset 
sponsored by the World Bank. She used the census and registry databases of the host 
countries where information on migrants and their educational attainments was available from 
1975 to 2000 with a five-year frequency. Evidently, collecting such data is demanding, as 
some data is unavailable for some host countries. Thus, Defoort only focused on six main host 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA.  . 
With such a dataset available, the first panel data analysis was generated by Beine et al. 
(2011) for 147 origin countries from 1975 to 2000 with a five-year frequency. One advantage 
of this paper is that it delivers a general picture of high skilled emigration rates and human 
capital aspects for developing and developed countries from 1975 to 2000 with a five-year 
frequency. Nevertheless, it only controls for the change in human capital level for the ex-ante 
human capital and high skilled emigration rate for developing and rich countries. Clearly, 
change in human capital does not depend only on ex-ante human capital or high skilled 
emigration rate, but on multiple other factors, such as public expenditure, remittance and 
population density, which are used elsewhere (Beine et al., 2008, 2010; Di Maria and 
Lazarova, 2011; Docquier et al., 2005; Docquier and Marfouk, 2004, 2006). For instance, 
public expenditure might have a significant effect on human capital, as it has a direct relation 
to it. Remittance might play a crucial role in easing the constraints on human capital 
investment for individuals in the origin country (Docquier et al., 2012; Siegel, 2010; 
Kaczmerczyk and Okólski, 2008).  Furthermore, consistent with the literature on the gravity 
models of migration, we use population density as a proxy for the cost of acquiring education, 
146 
 
because the more people there are per specified area in the origin, the lower the education 
cost. Finally, we have regional dummies for sub-Saharan and Latin American countries. Thus, 
overall we believe that it would be too simplistic too take only a very few control variables 
into account.   
In this chapter, we look at the impact of high skilled emigration rate on human capital level in 
origin countries. To conduct our panel data analysis, we use as the dependent variable the 
five-year growth rate of human capital defined as the five-year change in the logarithm of the 
human capital stock. All the explanatory variables are lagged by five years (i.e. ex-ante) and 
include the log of human capital, the high-skilled emigration rate, and interaction variable -for 
a possible non-linearity in the relationship between emigration rate and human capital-we 
interact the log of high-skilled emigration with GDPpc. Unlike Beine et al. (2011) we mainly 
interested in poor countries. To do this we set dummy variable 15D that is equal to 1 if the 
country has GDPpc less than 15 % of the average GDPpc of the G7 countries which are poor 
countries. We also narrow down the countries sampled by selecting countries which are even 
poorer- that are countries with 10D that is equal to 1 if the country has GDPpc less than 10% 
of the average GDPpc of the G7 countries, as we wanted to check if our results for countries 
with D15=1 is robust to findings when we narrow down the countries sampled  
The selection of origin countries is mainly based on the availability of data.  The data is 
restricted mostly on countries where migration rate is low, so we focused on countries where 
emigration rate is high.  Thus, we end up with 74 origin countries from 1980 to 2000 with a 5-
year frequency. For the list of sampled origin countries see Table 3.9 of Appendix J.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. Section 3.3 describes the 
data capture, regression model and concerns about reverse causality. Section 3.4 empirically 
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analyses the data and presents the results. Section 3.5 concludes and summarises the results. 
Appendix J, presents the list of origin countries sampled. Finally, Appendix K presents the 
additional cross-section results. 
3.2. Literature Review 
What is brain drain? Several definitions can be accepted in this regard. For instance, Kwok 
and Leland (1982) described it as skill transfer by professionals to the countries where the 
benefit of migration is highest. What is more, in Giannoccolo (2006)’s extensive survey, brain 
drain was defined as the emigration of highly skilled workers to more developed countries or 
technologically better off countries, or the emigration of particular professionals such as 
doctors, surgeons, physicians, etc. In general, regardless of its beneficial or detrimental effect, 
brain drain is a phenomenon where high skilled emigration occurs. What are the 
consequences of such emigration? Do origin countries benefit from it, or quite the opposite? 
Do individuals with high skills return to their origin countries with additional skills acquired 
from the host countries, or do they indirectly support individuals who are left behind by 
lessening the constraint on liquidity via remittances?  Or, in contrast, do they only attract 
more individuals to acquire higher skills in the origin country in order to be able to emigrate 
using the same channels? The paradox between the limited number of skilled residents in 
potential origin countries and yet the large number of skilled migrants in well-developed 
economies from those potential countries makes it important to investigate the brain drain 
effect (Carrington and Enrica, 1999). 
As stated before, not many empirical studies are available on the link between emigration and 
human capital. For the sake of understanding the empirical interpretation, it might be 
beneficial to outline some of the theory behind it.  To begin with early studies, Grubel and 
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Scott (1966, 1968) found that although the emigration of the highly skilled affects the social 
capital of the origin country negatively, the lessening numbers of skilled workers most likely 
to encourage individuals- who stay behind- to acquire higher education so the optimal level of 
skilled workers in origin country remains stable. By distinguishing between general skilled 
and technical skilled emigrants, Di Maria and Stryszowski (2009) claimed that the skill level 
of the remaining individuals is affected negatively in line with economic incentives as a result 
of skilled emigration, and this effect is even stronger when origin countries are further from 
the technological frontier.   Mountford (1997) argued that although the probability of high 
skilled immigration is uncertain, due to restrictions from the origin and/or receiving country, 
it is still most likely to increase the average growth rate of the origin country in the long run. 
This is because an individual requires a higher education to be able to emigrate under high 
skill emigration schemes ( unlike general emigration), thus this reduces the level of low 
skilled people in the origin country, which leads to an increase in the growth rate in the long 
run. The ratio of high skilled emigration in the origin country might depend on the labour 
market composition in the host countries. For instance, McCulloch and Yellen (1977) stated 
that if the cost of skilled labour migration is lower in host countries then the ratio of skilled 
labour (natives and migrants) is higher. High skilled emigration does not only affect the skill 
composition of origin countries, but also the wage distribution.  Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) 
assessed multiple possible scenarios around high skilled emigration labours’ effect on wages 
in the origin country. Firstly, they claimed that high skilled emigrants can eventually increase 
the wages at home after integrating the high skilled labours of host countries: secondly, 
following from the first potential increase in the wages of skilled workers, those of unskilled 
workers wages may increase, too: thirdly, having experienced higher salaries in host countries  
may lead to an increase in expected wages in the origin country: and finally, a potential 
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increase may be present after high skilled emigration as it may imply the integration into the 
international market of the origin country.  
Although not many empirical studies available, some findings can be discussed.  Using the 
Polish LFS database, Kaczmarczyk (2010) showed an extensive loss of skilled population 
caused by a high emigration rate of skilled to mostly EU15 countries and some OECD 
countries between 1994 and 2007. Seemingly, the long stay of the high skilled in host 
countries causes shortages of leading groups of workers (professionals) across firms in 
Poland. Stark and Wang (2002) and Stark (2004) proposed that individuals from closed or 
small open economies underinvest in human capital in the absence of migration, but choose to 
increase their human capital level if migration is present. Thus, it might be stated that the 
decision on high education is related to the probability of migration in origin countries. Vidal 
(1998) claimed that high skilled migration may eventually affect the origin country’s growth 
level positively by providing incentives for human capital formation. According to Dustmann 
et al. (2011), brain gain is experienced when the skilled emigrants eventually return to their 
home countries with additional skills acquired in the host countries, but brain drain occurs if 
they choose not to return, owing to the loss of the lifetime earnings that would have stayed in 
the origin country as well as the proportion of skilled workers that is lessened due to 
emigration. Stark et al. (1997, 1998), however, claimed that brain gain can arise regardless of 
emigrants returning with acquired skills from host countries, since the high skilled emigration 
eventually affects human capital investments positively and accordingly the human capital 
level, Thus, even if they do not return, there may still be an indirect brain gain. 
Beine et al. (2003) found evidence of brain gain using Carrington and Detragiache’s (1998) 
dataset for a cross-section of 50 developing origin countries to the USA.  The last decade of 
international migration featured more skilled migration due to pro-skilled labour migration 
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laws in developed countries.  Based on 37 developing origin countries, Beine et al. (2001) 
showed that emigration patterns play a crucial role in the education decisions of individuals 
because the expected return is high. This is firstly because skilled emigrants can move to 
developed countries, and also individuals staying in the origin country would be in a good 
position due to the lack of skilled individuals. Following this, Beine et al. (2007) controlled 
emigrants by their age of entry to the host country – this is a proxy for determining where 
emigrants gain their education – and found that although brain drain effects are slightly 
negative after controlling by the age of entry, there is still a significant variation across other 
control variables. Beine et al. (2008) exploited the new D&M dataset for a cross-section of 
127 countries in 1990 and 2000, and showed that although some sub-Saharan and Central 
American countries experienced brain drain, the overall effect of skilled emigration seemed to 
be beneficial for origin countries, because the skilled emigration ended up increasing the skill 
level of the origin countries sampled. The robustness of these findings was assessed by Beine 
et al. (2010) by distinguishing whether emigrants acquired their education in the origin or 
host country (similar to Beine et al., 2007), as well as using a relative measure for migration 
propensity rather than an absolute figure. They confirmed the robustness of all findings in 
Beine et al. (2008).  
A gender distinction was taken into account by Docquier et al. (2009), suggesting that the 
high skilled emigration rate is almost 17% more for woman in comparison to men. They 
found that women - particularly those from undeveloped regions - affect the highly skilled 
population much more than low skilled women or high skilled men, in 1990 and 2000. 
Noticeably, such analysis would have been more reliable if a longer time dimension had been 
available. Bein et al. (2011) were the first to overcome such limitations by utilising a new 
dataset created by Defoort (2008) who constructed panel data for 147 origin countries for 
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1975 to 2000 with a five-year frequency. They found a significant brain gain effect on the 
sampled countries if the level of skilled emigration is not higher than 0.30%.  They focused 
on the direct effect of the skilled migration rate from developing and rich countries and ex-
ante human capital level on the change in human capital level. However, there remained other 
essential factors that might directly or indirectly affect the human capital level through skilled 
emigration such as remittance and the relationship between high skilled outsourcing and 
human capital investment in the origin country. In Section 3.3.2, we will address these issues, 
and then we will compare some results in Section 3.4.  Moreover, using the D&M database, 
Di Maria and Lazarova (2011) investigated the impact of high skilled emigration on the 
human capital level and composition as well as growth effect of the origin countries. Their 
cross-section analysis suggested that the high skilled emigration rate significantly affects the 
human capital level and composition of the skill level in the origin country as well as the 
growth level of the country. Both effects are mostly present in countries which are 
technologically less sophisticated. 
Batista et al. (2012) assessed whether there is a substantial brain drain effect of emigration in 
Cape Verde by using unique household survey data from December 2005 to March 2006 
which included 1066 resident households. They concluded that on the contrary to the general 
belief in Cape Verde, a high rate of skilled emigration increased the human capital level. 
Also, an increase in the probability of emigration raises the probability of getting educated by 
around 45%.   
McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) examined the impact of emigration on educational levels in 
rural Mexico, and found that a high number of emigrants to the United States lowers the 
number of educated girls aged 16 to 18 and boys aged 12 to 18, significantly. Heuer (2011) 
also detected a significant negative effect of high skilled emigration on human capital level in 
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developing countries from OECD in 2000, and found that this effect is even stronger for more 
professional emigrants,   using Carrington and Detragiache (1998)’s database. Niimi et al. 
(2010) also proposed that high skilled emigrants remit less than unskilled ones using a 
combination of the D&M, IMF and World Bank databases for 2000.  Sanromá and Ramos 
(2008), by applying the LFS and Population Census of Spain in 2001, explained that the 
human capital of migrants from countries that have similar economic and social backgrounds 
is transferable, whereas migrants from countries with no similarities to Spain show negligible 
transferability of skills.  
Friedberg (2000) looked at human capital evaluation from the host country’s viewpoint and 
showed that individuals who have acquired skills abroad are less valued than those who have 
acquired them in Israel, using Israeli Censuses of Population and Housing data in 1974 and 
1985. This is due to the earning difference between migrants and natives. 
According to Herbst and Rok (2013), in their extensive human capital and migration survey, 
most empirical studies showed that high skilled emigration negatively affects the origin 
country’s human capital level. Adams (2003) found that international migration from 24 
popular origin countries to the USA and some OECD countries involved approximately 10% 
of the best educated population, yet some origin countries were faced with an extensive brain 
drain effect of losing the best educated population of the country, based on estimations of 
2000 census data. Docquier et al. (2005) focused on global migration rates and the selection 
bias of emigrants when examining the human capital effect using the D&M database. They 
suggested that a negative brain drain effect is observed only if there is a high emigration rate 
from the sampled origin countries, or if there is a high selection bias amongst emigrants, not 
both. They also found that the countries most affected by brain drain were in the Caribbean, 
most regions in Africa and Central America. These are the same regions which were found to 
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experience a strong and negative brain drain effect in Docquier and Morfouk (2004) and 
Carrington and Enrica (1998).  
Faini (2003) argued that undeveloped countries may not benefit from brain drain, and object 
to the common belief that high skilled migrants remit more. Applying Docquier and 
Marfouk’s (2004) dataset, Faini (2007) showed that although skilled migrants earn more and 
are thus expected to remit more; this is less likely to be the case. Because, in order for them to 
attain the life standards they have hoped for, they utilize most of earning for themselves. 
3.3. Data and Model 
3.3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Before estimating the regression models, we should first describe the data sources. The main 
database for human capital and the educational attainment of emigrants is - as mentioned 
earlier - obtained from Defoort (2008). We analyse 74 migrant origin countries for which data 
on human capital, educational attainment and number of emigrants are available. Defoort 
(2008) focused on six main individual OECD host countries, Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, the UK and the USA, as well as these as one aggregate group. The other control 
variables that we use, such as public expenditure, remittances, population density, population 
size and GDP per capita are obtained other databases.  Table 3.1 shows the notation, variable 
names, data sources and the units of analysis for these variables. 
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Table3.1 Data and Sources 
Notation Variable Unit Source 
EDU  Public expenditure on 
education  
% of GDP UN Database, World 
Bank WDI 
REM  Remittance Constant in current US 
Dollar price 
World bank WDI 
p  High skilled emigration 
rate by country of birth 
The emigration of skilled 
workers in the origin 
country  
Panel Data on 
International Migration 
by Defoort (2008)   
H  Human Capital Initial (i.e. at time t-5) 
level of ex ante human 
capital. Residents + 
emigrants with post-
secondary education  
Panel Data on 
International Migration 
by Defoort (2008)   
STOCK  Immigration Stock by 
country of birth 
The number of immigrants 
living in the OECD area 
Panel Data on 
International Migration 
by Defoort (2008)   
DENS  Population Density Midyear population 
divided by land area in 
square kilometres 
World Bank, WDI 
POP  Population size in the 
origin 
Total ITU Communication 
database 
GDPD  Gross Domestic Product Constant in current US 
Dollar price 
CEPII 
 
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of these variables. Our dependent variable is the 
five year growth rate of human capital and is summarized in row 1 of Table 3.2. As can be 
seen from these descriptive statistics this growth rate lays approximately between -2% and 
10%. The negative growth in human capital indicates that in some periods the number of 
people with post-secondary education in these origin countries fell. In order to investigate the 
potential catching up effect, we control the change in human capital level with the ex-ante 
human capital level summarized in row 2 of Table 3.2. From this we can see that the 
maximum level of individuals with post-secondary education or with more than 13 years of 
schooling - approximately 676 million - is almost half of the maximum level of population of 
1,200 million. Note that population only captures residents, whereas the human capital level 
captures both residents and emigrated individuals. Moreover, to be able to observe the 
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migration incentive effect we use the rate of skilled emigrant, row 3 of Table 3.2 as one of the 
control variables. The skill rate of the origin countries lies from approximately 1% to 85% of 
the population in the origin country.   
To address potential non-linear relation between high skilled emigration rate and human 
capital, we interact high skilled emigration rate with GDPpclog . Estimations carried out for 
two sub-samples of origin countries based on dummy variables: 15D and 10D which are 
defined as D10=1 and D15=1 if the country has GDPpc less than 10%  and 15% of the 
average GDPpc of the G7,  respectively. Thus our interaction variables for each sub-sample of 
countries can be written as 15)log( 5 Dpt   and 10)log( 5 Dpt  , as in row 4 and 5 of Table 
3.2. From the descriptive statistics, we lose a number of observations from 15D  to 10D , based 
on the GDP per capita of origin country. Seemingly, the number of countries with GDP per 
capita that is less than15% the average GDP per capita of the G7 countries is 207, whereas the 
number of countries where the GDP per capita is 10% lower than the average GDP per capita 
in the G7 countries is 177. Through the literature, population density, that is row 6 of Table 
3.2 , is found to be a decreasing factor for education cost, so we control for this variable. 
Thus, when midyear population of origin countries divided by land area in square kilometres 
across origin countries the population density varies from 1.2 to 1157.6.  Additionally, public 
expenditure on education, that is row 7 of Table 3.2, is also considered a factor that affects 
education cost, is given as % of GDP and lies between 5% and 17 % approximately. 
Decreasing the liquidity constrains, remittance-row 8 of Table 3.2 is considered a control 
variable at a constant in current US dollar price. This varies from 21,310.16 to 6,220 million 
US dollars. We also present the descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables in Table 
3.2 which is to be covered in Section 3.3.2.1. Variables in row 9 and 10 of Table 2.3 are the 
number of individuals in the origin country and the number of migrants in the host countries. 
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Finally, variables in row 11 and 12 of Table 3.2 are dummy variables for sub-Saharan 
countries and Latin American countries, and take values of 0 and 1. 
Table3.2 Descriptive statistics for five-year interval data 
No Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
1 
tH ,5 log   300 0.0587106 0.0171546 -0.0243697 0.0978335 
2 
5, tH  300 1.99E+07 7.60E+07 17025.11 6.76E+08 
3 
5tp  
300 0.2032383 0.2268437 0.0075913 0.8520139 
4 15)log( 5 Dpt   207 -15.53329 8.869384 -38.05195 -1.183644 
5 10)log( 5 Dpt   177 -15.65798 8.412883 -38.05195 -1.183644 
6 
5tDENS  
300 108.6069 182.8187 1.230139 1157.603 
7 
5tEDU  
300 3.854615 2.010898 0.045755 17.38824 
8 
5tREM  
300 4.41E+08 9.44E+08 21310.16 6.22E+09 
9 
5tPOP  
300 4.49E+07 1.57E+08 61906 1.20E+09 
10 
5tSTOCK  
300 170382 396208 105.5 4558347 
11 SSAD  300 0.36 0.480802 0 1 
12 LATD  300 0.2266667 0.4193747 0 1 
Note: The five year lags (t-5) actually represent a one-time interval lag because the data are recorded at five year intervals. 
3.3.2. Model 
We will be applying econvergenc  that has been used elsewhere in human capital 
literature (Beine et al.:2007, Beine et al.:2008, Beine et al.:2010, Beine et al.:2011, Docquier 
et al.:2009, Di Maria and Lazarova: 2011). This model suggests that poorer or developing 
economies grow faster than those rich ones. Since that is consistent with human capital and 
migration theories, that is, (1) poorer countries are more prone to acquire high skills than rich 
ones so that they can emigrate, or (2) they are more prone to acquire high skills than rich ones 
so the level of human capital in the origin countries holds around the same level even after 
high skilled emigration (Kaczmarczyk: 2010, Stark and Wang: 2002, Stark: 2004, Vidal 
1998). Using the econvergenc  model we regress the five-year growth rate of human 
capital, defined as )log()log(),log( 5,,:5  ttt HHH  , on a set of explanatory variables. 
To begin with, we control the five year growth rate of human capital with the level of human 
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capital at 5t , that is 
, 5tH   to capture the potential catching-up effect. The number of high 
skilled emigrants is also expected to have a direct impact on the five-year change in human 
capital so we also control for this by including its lagged value 5tp .  In addition, to control for 
possible non-linearities we include two dummy variables that are interacted with the log of 
the high-skilled emigration rate, see rows 4 and 5 of Table 3.2. These two dummy variables, 
15D  and 10D are used to indicate origin countries whose GDP per capita frontier is 
substantially below that of the average G7 countries. Moreover, we control the log of change 
in human capital for public expenditure - )( 5tEDU  which we believe has a positive effect on 
human capital formation.  In addition to the direct effect of high skilled emigration, the 
remittances from workers abroad would give the most relevant definition of human capital. 
Because, remittance- 5tREM  might play a crucial role in easing the constraints on human 
capital investment for individuals in origin countries and it is to control for return high skilled 
emigration. We also include population density in the model as a proxy for the cost of 
acquiring education, because the more people per specified area in the origin country means 
the lower the education cost. Finally, we have regional dummies for sub-Saharan and Latin 
American countries SSAD and LATD , respectively.  
Thus, our estimation model is: 


 





LATD
SSADREMEDUDENS
GDPpcppHH
ttt
ttttt
8
7565554
553525,10,5
log)log(
)log()log()log()log(
              (3.1) 
where  t  takes the value of 2000, 1995, 1990 and 1985, respectively. The dataset we obtained 
is a product of the World Bank Development Research Group, collected by Defoort (2008) in 
which most data for migration stocks and their educational attainments are based on six major 
OECD countries as host countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA. 
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Thus, one should be cautious about interpreting the regression results as all of the origin 
countries in the sample are not necessarily origin emigrants only to those six major host 
countries. To be able to compare the results with Beine et al (2011)’s findings, we provide 
their model as following:  
            RtDttt ppHH )log()log()log(log 53525,10,5                                  (3.2) 
where, Dtp )( 5 and Rtp )( 5 presents the skilled emigration rate in developing and rich countries at 
time t-5, respectively. 
3.3.2.1. Endogeneity 
Before we carry out the estimation, we should first address some concerns of endogeneity. 
Since we are looking at the impact of the emigration rate of skilled individuals on the change 
in the level of education that is gained by individuals in the origin countries, one should be 
cautious about reverse causality, because, the rate of high skilled emigration directly affects 
the human capital level in the origin, or on the other hand a higher level of human capital may 
lead to a higher skilled migration since there will be a reduction on the skill premium in local 
labour market in the origin countries. To address such a reverse causality issue, we adopted 
instrumental variables, population size in the origin and migration stock in OECD countries, 
which were also used by Beine et al. (2008:2011), and Di Maria and Emiliya (2011).  
Up until the existing of such panel data in regards of human capital and educational 
attainment of emigrants, the existing literature had difficulty to deal with omitted variables, 
unobserved heterogeneity or endogeneity issues. Since the data enables us to do so, we 
provided both fixed effect and first difference models in addition to our main estimation IV 
models. We run OLS, fixed effect and first differenced regressions as well as IV-fixed effect 
and IV-first differenced regressions. The essential features of instrumental variables are, 
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firstly, that the instrumental variable has to be correlated with the endogenous variable skilled 
migration rate- 5tp , and secondly, that it should be uncorrelated with an error term in the 
main estimation model (Baum, 2009). To begin with, the migration stock in the OECD area 
undoubtedly stimulates the future migration so is correlated with skilled migration rate- 5tp . 
Population size is also directly related to the ratio of the skilled migration rate. Thus, we 
guarantee the first feature of the instrumental variable. 
In order to see if the second feature of the instrumental variables is applied, in other words if 
the instruments are valid, we should see whether population size and migration stocks might 
have an independent direct effect on the independent variable, the log of change in human 
capital level. To do this, we perform a number of tests.  Firstly, we perform the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald F-statistic for identification, where the null hypothesis states that the instruments 
are strong.  Secondly, we perform the Hansen J-statistics for the over-identification test where 
the null hypothesis states that the instruments are over-identified, and finally, we perform the 
endogeneity test where the null hypothesis states that the endogenous variable is exogenous 
after being instrumented.  The F values for the Kleibergen-Paap Wald and Hansen J statistics 
and the p-values for endogeneity test are provided in the results tables.  
3.4 Results of the Panel Analysis 
The panel analysis results are presented in Tables 3.3 to 3.8. Models (1), (2) and (3) of Table 
3.3 present the results of the OLS, fixed effects (FE) and first difference (FD) regressions for 
poor countries, respectively, whereas models (4) and (5) of Table 3.3 present the IV-fixed 
effect and IV-first differenced results.  
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We found a significant divergence in native human capital levels among the countries 
sampled, as the coefficient for the log of ex-ante human capital is positive across the main 
regressions ranging from 50% to 88%. This is coherent with the negative and significant brain 
drain affect that we find. The negative coefficient for the log of high skilled varies from 1% to 
4% per year across all regressions, suggesting that it takes approximately 3 years for each 
country to diverge long run level of human capital. In other words the negative sign- ranging 
from 1% to 4% per year- for the percentage of skilled population means that there is a 
decrease in the human capital level in origin countries sampled in the model after high skilled 
emigration in as short as 3 years’ time, approximately. A negative and significant result for 
the interaction variable of high skilled emigrants with 15D suggests a weak incentive effect in 
poor countries. As expected, remittance and public expenditure are found to be positively 
related with a change in human capital level. Although the coefficient of public expenditure 
and remittance are small, they are mostly found to be significant at around 1%.  Population 
density is also found to be positive and significant at around 0.11 to 0.20, suggesting that the 
more population density the less distance to schools so the less cost of acquiring education 
which results in an increase in the human capital level. The dummy variables for sub-Saharan 
and Latin American countries are dropped from the models due to collinearity – apart from 
the OLS model – and only origin countries from Latin America found to positively and 
significantly affect the log change of human capital level, but the OLS results might be biased 
due to the endogeneity issue.  
As can be seen from columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.3, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 
for identifying the instrumental variables does  not reject the hypothesis that the instruments 
are strong, since the F-test is greater than the critical value of 10%.  The Hansen J-statistics 
for the over-identification test where the null hypothesis states that the instruments are over-
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identified is also not rejected, as the p-values are far above the critical value of 5%, and 
finally, the endogeneity test does not reject the exogeneity of the instrumented variable, since 
the F-test is above the critical value of 10%. 
Table3.3 Regression analysis for countries with D15 : 1980-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regression 
method: 
OLS F.E. F.D. F.E. I.V.
a 
F.D. I.V.
a 
5,log tH  -0.0013*
 
(0.0008) 
0.8815***
 
(0.0261) 
0.6163***
 
(0.1098) 
0.8652***
 
(0.0428) 
0.5018**
 
(0.2148) 
5log tp  -0.0272***
 
(0.0051) 
-0.0159 
(0.0183) 
-0.0417 
(0.0273) 
-0.0136 
(0.0186) 
-0.0439**
 
(0.0196) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  -0.0034***
 
(0.0007) 
-0.0015 
(0.0022) 
-0.0048*
 
(0.0028) 
-0.0012 
(0.0022) 
-0.0050**
 
(0.0023) 
5log tDENS  -0.0031***
 
(0.0011) 
0.1059***
 
(0.0339) 
0.1482**
 
(0.0743) 
0.1251**
 
(0.0523) 
0.1950**
 
(0.0975) 
5log tEDU  0.0052***
 
(0.0018) 
0.0035 
(0.0042) 
0.0065**
 
(0.0030) 
0.0033 
(0.0041) 
0.0066 
(0.0042) 
5log tREM  0.0010*
 
(0.0006) 
0.0039*
 
(0.0021) 
0.0001 
(0.0015) 
0.0041*
 
(0.0021) 
0.0001 
(0.0021) 
SSAD  -0.0038 
(0.0038) 
    
LATD  0.0079***
 
(0.0024) 
    
Cons  0.0594***
 
(0.0110) 
1.3840***
 
(0.2658) 
0.0372***
 
(0.0122) 
 0.0488**
 
(0.0222) 
2R  0.26 0.98 0.63 0.98 0.62 
N 203 197 140 193 140 
Hansen J-Stat    0.12 0.33 
Endogeneity    0.63 0.57 
K-P Wald F-Stat    10.726 10.725 
 (1)-(2) and (3) present the OLS, fixed effect and first difference results, (4) presents the fixed effect IV results and finally (5) presents the 
first differenced IV results. P-vals for Hansen J statistics of over-identification and endogeneity and the test for an endogenous regressor are 
reported. The F-test of the K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  SSAD and 
LATD are omitted from (2)-(5) due to collinearity.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and 
*** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a Stock of migrants in OECD and population size is used as instrumental variables. 
 
As to the countries with 10D  in Table 3.4, the results do not appear to be very different in 
terms of the sign of the coefficient than those in developing countries shown in Table 3.3. 
However, the main differences are that the divergence effect appears to be much stronger in 
undeveloped countries (Table 3.3) as the coefficients are quite larger than the ones in Table 
3.4. The ratio of the skilled population seems to be decreasing in undeveloped countries 
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almost twice as much as in developing countries. These two findings may suggest us that 
undeveloped countries are experiencing more detrimental brain drain effects than developing 
ones.  As to incentive effects, undeveloped countries show weak incentives, although smaller 
than the developing ones.  As can be seen from Models (4) and (5) of Table 3.4, tests for post 
estimation suggest the strong and good identification of instruments as well as the exogeneity 
of the instrumented variable. SSAD and LATD are omitted due to collinearity. The IV- fixed 
effect results is not provided by the command (Stata 13- xtivreg2) used, so is not available in 
Model (4). 
Table3.4  Regression analysis for countries with D10: 1980-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regression 
method: 
OLS F.E. F.D. F.E. I.V.
a 
F.D. I.V
a
 
5,log tH  0.996*** 
(0.0021) 
0.6200*** 
(0.1110) 
0.8870*** 
(0.0278) 
0.9340*** 
(0.0434) 
0.8610*** 
(0.1800) 
5log tp  -0.0915*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0796** 
(0.0378) 
-0.0484** 
(0.0230) 
-0.0571** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0765*** 
(0.0263) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  0.0113*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0085** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0047* 
(0.0025) 
-0.0056** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0083*** 
(0.0028) 
5log tDENS  -0.0074*** 
(0.0025) 
0.1520* 
(0.0791) 
0.1010** 
(0.0399) 
0.0409 
(0.0582) 
0.0488 
(0.0917) 
5log tEDU  0.0151*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0039 
(0.0045) 
0.0042 
(0.0045) 
0.0050 
(0.0049) 
5log tREM  0.0023* 
(0.0014) 
0.0006 
(0.0018) 
0.0046* 
(0.0026) 
0.0045* 
(0.0026) 
0.0012 
(0.0026) 
SSAD  -0.0030 
(0.0101) 
    
LATD  0.0191*** 
(0.0062) 
    
Cons  0.1380*** 
(0.0260) 
0.0374*** 
(0.0126) 
1.2800*** 
(0.2770) 
 0.0132 
(0.0189) 
2R  0.98 0.67 0.99 0.99 0.63 
N 172 116 172 168 116 
Hansen J-Stat    0.11 0.38 
Endogeneity    0.87 0.88 
K-P Wald F-Stat    10.180 10.976 
(1)-(2) and (3) present the OLS, fixed effect and first difference results, (4) presents the fixed effect IV results and finally (5) presents the 
first differenced IV results. The P-vals for Hansen J statistics of over-identification and endogeneity the test for endogenous regressor are 
reported. The F-test of K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. The robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  SSAD and 
LATD are omitted from (2)-(5) due to collinearity.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and 
*** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a Stock of migrants in OECD and population size is used as instrumental variables. 
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In comparison to Beine et al.’s (2011), panel data analysis, they showed a net brain gain effect 
of skilled emigration rates on human capital levels when the emigration rate does not exceed 
20 -30%. However, the descriptive statistics of high skilled emigrants in our work suggests 
that 235 out of 296 observations for high skilled emigration are less than 30 %, and 209 out of 
296 observations are less than 20%. In general, only 61 out of 296 figures are over 30%. Yet, 
we observe a significant brain drain effect across the sampled origin countries. One 
explanation to this could be the origin countries that are sampled. Also, we have more 
independent variables in comparison Beine et al. (2011)’s.    
Since migration stocks in the OECD area and population size in the origin are confirmed to be 
valid and strong instruments, we applied the IV-fixed effect and IV-first differenced models 
for six individual host countries, as Defoort’s (2008) database also provides migration stock 
in those individual host countries. However, the stock of migration in those individual 
countries can only capture the migration network of these six host countries, and therefore 
caution should be used in interpreting the results. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the country 
specific results of IV fixed effect results for developing and undeveloped countries, Tables 
3.7 and 3.8 present the country specific results of IV- first difference results for developing 
and undeveloped countries where the instrumental variables- stock of migrants and 
populations size- are measured for an individual host countries. Models (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) 
and (6) of Tables 3.5- 3.8 present the results for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK 
and the USA.  As expected, the K-P Wald F-statistics of the weak identification test in Table 
3.5 reject the null hypothesis of being strong instruments as the F statistic is lower than the 
critical value of 10% for each country. Intuitively, this reflects the results by weakening the 
significance of the brain drain effect and incentive effect of the human capital level, although 
the level of ex-ante human capital is still quite significant and suggests a strong divergence in 
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native human capital in developing origin countries.  For undeveloped countries - as can be 
seen from Table 3.6 – the weak identification test is even poorer, suggesting the weakness of 
the instruments again. However, there is a negative and significant brain drain effect for 
emigration to Canada, the UK and the US for undeveloped countries.   
Table3.5 Panel data analysis of IV-fixed effect for countries with D15 : 1980-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Host countries Australia
a 
Canada
a 
France
a 
Germany
a 
UK
a 
USA
a 
5,log tH  0.7663***
 
(0.1047) 
0.7863***
 
(0.1082) 
0.8156***
 
(0.0726) 
0.7591***
 
(0.1049) 
0.7641***
 
(0.1069) 
0.8413***
 
(0.0713) 
5log tp  0.0005 
(0.0241) 
-0.0023 
(0.0217) 
-0.0065 
(0.0246) 
0.0016 
(0.0242) 
0.0009 
(0.0244) 
-0.0102 
(0.0233) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  -0.0061 
(0.0026) 
-0.0002 
(0.0025) 
0.0003 
(00025) 
-0.0007 
(0.0026) 
-0.0006 
(0.0027) 
-0.0007 
(0.0024) 
5log tDENS  0.2417**
 
(0.1235) 
0.2181*
 
(0.1286) 
0.1836**
 
(0.0848) 
0.2502**
 
(0.1238) 
0.2443*
 
(0.1261) 
0.1533*
 
(0.0846) 
5log tEDU  0.0022 
(0.0045) 
0.0024 
(0.0045) 
0.0028 
(0.0042) 
0.0021 
(0.0045) 
0.0022 
(0.0045) 
0.0031 
(0.0041) 
5log tREM  0.0052**
 
(0.0025) 
0.0051**
 
(0.0024) 
0.0046**
 
(0.0022) 
0.0053 
(0.0025) 
0.0052**
 
(0.0025) 
0.0043**
 
(0.0021) 
SSAD  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
LATD  193 193 193 193 193 193 
Hansen J-Stat 0.46 0.58 0.32 0.78 0.39 0.24 
Endogeneity 0.29 0.22 0.37 0.17 0.17 0.49 
K-P Wald F-Stat 6.111 6.320 6.442 6.267 6.129 6.789 
Models (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) present the results for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA respectively.  The P-vals for the 
Hansen J statistics of over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of K-P Wald F-statistics is 
a weak identification test. The robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is 
xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
Stock of migrants in individual host countries and population size are used as instrumental variables 
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Table3.6 Panel data analysis of IV-fixed effect for countries with D10: 1980-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Host countries Australia
a 
Canada
a 
France
a 
Germany
a 
UK
a 
USA
a 
5,log tH  0.8610*** 
(0.0730) 
0.9030*** 
(0.0838) 
0.8980*** 
(0.0502) 
0.8640*** 
(0.0731) 
0.8780*** 
(0.0708) 
0.9450*** 
(0.0398) 
5log tp  -0.0437 
(0.0276) 
-0.0514** 
(0.0238) 
-0.0505 
(0.0327) 
-0.0441 
(0.0277) 
-0.0468* 
(0.0278) 
-0.0592* 
(0.0310) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  -0.0042* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0050** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0049* 
(0.0028) 
-0.0043* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0045* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0058** 
(0.0027) 
5log tDENS  0.1330 
(0.0951) 
0.0800 
(0.107) 
0.0861 
(0.0651) 
0.1300 
(0.0951) 
0.1120 
(0.0924) 
0.0264 
(0.0520) 
5log tEDU  0.0037 
(0.0039) 
0.0040 
(0.0040) 
0.0041 
(0.0038) 
0.0037 
(0.0039) 
0.0038 
(0.0039) 
0.0043 
(0.0039) 
5log tREM  0.0047* 
(0.0024) 
0.0046* 
(0.0025) 
0.0046* 
(0.0024) 
0.0047* 
(0.0024) 
0.0047* 
(0.0024) 
0.0045* 
(0.0025) 
SSAD  0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
LATD  168 168 168 168 168 168 
Hansen J-Stat 0.44 0.42 0.51 0.46 0.13 0.18 
Endogeneity 0.72 0.80 0.93 0.57 0.94 0.11 
K-P Wald F-Stat 3.207 3.747 3.560 3.269 3.356 10.750 
Models (1),(2),(3),(4),(5) and (6) present the results for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA respectively.  The P-vals for the 
Hansen J statistics of over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of K-P Wald F-statistics is 
a weak identification test. The robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is 
xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Stock of migrants in individual host countries and population size are used as instrumental variables 
 
 Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the IV-first difference models for developing and undeveloped 
countries respectively. Although the instruments are weak as the K-P Wald F-statistics 
suggest, the significance of the main variables hold both for developing and undeveloped 
countries. In fact, the results for undeveloped countries are much better than those for 
developing countries in respect of significance.  
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Table3.7 Panel data analysis of IV-first differenced for countries with D15: 1980-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Host countries Australia
a 
Canada
a 
France
a 
Germany
a 
UK
a 
USA
a 
5,log tH  
0.1603 
(0.6323) 
0.3451 
(0.4757) 
0.4054 
(0.4835) 
0.1061 
(0.5156) 
-0.1651 
(0.6313) 
0.3672 
(0.3351) 
5log tp  
-0.0507**
 
(0.0249) 
-0.0470*
 
(0.0258) 
-0.0458* 
(0.0241) 
-0.0518**
 
(0.0241) 
-0.0506**
 
(0.0249) 
-0.0466**
 
(0.0233) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0056**
 
(0.0028) 
-0.0052*
 
(0.0028) 
-0.0051**
 
(0.0026) 
-0.0056**
 
(0.0028) 
-0.0055**
 
(0.0028) 
-0.0052**
 
(0.0025) 
5log tDENS  
0.3345 
(0.2606) 
0.2590 
(0.2038) 
0.2344 
(0.1982) 
0.3567 
(0.2195) 
0.3326 
(0.2602) 
0.2500 
(0.1542) 
5log tEDU  
0.0068*
 
(0.0041) 
0.0067**
 
(0.0032) 
0.0067**
 
(0.0031) 
0.0069 
(0.0045) 
0.0068*
 
(0.0041) 
0.0067**
 
(0.0032) 
5log tREM  
0.0001 
(0.0019) 
0.0001 
(0.0017) 
0.0001 
(0.0016) 
0.0001 
(0.0021) 
0.0001 
(0.0019) 
0.0001 
(0.0017) 
Cons  0.0833 
(0.0659) 
0.0647 
(0.0494) 
0.0586 
(0.0503) 
0.0888 
(0.0541) 
0.0828 
(0.0658) 
0.0624*
 
(0.0344) 
2R  0.47 0.57 0.60 0.43 0.47 0.58 
N 140 140 140 140 140 140 
Hansen J-Stat 0.51 0.55 0.33 0.79 0.89 0.66 
Endogeneity 0.40 0.51 0.69 0.11 0.41 0.42 
K-P Wald F-Stat 1.219 1.642 1.606 1.635 1.221 5.689 
Models (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) present the results for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA respectively.  The P-vals for the 
Hansen J statistics of over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of K-P Wald F-statistics is 
a weak identification test. The robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is 
xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
Stock of migrants in individual host countries and population size are used as instrumental variables 
  
Table3.8 Panel data analysis of IV-first differenced for countries with D10: 1980-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Host countries Australia
a 
Canada
a 
France
a 
Germany
a 
UK
a 
USA
a 
5,log tH  
0.5300* 
(0.2710) 
0.6580** 
(0.3180) 
0.7210*** 
(0.1880) 
0.4460* 
(0.2540) 
0.5240* 
(0.2710) 
0.7850*** 
(0.1980) 
5log tp  
-0.0808** 
(0.0362) 
-0.0791** 
(0.0398) 
-0.0783** 
(0.0391) 
-0.0819** 
(0.0346) 
-0.0809** 
(0.0361) 
-0.0775* 
(0.0413) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0085** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0084** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0084** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0085** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0083** 
(0.0038) 
5log tDENS  
0.1910 
(0.1230) 
0.1360 
(0.1440) 
0.1090 
(0.0808) 
0.2270* 
(0.1190) 
0.1940 
(0.1230) 
0.0812 
(0.0890) 
5log tEDU  
0.0067*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0060** 
(0.0026) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0067*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0054** 
(0.0024) 
5log tREM  
0.0004 
(0.0017) 
0.0007 
(0.0017) 
0.0009 
(0.0018) 
0.00014 
(0.0017) 
0.0003 
(0.0017) 
0.0010 
(0.0019) 
Cons  0.0465 
(0.0296) 
0.0336 
(0.0338) 
0.0273 
(0.0208) 
0.0550* 
(0.0282) 
0.0472 
(0.0298) 
0.0208 
(0.0214) 
2R  0.66 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.65 
N 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Hansen J-Stat 0.33 0.16 0.32 0.08 0.29 0.17 
Endogeneity 0.85 0.57 0.81 0.19 0.84 0.36 
K-P Wald F-Stat 3.274 3.261 4.208 3.417 3.291 7.473 
Models (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) present the results for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA respectively.  The P-vals for the 
Hansen J statistics of over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are  reported. The F-test of K-P Wald F-statistics is 
a weak identification test. The robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is 
xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
a
Stock of migrants in individual host countries and population size are used as instrumental variables 
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In order to check whether the panel data analysis results would differ from cross-section 
analysis, we provide additional regressions of cross-section analysis for each time interval 
(i.e. 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000) both for country groups with 15D and 
10D and present them in Tables 3.10-3.25 in Appendix K.  One reason to this is that, up until 
the use of panel data on migration and human capital, for the analysis on human capital and 
migration, only cross-section analysis were available. (Beine et al., 2001:2003; 2007:2008, Di 
Maria and Lazarova, 2011). Thus, we would like to see whether the results would deviate 
much. Cross-section analyses are carried out as follows:  
For the 1980-1985 time interval, the dependent variable is the log change of the human capital 
as 
8085,log  H regressed on the log of ex-ante human capital - 80,log H and the other control 
variables are just as in equation (3.1). The dependent variable repeats for the 1985-1990, 
1990-1995 and 1995-2000 time intervals as
8590,log  H , 9095,log  H , 9500,log  H  
respectively. Intuitively, all dependent variables are regressed on the log of ex-ante human 
capital level
85,log H , 90,log H , 95,log H , and other corresponding control variables.   
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present the OLS results of the cross-section analyses for countries with 
15D  and countries with 10D thresholds. Tables 3.12,  3. 14, 3.16, 3.18, 3.20, 3.22, 3.24 
present the IV results for countries with 15D  thresholds where migration stock as the 
instrumental variable is taken as the stock of immigrants in OECD, Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, the UK and the US respectively. Finally, Tables 3.13,3. 15, 3. 17, 3. 19, 3. 21,3. 23 
and 3.25 present the IV results of countries with 10D  where migration stock as the 
instrumental variable is taken as the stock of immigrants in OECD, Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, the UK and the USA respectively. Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) of each table from 
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Table 3.10-3.25 present the results for the 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 
time intervals.  
To start with, since we are dealing with the cross-section of individual host countries per 5-
year time interval, the number of observations for each analysis is quite large, varying from 
40 to 50. However, as can be seen from Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the OLS results suggest that a 
negative and significant brain drain effect (the coefficient of
5log j ) for each time period: 
1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000, for countries with 15D and 10D
thresholds, respectively. The estimation carried out is based on all aggregated OECD 
countries. We observe convergence (i.e. negative coefficient for
5,log tH ) in native human 
capital in origin countries and for countries with 10D it is more significant. This finding is 
completely opposite of what we found in panel data analysis. The reason to this could be the 
very few observation in each cross-section analysis.  Table 3.10 and 3.11. Tables 3.12 and 
3.13 present the IV results for countries with 15D  and 10D  where population size and 
migration stocks in OECD are considered as an instrument. A negative brain drain effect 
(coefficient of 5log t ) still holds very significant both for countries with 15D  and 10D  , 
with the effect a little stronger in countries with 10D . This suggests that countries- whose 
GDP per capita is bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution of G7 countries- experience 
more negative brain drain effects. This may suggest that the poorer the country the more 
emigration of high skilled and the less incentive to go back to origin countries after 
emigrating better countries. Public expenditure on education found to affect changes in human 
capital levels positively and significantly. For Tables 3.14-3. 15, 3.16-3.17, 3.18-3.19, 3.20-
3.21, 3.22-3.23 and 3.24-3.25, in addition to population size, migration stock in Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the US is considered, respectively. The significance of 
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the negative brain drain effect holds across all specifications both for countries with 15D and
10D . For the cross section analysis for each individual host countries, not much evidence is 
found for the significance of human capital convergence in natives in origin countries. This 
could be due to the fact that the number of observations is limited (varying from 40 to 50), 
and also the instrumental variable for the stock of migration based on in individual countries 
may not be a strong instrument. The Hansen J-statistics reject the hypothesis that the 
endogenous variable - high skilled emigration - is over-identified, across all specifications.  
3.5. Conclusion  
We found a significant negative brain drain impact of high skilled emigration across 74 origin 
countries by applying panel data on international migration by Defoort (2008) from 1980 to 
2000 with a five-year frequency, where most data for migration stocks and their educational 
attainments are based on six major OECD countries as host countries: Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, the UK and the USA.  
Our IV-fixed effect and IV-first difference models showed a significant and negative brain 
drain effect of high skilled emigration across countries sampled. This suggests that origin 
countries in the sample lose their skilled population rather than gaining them ex-post 
emigration. Our findings for two sub-sample countries - D10 and D15- are not much different 
in terms of the signs of the coefficients, but the significance improves much more for 
countries with D10.  In general, we found a divergence in native human capital levels among 
the countries sampled.  A negative and significant result for the interaction variables of high 
skilled emigrants for countries with 15D  and 10D suggests a weak incentive effect in both 
sub-sampled countries; it is more deficient for countries with D10. As expected, remittance 
and public expenditure are found to be positively related with a change in human capital level. 
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Although the coefficient of public expenditure and remittance are small and mostly 
insignificant, they are all found to be positive.  It confirms our findings where the incentive 
effects do not operate, meaning that there is a brain drain rather than a brain gain effect of 
high skilled emigration for the countries sampled.  The coefficient of 5tREM  is found to be 
around 0.1%, which is quite low, may suggest that once high skilled people emigrate to 
developed/rich countries, they settle down quickly and hold their earnings for their high 
standard life. Population density is also found to be positive and significant, suggesting that 
the less the cost of acquiring education, the more the increase in human capital level. We 
found a negative effect for sub-Saharan origin countries, although insignificant, but a positive 
and significant affect for Latin American origin countries. We only see these results by OLS 
estimation, as they are dropped from the fixed effect and first differenced estimations due to 
collinearity. 
The selection of instrumental variables, just as used elsewhere (Beine et al., 2008, 2011; Di 
Maria and Emiliya, 2011), are shown to be valid and strong instruments, as confirmed by the 
Hansen J-statistics, endogeneity test and K-P Wald F statistics. The value for each statistic is 
above the critical value suggesting the exogeneity of the instrumented variable, not to mention 
being strong and over-identified.  
 The IV-fixed effect and IV-first differenced results for both country groups based on the 
instrument - migration stock in individual host countries - holds the significance of the 
negative brain drain effect. The instrument of migration stocks in individual host countries - 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK and the USA - may not be as strong instruments 
as migration stock in OECD. This can be seen by the fail of Hansen J-statistics of over-
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identification test. This could also be the result of the limited number of observations, varying 
from 40 to 50 for each cross-section analysis. 
In general, our panel data analysis delivers a negative brain drain effect across the countries 
sampled. This effect is much stronger in countries with D10 specification in comparison to 
countries with D15 specification, suggesting more detrimental brain drain for even poorer 
countries. This chapter contributes a more insightful panel data analysis of human capital and 
high skilled emigration. The results of the IV-fixed effect and IV-first difference are quite 
robust, and the number of tests for post-estimations assures that the possible reverse causality 
concern is addressed. In addition to Beine et al.’s (2011) procedure, we controlled remittance, 
as a soothing effect of liquidity constraint, public expenditure on education as an intensifier of 
the decision to gain higher education, and population density as a proxy for cost of acquiring 
education, and indeed found them to be significant factors in most cases. In general, in 
contrast to Beine et al. (2011), we found a significant and negative brain drain effect. This 
could be the fact that the origin countries sampled are different from ours as well as additional 
variables we used.  
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APPENDIX J 
 
Table3.9 List of Origin Countries in data sample 
Algeria 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
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APPENDIX K 
 
Table3.10 Cross-section analysis of OLS for countries with D15a : OECDb   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0017) 
-0.0011 
(0.0015) 
-0.0023 
(0.0016) 
-0.0009 
(0.0014) 
5log tp  
-0.0307* 
(0.0153) 
-0.0287* 
(0.0147) 
-0.0281** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0253** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0014 
(0.0030) 
-0.0035 
(0.0022) 
-0.0036 
(0.0024) 
-0.0038** 
(0.0017) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0031) 
-0.0028 
(0.0019) 
-0.0020 
(0.0022) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0016) 
5log tEDU  
0.0114* 
(0.0058) 
0.0101** 
(0.0045) 
0.0065 
(0.0051) 
0.0005 
(0.0021) 
5log tREM  
0.0010 
(0.0014) 
0.0011 
(0.0011) 
0.0016 
(0.0011) 
0.0011 
(0.0011) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0083) 
0.0056 
(0.0063) 
-0.0019 
(0.0065) 
-0.0116 
(0.0074) 
LATD  0.0080 
(0.0053) 
0.0095* 
(0.0056) 
0.0098** 
(0.0047) 
0.0078* 
(0.0045) 
Cons  0.0479*
 
(0.0240) 
0.0458** 
(0.0225) 
0.0511* 
(0.0299) 
0.0641*** 
(0.0171) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
     
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. Robust t-statistics  
are reported in parenthesis *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in OECD and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
 
Table3.11 Cross-section analysis of OLS for countries with D10 a : OECDb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 
5,log tH  
-0.0532*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.0476*** 
(0.0142) 
-0.0337*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0323*** 
(0.0107) 
5log tp  
-0.0069*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0041** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0014) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038* 
(0.0021) 
-0.0035 
(0.0021) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
0.0155** 
(0.0065) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0036 
(0.0059) 
0.0024 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0155** 
(0.0065) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0036 
(0.0059) 
0.0024 
(0.0015) 
5log tREM  
0.0005 
(0.00114) 
0.0001 
(0.0012) 
0.0004 
(0.0010) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
SSAD  -0.0073 
(0.0104) 
0.0031 
(0.0076) 
-0.0041 
(0.0076) 
-0.0031 
(0.0093) 
LATD  0.0084 
(0.0068) 
0.0101 
(0.0061) 
0.0027 
(0.0064) 
0.0077* 
(0.0045) 
Cons  0.0436* 
(0.0226) 
0.0441* 
(0.0257) 
0.0545* 
(0.0283) 
0.0533*** 
(0.0171) 
2R  0.34 0.47 0.32 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. Robust t-statistics  
are reported in parenthesis *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.  
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b 
Stock of migrants in OECD and population size are used as instrumental variables.  
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Table3.12 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D15 a : OECDb   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0015) 
-0.0010 
(0.0013) 
-0.0023 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
5log tp  
-0.0306** 
(0.0137) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0281*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0253*** 
(0.0088) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0014) 
5log tEDU  
0.0114** 
(0.0052) 
0.0101** 
(0.0041) 
0.0065 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.0010 
(0.0012) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
0.0016* 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0075) 
0.0055 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0080*
 
(0.0048) 
0.0095* 
(0.0050) 
0.0098** 
(0.0042) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0475**
 
(0.0214) 
0.0455** 
(0.0202) 
0.0511* 
(0.0271) 
0.0643*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51  53 
Hansen J-Stat 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.41 
Endogeneity 0.74 0.53 0.93 0.79 
K-P Wald F-Stat 779.952 1227.069 708.806 946.731 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for   
Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P Wald 
 F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first  
difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in OECD and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
Table3.13 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D10 a  : OECDb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0020) 
-0.0019 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0021* 
(0.0012) 
5log tp  
-0.0527*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0354*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0049) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.00141) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
0.00170* 
(0.0010) 
0.0005 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0052 
(0.0108) 
0.0056 
(0.0077) 
-0.0027 
(0.0069) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0104 
(0.0073) 
0.0124** 
(0.0062) 
0.0055 
(0.0053) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0491** 
(0.0210) 
0.0489* 
(0.0251) 
0.0691** 
(0.0282) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0152) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.91 0.44 0.46 0.90 
Endogeneity 0.35 0.93 0.68 0.39 
K-P Wald F-Stat 803.843 580.489 691.542 1240.333 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  Hansen J statistics 
of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak 
identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** 
and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in OECD and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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Table3.14 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D15 a : Australiab 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0018 
(0.0016) 
-0.0011 
(0.0013) 
-0.0023 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
5log tp  
-0.0308** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0281*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0254*** 
(0.0088) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0114** 
(0.0052) 
0.0101** 
(0.0041) 
0.0065 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.0010 
(0.0012) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
0.0016* 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0076) 
0.0055 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0080* 
(0.0048) 
0.0095* 
(0.0050) 
0.0098** 
(0.0042) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0481** 
(0.0215) 
0.0457** 
(0.0202) 
0.0511* 
(0.0271) 
0.0644*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
Hansen J-Stat 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 
Endogeneity 0.71 0.73 0.95 0.75 
K-P Wald F-Stat 1021.297 1397.544 787.979 1115.850 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  Hansen J statistics 
of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak 
identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** 
and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in Australia and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
 
Table3.15 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D10 a: Australiab  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0019 
(0.0020) 
-0.0021 
(0.0025) 
-0.0028* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0024* 
(0.0012) 
5log tp  
-0.0526*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0468*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0354*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0010 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0049) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.0014) 
0.0011 
(0.0011) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.00056 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0050 
(0.0108) 
0.0058 
(0.0077) 
-0.0027 
(0.0069) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0105 
(0.0073) 
0.0127** 
(0.0062) 
0.0055 
(0.0053) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0497** 
(0.0211) 
0.0494** 
(0.0251) 
0.0692** 
(0.0282) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0152) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.15 
Endogeneity 0.87 0.35 0.73 0.49 
K-P Wald F-Stat 1007.500 686.070 797.186 1127.540 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  Hansen J statistics 
of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak 
identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** 
and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in Australia and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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Table3.16 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D15 a: Canada b 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0016 
(0.0016) 
-0.0011 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
5log tp  
-0.0305** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0280*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0088) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0014) 
5log tEDU  
0.0115** 
(0.0052) 
0.0101** 
(0.0041) 
0.0066 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.0010 
(0.0012) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
0.0016 
(0.0011) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0075) 
0.0054 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0080* 
(0.0048) 
0.0094* 
(0.0050) 
0.0097** 
(0.0042) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0471** 
(0.0215) 
0.0453** 
(0.0202) 
0.0505* 
(0.0271) 
0.0644*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.30 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
Hansen J-Stat 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03 
Endogeneity 0.56 0.45 0.36 0.93 
K-P Wald F-Stat 719.896 1240.188 815.529 958.589 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  Hansen J statistics 
of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak 
identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** 
and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirdsof the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in Canada and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
 
Table3 .17 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D10 a  : Canadab 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0020) 
-0.0019 
(0.0025) 
-0.0027* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0012) 
5log tp  
-0.0526*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0354*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0050) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.0014) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
0.0017* 
(0.0011) 
0.0005 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0051 
(0.0108) 
0.0055 
(0.0076) 
-0.0028 
(0.0069) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0104 
(0.0073) 
0.0124** 
(0.0062) 
0.0054 
(0.0053) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0492** 
(0.0210) 
0.0488* 
(0.0251) 
0.0687** 
(0.0282) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0152) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Endogeneity 0.61 0.92 0.24 0.13 
K-P Wald F-Stat 788.712 609.579 805.087 1143.481 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for   
Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P Wald 
 F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect and first  
difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in Canada and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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Table3.18 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D15 a : Franceb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0016 
(0.0016) 
-0.0010 
(0.0013) 
-0.0024 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
5log tp  
-0.0306** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0281*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0088) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0014) 
5log tEDU  
0.0114** 
(0.0052) 
0.0101** 
(0.0041) 
0.0065 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.0010 
(0.0013) 
0.0010 
(0.0011) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0076) 
0.0055 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0080* 
(0.0048) 
0.0095* 
(0.0050) 
0.0098** 
(0.0043) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0473** 
(0.0215) 
0.0455** 
(0.0202) 
0.0514* 
(0.0272) 
0.0645*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
Hansen J-Stat 0.71 0.42 0.14 0.77 
Endogeneity 0.61 0.51 0.97 0.68 
K-P Wald F-Stat 921.598 1346.506 1095.559 1179.773 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals 
 for  Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test 
 of  K-P Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for  
IV – fixed effect and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
a Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b Stock of migrants in France  and population size are used as instrumental variables.     
 
Table3.19 Cross-section analysis of  IV for countries with D10 a  :Franceb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0020) 
-0.0019 
(0.0025) 
-0.0028* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0012) 
5log tp  
-0.0527*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0355*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0323*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0038** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0049) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.0014) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0006 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0052 
(0.0108) 
0.0056 
(0.0076) 
-0.0027 
(0.0069) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0103 
(0.0073) 
0.0125** 
(0.0062) 
0.0055 
(0.0053) 
0.0077* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0491** 
(0.0210) 
0.0490* 
(0.0251) 
0.0695** 
(0.0283) 
0.0533*** 
(0.0153) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.50 0.91 0.15 0.31 
Endogeneity 0.43 0.90 0.79 0.48 
K-P Wald F-Stat 1024.172 832.633 1127.586 1407.195 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  
 Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P  
Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect 
 and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in France and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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Table3.20 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D15 a: Germanyb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.00160 
(0.00155) 
-0.000992 
(0.00127) 
-0.00230 
(0.00149) 
-0.000903 
(0.00125) 
5log tp  
-0.0016 
(0.00155) 
-0.0010 
(0.00127) 
-0.0023 
(0.00149) 
-0.0009 
(0.00125) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.00186) 
-0.0035* 
(0.00191) 
-0.0032** 
(0.00132) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.00107) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.00280) 
-0.0028 
(0.00175) 
-0.0020 
(0.00202) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.00145) 
5log tEDU  
0.0114** 
(0.0052) 
0.0101** 
(0.0041) 
0.0065 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.0010 
(0.00125) 
0.00103 
(0.000960) 
0.00161* 
(0.000956) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0075) 
0.0055 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0080* 
(0.0048) 
0.0094* 
(0.0050) 
0.0098** 
(0.0042) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0472** 
(0.0214) 
0.0454** 
(0.0202) 
0.0509* 
(0.0272) 
0.0644*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
Hansen J-Stat 0.83 0.88 0.74 0.81 
Endogeneity 0.59 0.55 0.85 0.72 
K-P Wald F-Stat 704.871 1211.072 1196.491 1396.524 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  
 Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P 
 Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect 
 and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in Germany and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
 
Table3.21 Cross-section analysis of  IV for countries with D10 a :Germanyb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0020) 
-0.0019 
(0.0025) 
-0.0027* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0018* 
(0.00125) 
5log tp  
-0.0527*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0354*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0013) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0028 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0050) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.0014) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0006 
(0.0011) 
SSAD  -0.0052 
(0.0108) 
0.0056 
(0.0076) 
-0.0027 
(0.0069) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0103 
(0.0073) 
0.0125** 
(0.0062) 
0.0055 
(0.0053) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0491** 
(0.0210) 
0.0489* 
(0.0251) 
0.0690** 
(0.0283) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0152) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.36 0.33 0.90 0.67 
Endogeneity 0.40 0.90 0.59 0.40 
K-P Wald F-Stat 746.254 587.051 1142.368 1462.187 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  
 Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P 
 Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect  
and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in Germany  and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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Table3.22 Cross-section analysis of IV for countries with D15 a: UKb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0015 
(0.0016) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
-0.0022 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
5log tp  
-0.0305** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0280*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0254*** 
(0.0088) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0115** 
(0.0052) 
0.0101** 
(0.0041) 
0.0066 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.0009 
(0.0012) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
0.0016 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0075) 
0.0054 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0116* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0081* 
(0.0048) 
0.0093* 
(0.0050) 
0.0097** 
(0.0042) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0467** 
(0.0216) 
0.0450** 
(0.0203) 
0.0503* 
(0.0272) 
0.0642*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
Hansen J-Stat 0.32 0.16 0.05 0.02 
Endogeneity 0.39 0.20 0.35 0.79 
K-P Wald F-Stat 873.501 1454.507 919.764 1078.235 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for 
  Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P  
Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect  
and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
Stock of migrants in the UK and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
 
Table3.23 Cross-section analysis of  IV for countries with D10 a  :UKb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0020) 
-0.0018 
(0.0025) 
-0.0026* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0012) 
5log tp  
-0.0527*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0353*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0029 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0025 
(0.0050) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.0014) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
0.0017* 
(0.0010) 
0.0005 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0052 
(0.0109) 
0.0054 
(0.0076) 
-0.0028 
(0.0069) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0103 
(0.0073) 
0.0123** 
(0.0062) 
0.0053 
(0.0053) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0490** 
(0.0210) 
0.0485* 
(0.0252) 
0.0685** 
(0.0283) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0152) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.72 0.18 0.12 0.01 
Endogeneity 0.37 0.31 0.20 0.21 
K-P Wald F-Stat 830.343 841.212 928.513 1293.225 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for  
 Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P  
Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect 
 and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in the UK and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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Table3.24 Cross-section analysis of  IV for countries with D15 
a
 :USA
b 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0016 
(0.0016) 
-0.0010 
(0.0013) 
-0.0023 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0013) 
5log tp  
-0.0306** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0287** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0281*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0088) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0035* 
(0.0019) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
-0.0028 
(0.0018) 
-0.0020 
(0.0020) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0014) 
5log tEDU  
0.0114** 
(0.00524) 
0.0101** 
(0.00406) 
0.0065 
(0.0046) 
0.0005 
(0.0019) 
5log tREM  
0.00010 
(0.0012) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
0.00160* 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0036 
(0.0075) 
0.0054 
(0.0057) 
-0.0019 
(0.0059) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0067) 
LATD  0.0080* 
(0.0048) 
0.0094* 
(0.0050) 
0.0098** 
(0.0042) 
0.0078* 
(0.0041) 
Cons  0.0472** 
(0.0215) 
0.0452** 
(0.0203) 
0.0508* 
(0.0272) 
0.0645*** 
(0.0156) 
2R  0.21 0.34 0.31 0.38 
N 50 49 51 53 
Hansen J-Stat     
Endogeneity     
K-P Wald F-Stat     
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for   
Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P  
Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect  
and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom two-thirds of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in the USA and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
Table3.25 Cross-section analysis of  IV for countries with D10 a  :USAb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time intervals 1980-1985
 
1985-1990
 
1990-1995
 
1995-2000
 
5,log tH  
-0.0017 
(0.0020) 
-0.0019 
(0.0026) 
-0.0027* 
(0.0015) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0012) 
5log tp  
-0.0527*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0469*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0354*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0097) 
DGDPpcp tt   55 loglog  
-0.0066*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
5log tDENS  
-0.0011 
(0.0026) 
-0.0029 
(0.0024) 
-0.0039* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0015) 
5log tEDU  
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0050) 
0.0023* 
(0.0013) 
5log tREM  
0.0007 
(0.0014) 
0.0009 
(0.0012) 
0.0017* 
(0.0011) 
0.0005 
(0.0010) 
SSAD  -0.0052 
(0.0108) 
0.0055 
(0.0077) 
-0.0027 
(0.0068) 
-0.0031 
(0.0084) 
LATD  0.0103 
(0.0073) 
0.0124** 
(0.0062) 
0.0054 
(0.0053) 
0.0076* 
(0.0042) 
Cons  0.0491** 
(0.0210) 
0.0487* 
(0.0252) 
0.0690** 
(0.0283) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0153) 
2R  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.45 
N 44 40 47 46 
Hansen J-Stat 0.48 0.23 0.88 0.92 
Endogeneity 0.29 0.84 0.53 0.38 
K-P Wald F-Stat 736.011 605.643 958.951 1323.661 
Models (1), (2), (3) and (4) present the results for 1980-1985: 1985-1990; 1990-1995; and 1995-2000 time intervals. The P-vals for 
  Hansen J statistics of  over-identification and endogeneity and the test for the endogenous regressor are reported. The F-test of  K-P  
Wald F-statistics is a weak identification test. Robust t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  The stata command for IV – fixed effect  
and first difference results is xtivreg2. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.   
a
 Countries in the bottom half of the GDP per capita distribution 
b
 Stock of migrants in the USA and population size are used as instrumental variables. 
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